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summary 
For the first time in modern history Asian states are spending more on defence than their 
European counterparts. The sea power ambitions of leading land powers such as China, 
Russia and India stand as a challenge to US naval supremacy in the region. The old 
Euro pean great powers are becoming marginalised in an increasingly Asia-centred world. 
The edited volume The Rise of Naval Powers in Asia and Europe’s Decline examines this 
new geopolitical landscape of the 21st century, emphasising the role of the great powers 
and the importance of sea power in shaping international politics.
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Preface
The working papers presented here were initially read at the second Norwegian Seapow-
er Symposium. It was held at the Royal Norwegian Naval Academy in Bergen in August 
2011, and chaired by Rear Admiral Bernt Grimstvedt, Chief of the Royal Norwegian 
Navy. The aim of the Seapower Symposia is to engage with naval issues and devel-
opments of importance, while identifying and analysing their potential implications for 
small modern navies in general and the Norwegian Navy in particular. The first sym-
posium, which took place in 2009, focused on maritime and naval challenges and op-
portunities in the High North. This second symposium examined naval developments in 
Asia, the major players being China, India, Japan and the US, and what the implications 
of changes might be for small modern navies. Both symposia were in two parts. After 
focusing on naval thinking, maritime strategy, doctrines and general trends in an inter-
national perspective, discussions followed on the Norwegian perspectives at strategic, 
operational and tactical levels. Those participating at the symposia are serving naval of-
ficers in the fleet and Coast Guard, headquarters, personnel at naval schools and training 
centres, academics attached to the Norwegian Armed Forces and from various defence 
institutes in Norway and abroad, retired flag officers and others.
 The academic and military expertise of distinguished speakers from India, Japan, 
United Kingdom, the United States and Norway ensured rigorous analyses and con-
structive discussions. The main conclusions of the symposium are that a war between 
major powers seems unlikely for the time being, and that navies will continue to empha-
sise military operations other than war. Nonetheless, it was acknowledged that rivalry 
and tensions among major sea powers in Asia will likely contribute to a resurgence of 
great power politics in international affairs. 
As organisers of the symposia, we hope the various discussions and papers will en-
able information sharing, foster understanding and build confidence among allies and 
partners. 
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Introduction
Karl Rommetveit and Bjørn Terjesen
The world has been undergoing a fundamental transformation for some time, as eco-
nomic power shifts with seemingly unstoppable momentum from west to east. Gov-
ernments of East and South East Asia are in consequence revisiting and revising their 
defence and security policies, not least in the field of naval defence as Asian waters 
increasingly play host to the world’s maritime and naval activity. Asian governments are 
spending more on defence than their European counterparts. Washington is realign-
ing policy to safeguard its economic and security interests in the Asia-Pacific and East 
Asia, while de-emphasising its presence in Europe (U.S. Department of Defense 2012; 
Clinton 2011). The papers collected in this volume explore these geopolitical changes 
from different perspectives, analysing the growing maritime and naval importance of 
Asia. Two of the most important questions the authors seek to answer are how Western 
navies will respond and adapt to an Asia-centred world and can we say something about 
the potential for conflict, on the one hand, and, on the other, for mutually rewarding col-
laboration among the great Asian powers. 
Three land powers, China, India and Russia, are expanding and modernising their 
naval capacities. The three papers focusing on China’s, India’s and Russia’s naval ex-
pansion discuss some of the challenges confronting land powers when they decide to 
become sea powers. Is it the case that maritime security concerns take precedence over 
these countries’ historical dependence on continental power? The papers addressing the 
US, Japanese and British perspectives tackle the response of the traditional maritime 
powers to this ongoing transformation of old land powers as they go to sea. 
Historically, when land powers have sought sea power, conflict has often erupted. 
We need to know how to achieve stability but also what factors are likely to lead to a 
naval arms race and potential conflict? While Germany and ‘Checkpoint Charlie’ may 
have constituted the military front line of the Cold War, the South China Sea, East China 
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Sea and Indian Ocean may constitute the military front line in the decades ahead, but the 
‘stopping power of water’ may do more to mitigate the effect in the Asia-Pacific Region 
than confrontation on land did in Europe during the Cold War. For example, it will be 
much more difficult for China to challenge US naval supremacy at sea, than it was for the 
Soviet Union to challenge Western Europe on land.
While there are many uncertainties regarding future developments in Asia, navies 
will be of critical importance in the twenty first century. Sea lanes are essential for power 
projection and vital to economic growth and prosperity. Navies will continue to protect 
maritime interests and resources at sea. The global commons and maritime domain will 
probably be even more important commercially in a globalised and interdependent world. 
As the authors show, this is one of the main driving forces propelling the naval build-up 
in the Asia-Pacific Region. 
At the same time, naval planners have the daunting task of developing navies that 
are able to tackle broader ‘security’ issues, ranging from constabulary duties, Humani-
tarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) operations, support of national diplomacy, 
safeguarding national sovereignty rights to the ability to neutralise and fight other naval 
forces. The uncertain threat environment has brought forth a mix of naval capabilities. 
However, the acquisition of platforms by some of the leading powers in Asia suggests 
that navies in the Asian-Pacific region are predominantly being developed with opera-
tions against peer competitors in mind. Advanced, expensive naval ships are frequently 
conducting missions for which they were not necessarily acquired, such as constabulary 
duties, i.e. counter-piracy operations. This collection of papers examines how navies 
in the Asia-Pacific Region intend to manage the balance between traditional and non-
traditional security tasks and compares naval priorities in Asia and Europe. 
Fundamental questions for coastal states are why they need a navy and to what 
purpose. A tentative answer, generically speaking, might be that navies essentially exist 
to provide support to armies and to weaken the enemy’s economic-military potential at 
sea while ensuring the uninterrupted flow of friendly maritime commerce in peace, crisis 
and war. Ken Booth proposes a tripartite division of navies’ functions or roles: a military; 
a diplomatic; and a policing role. The military role forms the base of the trinity, because 
of a navy’s capacity to threaten and use force (Booth 1979, 16). Today, and in the im-
mediate future, however, naval forces will probably be employed in diplomatic tasks and 
many and varied policing tasks – what Geoffrey Till, in his paper, calls maintaining good 
order at sea. This does not indicate that major conflict between nation-states can be 
excluded altogether, even if it seems unlikely today. Indeed, one of the principal findings 
of these papers is that the naval build-up in the Asia-Pacific is significantly focused on 
war fighting capabilities and that Asian navies are better funded and provided with extra 
resources to perform non-traditional security tasks. 
A navy, no matter how strong, cannot do everything alone, it has to work with other 
elements of naval power, such as a coast guard, and of the country’s maritime power, 
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such as the merchant marine, shipbuilding industries, ocean and offshore technology 
enterprises and other parts of the maritime cluster. Navies need to work closely with the 
army, air force and many civilian government agencies. Navies and coast guards must 
work with many Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and private volunteer organi-
sations ashore. In other words, in addition to being a warrior and military leader, a naval 
officer must be a diplomat and manager.
In extension, the nation-state is still the basic entity of the international system. 
Navies are primarily instruments in defending national rather than transnational interests 
and values against direct and indirect threats. On the other hand, again according to 
Till, the global maritime system is under increasing pressure from piracy, transnational 
terrorism, illegal immigration and certain coastal states’ actions to restrict freedom of 
navigation. While mostly concerned with Asia, Till nevertheless provides a tour d’horizon 
of global naval trends, emphasising uncertainty, a balanced navy, technology, maritime 
law, strategic identity, economics of sea power and a decline of naval independence. 
He compares the significant naval rearmament of the Asian region with declining naval 
funding in Europe, and, partly, in the United States. 
Till points to implications for Europe of what transpires in the Asian-Pacific region 
and uses the Royal Navy as an illustration to draw out some consequences. He reminds 
us of the importance of a balanced or general purpose fleet, one that can be adapted to 
respond to the unexpected in an unknown future. Navies should be able to balance the 
whole spectrum of tasks from high intensity war fighting and naval diplomacy to polic-
ing/constabulary duties. Since the global system is based on sea-borne trade, the role of 
the navies is to keep the oceans open. This implies the ability to maintain good order at 
sea and probably conduct expeditionary operations in a multinational framework.
In chapter 3, Bernard D. Cole assesses the recent naval developments in China 
which has been impressive and, for some actors, alarming. Cole first discusses the ‘hard-
ware’ and ‘software’ aspects of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN); too many 
studies overlook the people who maintain and operate the hardware, he emphasises. The 
human dimension is the key factor in naval effectiveness and fighting power. Cole exam-
ines the capabilities, missions, challenges and weaknesses of the PLAN. Pointing to the 
lack of replenishment-at-sea ships in the PLAN’s inventory, Cole argues that the logistic 
focus of maritime thought in Beijing remains on Taiwan and other regional situations. In 
short, the ‘[r]ealisation of any talk of a Chinese “blue water navy” awaits construction of a 
capable logistic force able to sustain long-term operations at sea’ China’s naval moderni-
sation will continue, Cole concludes, driven largely by great power status; its ambition for 
regional dominance; its military-industrial complex; and finally domestic politics. How 
China defines its national security interests in the decades to come will determine the 
type of navy it will deploy.
Robert S. Ross analyses the implications of China’s military modernisation for US 
security and the East Asian security order. Since the end of the Second World War, the 
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United States has been almost unchallenged at sea in the Western Pacific. But China’s 
expanding capabilities will disturb the present maritime strategic order, suggesting that 
the era of unqualified US naval security is over. Ross addresses the challenge posed by 
PLAN’s sub-surface vessels, its surface vessels, and its increasingly important land-
based capabilities. Despite improvements in China’s subsurface and surface force, Ross 
does not see the former fundamentally challenging US maritime supremacy, and the 
latter has only played a marginal role in constraining US naval operations in the Western 
Pacific. China’s improving land-based capabilities, however, could challenge US mari-
time supremacy in East Asia. 
Ross discusses the United States’ response to China’s growing military capabili-
ties, emphasising the development of smaller, faster, stealthier and less expensive naval 
ships and the transition to less vulnerable maritime platforms, such as nuclear-powered 
cruise missile submarines and unmanned aerial vehicles. In this regard, Ross points out, 
the US is confronted with a major challenge: how to reconcile the development of less 
visible, but more lethal smaller naval platforms and more distant basing arrangements 
without seemingly ceding the region to Chinese power. And how can US avoid degrad-
ing the credibility of its commitment to defend the maritime states in East Asia, thereby 
undermining its regional alliance system?
Japan, like the United States, is increasingly concerned about the expansion and 
modernisation of China’s naval forces. Japan works extensively alongside the US and was 
a vital ally in deterring and neutralising the Soviet Union’s naval ambitions in the Pacific 
during the Cold War. Yoji Koda provides a historical survey of the formation of the Japa-
nese Maritime Self-Defence Force (JMSDF), which came into being after the dissolution 
of the erstwhile Imperial Japanese Navy. In light of Japan’s past as an imperial power in 
the region, clear limitations were laid down in its constitution: Japan could have a self-
defence force for defensive purposes, a protective ‘shield’. In mission sharing operations, 
Koda writes, the United States concentrates on offensive operations, on being the ‘spear’ 
in what is called a ‘spear and shield’ relationship. Japan, a nation of densely populated 
islands but limited natural resources, depends on being able to import and export goods 
by sea. As a Japanese scholar, Koda understands the country’s need to protect its com-
mercial sea lines. Japan’s defence strategy during the Cold War was directed at warding 
off threats posed by Soviet submarines, and therefore concentrated on anti-submarine 
warfare (ASW) within a balanced force structure. Interestingly though, this capability 
could also be employed against the emerging Chinese submarine force. After 9/11, a 
new initiative was launched to actively participate in international security and counter-
piracy missions and humanitarian operations.
Vijay Sakhuja examines contemporary naval developments in India and the possi-
bilities for multinational cooperation. The land wars that India fought with China (1962) 
and Pakistan (1949, 1965 and 1971) shaped a continental mindset and led to neglect 
of the navy. However, historical experience of colonisation and foreign naval activities 
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close to Indian territorial waters in the Indo-Pakistani wars of 1965 and 1971, dem-
onstrated India’s need to build an autonomous naval capability to deter aggression from 
the sea. India’s fast growing economy is increasing the country’s dependence on the 
sea lines of communications. According to Sakhuja, over 97 per cent of India’s trade by 
volume and 75 per cent by value is sea borne. Two-thirds of its energy needs must be 
imported, of which the volatile Persian Gulf region provides 67 per cent. India’s strategic 
geography and its vast Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) also testify to the importance of 
its maritime domain. 
The primary maritime areas of interest to India are the following choke points: Strait 
of Bab-el-Mamdeb; Strait of Hormuz; Straits of Malacca; and Cape of Good Hope. Other 
areas of interest and operations are the Red Sea, South China Sea, Southern Indian 
Ocean and East Pacific region. These are vast ocean expanses, and patrolling them re-
quires a very large navy indeed. India buys hard and software from many countries, in-
cluding Russia, UK, Germany, France and the US, giving the Indian Navy ‘multinational 
interoperability’, but in accordance with India’s policy of non-alignment.
Mikhail Tsypkin discusses the challenge of understanding the Russian Navy. His-
torically, the Eurasian power of Russia has been (and still is) a great land power. Although 
Russian leaders have dreamt from time to time of turning Russia into a great naval power, 
their visions of a blue water navy have often foundered on the rocks of reality. An im-
portant exception was the naval build-up in the years between the 1962 Cuban missile 
crisis and late 1980s.
According to Tsypkin, the Russian Navy’s most important missions are a mixture of 
strategic deterrence and power projection to defend Russian interests in adjacent waters, 
but the Navy also takes part in selected international operations such as counter-piracy 
and anti-smuggling. Interestingly, meeting the need for aircraft carriers is not one of the 
main priorities, despite its being a frequently occurring item on the Russian authorities’ 
agenda since 2005. The Russian economy, including the naval budget, is heavily de-
pendent on the rise and fall of energy prices. Furthermore, the war between Russia and 
Georgia in 2008 showed that the Russian armed forces had some serious deficiencies. 
This spurred the Russian navy to purchase four French Mistral class amphibious assault 
ships, giving Russia new power projection and ‘show of force’ capabilities for use in dif-
ferent scenarios in Russia’s areas of interest. Increasingly, this also means the Far East. 
Global warming has boosted the relative importance of geography in the northern 
areas, creating challenges along with opportunities. If the Northern Sea Route, as the 
Russians call it, is opened, it will improve Russia’s geostrategic position by allowing it to 
transfer naval assets more rapidly from European Russia to the Far East. Climate change 
will also strengthen Russia’s position as a link nation between Asia, Europe and North 
America. The Far East is of huge economic importance to Russia because of its rich fish-
ing grounds, oil and gas reserves and transportation links to Asian markets. However, the 
unresolved dispute between Russia and Japan over the four southernmost Kurile Islands, 
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continues to sour relations. Finally, in a bid to bolster their ‘bargaining’ position relative 
to the other Arctic nations, i.e. the US, Canada, Denmark and Norway, the Russians are 
strengthening their military presence in the Arctic. 
Like Till, Øystein Tunsjø starts with an overview of geopolitical shifts and the re-
emergence of great powers in Asia. Tunsjø examines implications for Europe, transatlan-
tic relations and NATO. The shift towards an Asia-centred world along with e xpansionary 
maritime policies in the region have geopolitical, commercial, strategic, military and legal 
ramifications even for a geographically remote country like Norway. An Asia-centred 
world, he continues, accentuates the need for a new division of labour in transatlantic 
relations where the EU and NATO take more responsibility for defence and security in 
Europe and its neighbourhood. It would redress Washington’s diminishing interest in 
European affairs and growing preoccupation with the rise of China and the Asia Pacific 
region. Finally, Tunsjø discusses the direct and indirect effect of maritime developments 
in Asia on Norway’s maritime interests.
As the papers and issues discussed in this collection show, problems of a particular 
nature will require the attention of politicians and policy makers in Norway, a small naval 
power but a major coastal state, with maritime interests all over the world, and an open 
economy. A conflict between local and global presence can easily erupt, even more so 
when we realise that most western navies are declining in size and capacities, while 
many Asian states are growing their naval budgets. For Norway, with its large maritime 
domain in the High North and limited naval resources, it is natural and necessary to 
prioritise its obligations and address possible challenges so as to protect its maritime 
interests, prevent crises and maintain a credible resource management in northern wa-
ters. It will become even more important if the Arctic ice continues to recede, opening 
new areas for energy exploitation and transportation, but also increasing the likelihood 
of undesired incidents.
Consequently, the area of operations and spectrum of tasks of the Norwegian Navy 
(of which the Coast Guard is a branch), will grow significantly. It is crucial for a coastal 
state like Norway to maintain sovereignty, naval presence and situational awareness 
around the clock. Coast Guard and Navy vessels, aircrafts, border guards and other sen-
sors are always operational (Bruun-Hanssen 2012, 26). Inasmuch as Norway’s allies 
are downscaling their navies and, in consequence, capabilities, their presence in the 
High North will gradually decline, too. The relative importance of the Norwegian Navy 
will therefore increase. As the presence of Asian commercial and naval vessels in Arctic 
waters will probably become more common, new players will doubtless seek to challenge 
Norwegian interests in the area. 
One way of prevent or mitigating tension would be to take measures to strengthen 
multilateral and bilateral confidence on maritime issues. Examples are the operations in 
the Gulf of Aden and the Pomor exercises with the Russian Navy, including the exchange 
of officers, common exercise procedures, port visits and dialogue to facilitate greater 
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mutual understanding and cultural awareness. Having said all that, the Norwegian mer-
chant marine, other maritime industries and the international community expect wealthy 
Norwegians to do their bit in peacemaking, peacekeeping and stabilisation operations 
directed by the UN or NATO. By modernising the Norwegian Navy and Coast Guard, 
exemplified by the new Nansen class frigates, the country is better able to take part in 
international operations. How the Norwegian authorities balance between ‘home’ and 
‘abroad’ will continue to be a significant challenge. In any event, international policing 
operations are likely to become more frequent. 

A global survey of naval trends: 
the British approach
Geoffrey Till 
Naval planners always have a difficult time, but things are now particularly difficult as the 
problems they face seem so much more complex than they were. Although the mix of 
problems and the particular effects they have vary from country to country, these prob-
lems are near universal in their application and their consequence. Seven basic issues 
and problems, which are much inter-connected, seem to afflict them, and this paper will 
go through each in turn. 
Problems 
1. An unknowable future seen ‘through a glass darkly’
The editor of one review of the possible ‘futures of war’ recently quoted J.B. Haldane: 
‘This is my prediction for the future – whatever hasn’t happened will happen and no-one 
will be safe from it.’ He went on to conclude that ‘in the dynamic security environment, 
an assessment of the future is truly only as valuable as its facility for being up-graded’ 
(Tangredi 2008, 145, 59). It is always difficult to sketch out the future that defence 
planners need to prepare for but never more so than now, since in addition to the usual 
sets of challenges to do with the rise and fall of nations and the deadly quarrels so of-
ten associated with this (which may well be hugely exacerbated by the perfect storm of 
shortages in energy, food and water foreseen by some by the 2030s), we also have to 
grapple with a range of asymmetrical threats from a variety of non-state actors including 
terrorists and pirates. And then there are the faceless threats and challenges brought 
about by climate change – such as the increased propensity for catastrophic weather 
events or the rising importance of the increasingly ice-free waters of the High North both 
of which could have both a direct and an indirect impact on Alliance security. The cur-
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rent growth of European interest in the strategic and resources potential of the Arctic, 
indeed, is becoming a matter of concern and likely rivalry (Depledge and Dodds 2011). 
To paraphrase Lord Salisbury, if you believe defence analysts, nothing is safe. Because 
that does seem to be the way it is, planners have instinctively to assume that as complete 
a range of military capabilities as possible is necessary, so it is extremely hard to identify 
capabilities that can be safely cut. 
Within this situation, though, defence planners have continually to adapt to new 
circumstances. As Secretary Clinton recently said ‘You don’t win by fighting the last 
war. And NATO cannot continue to succeed by looking in the rear-view mirror’ (Clinton 
2010). The general tendency, then, is to guard against the difficulty of prediction by 
building general purpose fleet capabilities that can be adapted to respond to unexpected 
events and trends. Planners will try to do so, at least to the extent that available resources 
make possible.
2. Deciding the balance between traditional and non-traditional tasks
Navies around the world have been hugely affected by the impact and the consequences 
of globalisation. Globalisation, for all its faults, is generally accepted as the basis for the 
world’s peace and prosperity. It is a global system based on sea-borne trade that links all 
parts of the world together, such that troubles in one part of the system inevitably impact 
on all the rest. It is a system that has failed before and it faces a variety of serious threats 
today. In many ways the world’s navies are assuming non-traditional tasks that are in-
tended to defend the system against what threatens it. These tasks include the mainte-
nance of the kind of non-dominating Sea Control that ensures that the ocean remains 
freely available to all forms of legitimate use. This implies the maintenance of good order 
at sea, and very possibly the conduct of expeditionary operations in situations which 
threaten the system’s stability and the conditions for trade. The successful performance 
of these tasks requires collaborative action between navies and often a specific mix of 
capabilities, normally aimed at the conduct of operations at lower levels of intensity than 
would commonly occur in advanced inter-state war.
The problem is that alongside this, there is still a perceived need to deter standard 
inter-state conflict, and so many, if not most, navies also feel they have to invest in 
higher-intensity capabilities of the sort needed to deter, or worst case to conduct, inter-
state conflicts of the traditional sort. In the doctrinal statements of most countries, this 
possibility is listed as one that is unlikely, but, at the same time, one that cannot safely 
be ruled out. 
The navies of the Asia-Pacific Region (APR) face a particularly acute dilemma in 
this regard, because, alongside many common interests which draw them together in 
collaborative action against, for example, piracy and other forms of maritime crime, they 
operate in an area riven by serious maritime disputes (such as are to be found in the 
South and East China Seas) and long-held historic antipathies and mutual suspicions. 
19OslO Files on defenCe and seCurIty 6/2012 The rise of naval powers in Asia
The sinking of the ROKS Cheonan by the North Koreans and the ferocious response of 
the Chinese to the American response to this (which initially took the form of what the 
Chinese regarded as a planned ‘intrusion’ into the Yellow Sea by a US carrier battle group 
led by the USS George Washington in the spring of 2011) exemplifies the point.
As a result, the naval planners for the region have a particularly difficult issue in 
deciding where to strike the balance between these alternative sets of traditional state-
based and non-traditional system-based tasks.1   
3. The challenges of new technology
New technology always presents problems as well as opportunities. The most obvious 
of these is the increasing expense and complexity of new technology. Around the world, 
the acquisition of new technology (in the shape of platforms, weapons and sensors) is 
therefore depressingly often both late and hugely over budget. In the Second World War 
for example, the 14,000 ton amphibious support ship USS Mt McKinley commissioned 
90 days after contract. Today, major projects can take decades to see through provid-
ing opportunities for constant changes of mind and requirements, political meddling, 
unexpected currency movements and the like. As a result of this near constant level of 
failure to deliver on budget and in time, there is strong political pressure to speed up and 
reform the acquisition process itself – at least once every four years – which in itself cre-
ates continuing instability of course. In addition to all this, there is in much of the APR 
a problem of corruption among the decision-makers and a lack of clarity about strategic 
priorities over the long term. 
The proliferation of asymmetric technologies which potentially narrow the gap be-
tween the strong and the weak presents real dilemmas for planners too. Nowadays, for 
example, the US Navy has to cope at the one end of the scale with the Anti-Access 
Area Denial ship-killing ballistic missiles of the Chinese, with the swarming tactics of 
the Iranian Revolutionary Guard and the prospect of threats from suicide bombers on 
jet skis. The fact that they have to divide their resources among these different types of 
technological threat of course evens up the balance that even the strongest naval power 
in the world can manage against each. In the case of the delicate balance between the 
Chinese and US navies, this could have potentially important consequences for the sta-
tus quo in the APR.
4. The emerging problems of maritime law
Far from simply resolving tensions and disputes, international maritime law can often be 
a cause of them, when it comes to agreeing what the law is, interpreting it and applying 
it. Even in the less controversial area of the global counter-piracy campaign, the deficien-
cies in national jurisdiction make dealing with the problem much more difficult now than 
it used to be in the age when one simply staked out captured pirates between the low 
and high tide-lines. In the APR, maritime disputes such as that over the South China Sea 
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are a major cause of tension and at the very least encourage and help shape naval devel-
opment. It has also fed a developing row over the status of the EEZ, most particularly, 
though not exclusively, between the US and China, as to what foreign warships may, or 
may not, do in other people’s EEZs. For such reasons, the traditional freedom of naviga-
tion assumed by the likes of Mahan is under serious threat these days, and this must 
be a matter of major concern, particularly to the maritime countries of the West who 
strongly adhere to the notion of the ‘freedom of the seas’ for a whole variety of cultural 
and strategic reasons. Particularly in the APR, developing notions of the international 
law of the sea frame maritime policy, provide sets of naval tasks and capabilities and 
could very well spark conflict with others. Indeed, with the pointed exchanges between 
the US and China over the former’s developing interests in the South China Sea, with 
Chinese harassment of Vietnamese and Philippine vessels, and with furious exchanges 
between Japan and China over a number of incidents in the East China Sea in 2011, the 
prospect of conflict has got significantly closer. One result of this is a redoubling of efforts 
to manage (rather than seek to resolve) such conflicts more effectively. Another though, 
has been to accelerate the modernisation and shape the deployments of the navies of 
the region. 
5. Problems of strategic identity
These problems revolve around the question of what sort of country and what sort of 
national strategy should shape the navy’s operational priorities and composition. Uncer-
tainty here is commonplace and this can be decidedly malign in its effects. Even in the 
APR, where awareness of the centrality of maritime concerns is now significantly higher 
than it often seems to be in Europe, this lack of clarity about strategic identity can be a 
major problem. 
The Navy of the Republic of Korea for example is currently torn between two, or 
maybe even three, competing visions of what its operational priorities should be. Firstly, 
in dealing with the implacable hostility of its northern neighbour as evidenced by the 
sinking of the ROKS Cheonan and the recent deadly bombardment of a disputed island 
in the Yellow Sea, it has pressing issues of territorial defence in and around the peninsula 
itself. Then, in responding to the competitive pressures of China, Japan, Russia and the 
US in its dangerous strategic neighbourhood, it has a distinctive regional agenda. Finally, 
its increasing economic stake in the global trading system impels the country to assume 
wider global responsibilities, such as participating in the Proliferation Security Initiative 
and the counter-piracy effort in the Gulf of Aden. But the type of naval force required for 
each of these three alternatives are far from identical and so pose dilemmas of choice for 
ROK naval planners (Till and Yoon 2011).
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6. The economics of seapower
Mahan painted an encouraging picture of the manner in which naval strength underpins 
and encourages economic prosperity and then feeds from it in a kind of virtuous circle. 
Arguably, we are witnessing such a process in the APR, where the rise of its relative na-
val power seems intimately connected with the rise of the region’s sea-based economic 
endeavour in the shape of its many and various shipping and trading industries.2 As 
the latter rise, then so will naval expenditure; and as naval expenditure rises, so will the 
conditions for trade improve. This assumption is core to most conceptions of maritime 
strategy.
But the arrows go both ways. As the economy dwindles or fails, then the resources 
available for navies dwindle, too. The circle turns vicious, in other words. Naval planners 
are then faced by constant cutbacks in expenditure, and eventually at any rate, a re-
quired downsizing of operational aspiration. Here the current experience of the substan-
tial downsizing of European fleets, compared to their expansion elsewhere, illustrates 
the point.
7. A decline in naval independence 
In the Western tradition, navies have had a fair degree of operational autonomy, espe-
cially in those times when fleet commanders left home for months or even years at an 
end. This, though, sometimes encouraged habits of mind and procedure that made it 
difficult for them to cooperate synergistically with the army, and then the air force. The 
British discovered this, or re-discovered it, in the Gallipoli campaign of 1915 and initi-
ated the sometimes very controversial process of developing jointery that is still going 
on today. Generally, its effects have been notably benign enabling such successes as the 
Falklands Campaign of 1982, or the recent Sierra Leone operation. But it has also meant 
that the strategic independence of the Royal Navy, and indeed of most other navies too, is 
increasingly constrained by the requirement to operate in concert with the other services, 
and indeed other government departments. In consequence, purely ‘naval’ priorities may 
not prevail. Moreover, the necessary equipment and procedural synergies with other na-
vies and other maritime agencies are likely to be more difficult to achieve when navies are 
primarily focused on inter-operating with armies and air forces. 
The same kind of processes are happening in the APR too, but at a much slower 
rate, and so generally appear to have more control over their destiny. They may very often 
be over-shadowed by the army, but at least they can state their case on an institutional 
basis. The revitalisation of the Indonesian Navy seems to show that in the clearly mari-
time circumstances of that country, this is a considerable advantage. 
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emergIng trends
From these seven issues and problems, just two very broad conclusions about the likely 
trajectory of global naval development seem to emerge. The first is that the maritime 
strategy of the twenty-first century is likely to be much broader than it used to be in the 
past, just as the concept of what we mean by ‘security’ has got broader too.3 Navies face 
a much wider range of threats and tasks. Their efforts at and from the sea will need to be 
integrated into complementary military and civil lines of approach in what NATO calls 
the ‘twisted’ rope of the ‘comprehensive’ approach.
The second conclusion that emerges from this review has to be that the maritime 
balance between East and West is shifting dramatically, and that this will have crucial 
consequences for the rest of the world, not least for us here in Europe.
The modernisation of Asian naval forces began in the 1980s as part of a growth in 
its share of global defence expenditure from 11 per cent in the mid 1980s to 20 per cent 
in 1995 with a corresponding leap in the region’s arms imports (Ball 2010). A natural 
reflection of Asia’s growing economic clout and political confidence – together with a 
need to replace obsolescent second-hand equipment acquired decades before – this was 
more a ‘festival of competitive modernisation’ than a potentially destabilising naval arms 
race as generally understood. In any case, it was largely brought to a halt by the Asian 
financial crisis of the late 1990s. 
By the early 2000s most countries in the region had recovered from this crisis suf-
ficiently to resume naval modernisation programmes funded by steadily increasing levels 
of defence expenditure. The US-based naval consultancy firm AMI International an-
ticipates a naval spend in the APR of US$ 173 billion by 2030; the Asia-Pacific naval 
market as a whole is ‘expected to move past NATO countries to become the second 
largest source of future naval spending after the United States’. Asia already spends more 
on defence in general than does Europe. According to the French naval armaments firm 
Direction des Constructions Navales (DCNS), the APR was considered ‘as a future cen-
tre for defence business.... The defence market in the Asia-Pacific should be, in about 
2016, a major market – even above the US (Straits Times 2009)4 
This increase in focus and effort is especially evident in Northeast Asia, an area pri-
marily engaged in the acquisition of platforms, weapons and sensors such as anti-ship/
land attack cruise missiles, submarines, anti-submarine capabilities (ASW), sea-based 
air and missile defence capabilities, electronic warfare capabilities, and so on, which at 
first glance only really make sense for operations against peer competitors. But with its 
acquisition of submarines and modern frigates, something of the same behaviour may 
be seen in Southeast Asia too. The ambitiousness of these acquisition aspirations is also 
reflected in these navies growing levels of confidence and in their mission structures. For 
the first time the navies of the Pacific have joined with India in participating in maritime 
missions far from home – most obviously in the counter-piracy campaign in the Gulf of 
Aden. The presence of the Chinese air-defence frigate Xuzhou lying off Libya, providing 
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cover for the evacuation of its citizens from the civil war then in progress was a startling 
if generally unremarked indication of the extent to which naval development in the far off 
Pacific ocean are likely to impact other regions, Europe included (Lili 2011). 
so what for euroPe? 
The world’s peace and prosperity are going to depend partly on the consequences of all 
this. Will this naval expansion lead to competitive naval arms races in the region and 
possible conflict; or should it be seen as a perfectly natural, indeed benign process, in 
which the various states of the Asia-Pacific recognise the maritime dimension of their 
peace and security, accept the strategic responsibilities that go with their increasing eco-
nomic importance and develop the kind of capabilities needed to perform them? Either 
way, what transpires in the region will have vast consequences for the rest of the world.
And what will it mean for us here in Europe? How will we be affected by all this, 
either as helpless bystanders or as participants in the process? One thing of which we can 
be certain is the need to respond to the US Navy’s increasing focus on events in the re-
gion. Already much of the US Navy, once a principal guarantor of European security, sees 
the Atlantic merely as an area that must be passed through on the way to somewhere 
more important. And this perception is more likely to grow than to diminish in the future.
the brItIsh resPonse 
So, finally, to what extent does the development of the Royal Navy, during and after the 
Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) process of 2010 support and illustrate 
these premises and suggest a response to them (HM Government 2010)? This paper 
will take the same seven central problem areas identified above as affecting all navies, not 
least those in the APR, but in reverse order:
JoIntery and the deClIne In naval IndePendenCe
In the SDSR process, the Afghanistan campaign was clearly regarded as the ‘main effort’ 
for the time being and so took precedence over all other priorities. For this reason, the 
cuts bore particularly heavily on the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force, and within the 
latter on the specifically maritime component of that service, with the cancellation of the 
Nimrod maritime patrol aircraft replacement. This struck many as particularly perverse, 
given the fact that 40 per cent of the personnel deployed in Afghanistan at times came 
from the naval service. The Army’s cuts, however, are essentially to be delayed until 
the Afghanistan campaign is over. Despite the fact that both the Army and Air Force 
interests have publicly expressed their scepticism over the need for the Royal Navy’s 
new aircraft carriers, the Navy has felt constrained from waging a partisan campaign 
in defence of its interests, arguing that it would be politically counter-productive to do 
any such thing in the current circumstances. When expressing his concerns about the 
Navy’s capacity to go on fighting the Libyan campaign indefinitely, with the current level 
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of naval commitment, the First Sea Lord, for example, was reportedly reprimanded for 
speaking out of turn. Much the same happened to the Chief of the Air Staff shortly af-
terwards. The capacity of the services to ‘make their case’ would now seem significantly 
less than it was, even though the high regard in which they are held by the general public 
has if anything been increased by their role in recent events. But against this, and perhaps 
unexpectedly, one curious consequence of the defence reform programme announced by 
the previous Secretary of Defence Dr Liam Fox, is that the individual services are likely 
to be more in control of their own destinies in the implementation if not the deciding of 
policy from now on. 
the eConomICs of seaPower
Although, until the recent recession, British maritime industries were in a generally bull-
ish state (Chamber of Shipping 2009, 1–2, 4), when compared to past decades, they 
seem likely to suffer in consequence of the huge spending cuts introduced by the new 
coalition Government to tackle its budget deficit of some £900 billion; an estimated cut 
of between 7.5 and 8 per cent in Britain’s future defence spending over the next five 
years was announced. This was on top of a 10 per cent ‘black hole’ (in which projected 
and committed expenditure exceeded the money thought to be available) in the defence 
budget that already existed. Since the Treasury announced it had no intention whatever 
of filling that hole, the actual total cuts are more like 17.5 per cent than the figure of-
ficially announced. In response to criticism for this the Government has claimed its de-
fence budget still to be the 4th largest in the world, that Britain’s level of defence effort 
at just over 2 per cent of GNP is better than most of its allies and that no more can be 
afforded until the next review in 2015.
CamPaIgn losses 
The RN’s consequential losses have been equivalent to those of a substantial defeat 
during World War II:
•	 HMS Ark Royal and its Harrier aircraft plus one helicopter carrier were cut. While 
both 65,000 ton Queen Elizabeth class carriers will be built, only the second, HMS 
Prince of Wales will be initially completed as a fleet carrier and will only ‘routinely’ 
carry 12 Joint Strike Fighters although equipped for 36. On current plans, the first 
carrier to be completed – HMS Queen Elizabeth – will be commissioned for three 
years as a helicopter carrier, without fixed-wing aircraft, and may even be sold off. 
As a result, a ten-year capability gap in ‘carrier strike’ will open up. It will be a major 
challenge for the RN to regenerate this capacity when its carriers and aircraft even-
tually become available.
•	 One new and operationally busy amphibious warfare ship HMS Albion will go into 
extended reserve
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•	 4 Type 22 frigates were cut from the RN escort fleet
•	 2 replenishment vessels
•	 5,000 people
The Trident replacement programme has passed its ‘Initial Gate’ but ‘Main Gate’ will 
be delayed until 2015, and so the decision whether or not to proceed will be that of the 
next government. Meanwhile, a review into cheaper alternatives is being conducted, at 
the insistence of the Liberal Democrats in Mr Cameron’s coalition.5 
This sounds bad enough, but many expected it to be worse. The amphibious force 
has survived, albeit at a somewhat smaller scale, and the Royal Marines have fought off 
the threat of being taken over by the Army. In addition, the Type 45 destroyers will be 
completed, and there will even be a seventh Astute class SSN. From 2015, 13 new 
frigates in the shape of the Type 26 Global Combat Ship, new tankers, landing ships 
and maritime helicopters will, hopefully, all be joining the fleet in the next few years. The 
Royal Navy is now getting the VSTOL version of the Joint Strike Fighter the F35B and 
not the conventional version the F35C. It is hoped in consequence that the the Royal 
Navy will now be able to operate two carriers not one. A claimed uplift of funding for 
these programmes is expected from the 1 percent increase (in real terms) in support for 
Defence Equipment and support from 2015 recently announced.
strategIC IdentIty
Because of the fixation on Afghanistan, Britain in 2015 will end up at least temporarily 
with a force ratio of army to the other services of 65 per cent, analogous to the continen-
tal mind-set of Germany – and significantly worse from a maritime point of view than the 
US equivalent figure of 55 per cent. Extraordinary consequences like this for an allegedly 
maritime power only emerged after the review process, not during it. For years now, with 
the decline of the merchant marine and Britain’ shipping industries, analysts have been 
lamenting the phenomenon of sea-blindness in the country’s political classes. But per-
haps, if belatedly, the tide is turning. The country’s National Security Strategy specifically 
recognises that Britain is a maritime country6 and the revival of the British shipping in-
dustry is beginning to be recognised – or at least was, before the current economic crisis.
Prime Minister David Cameron has stated that the cuts will not reduce Britain’s stra-
tegic weight, but it is hard to see how this can possibly be the case once the A fghanistan 
campaign has ended.7 There will be at least temporarily a marked reduction in the Royal 
Navy’s ability to meet its increasingly important commitments all around the world, such 
as its regular participation in the Five Power Defence Arrangements in Southeast Asia. 
These cuts can be seen as part of the slow drift of maritime power from West to East, 
accelerating, as many commentators have remarked, the relative maritime decline of the 
West.
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legal develoPments
The UK tends to take the same line on the freedom of navigation as the United States, 
and seeks in its own modest way to defend that conception against those who would 
limit it. Its capacity to do this depends on it being able to maintain sufficient ships at sea 
to exercise and demonstrate the country’s understanding of that particular part of the law 
of the sea. The reduction in what is popularly if inaccurately known as the ‘escort fleet’ 
will make this more difficult. 
The UK has also run into procedural difficulty in reconciling the demands of its part 
of the counter-piracy campaign with its position on wider aspects of humanitarian law, 
especially that summarised under the European Convention on Human Rights. The UK 
was instrumental in persuading the Kenyans and the Seychelloise to accept the task of 
prosecuting captured pirates, as a means of getting round this difficulty, but with some 
difficulty, significant cost and little expectation that this would provide a long-term solu-
tion. 
teChnologICal Challenges
The cancellation of the Nimrod MRA4 replacement programme leaves the Royal Air 
Force (RAF) without a credible maritime patrol aircraft, for the time being. This pro-
gramme was admittedly lamentably late – some 144 months behind schedule – and 
with some £3.6 billion already spent on it, a third more than planned, it had become very 
expensive and perfectly illustrated apparent deficiencies in the UK’s equipment acquisi-
tion process. Yet another major programme of reform, associated with the entrepreneur 
Bernard Gray and Lord Levene and dubbed the Defence Transformation Programme is 
now underway as a consequence of this kind of failure. 
strIkIng balanCes and agreeIng PrIorItIes 
The RN has made a conscious decision to go for quality over quantity. Over the better 
part of 20 years it has sacrificed people, minor warships, auxiliaries, submarines and the 
escort fleet in order to get carriers capable of operating fixed-wing aircraft, the Type 45 
destroyer and Astute SSNs. The consequence will be a marked reduction in fleet num-
bers and a corresponding capacity to defend the country’s lower intensity maritime se-
curity interests. However good an individual ship may be, and these two programmes are 
very ambitious, it can only be in one place at a time. The RN currently deploys some 20 
per cent of its assets operationally at any one time. This is significantly higher than either 
of the other services, but even so, a decline in the RN’s global footprint seems inevitable 
given the decline in the number of its ships and people. For this reason, there have been 
substantial calls from within the maritime community for something of a switch from 
quality to quantity in future acquisitions.8 
27OslO Files on defenCe and seCurIty 6/2012 The rise of naval powers in Asia
an unCertaIn future?
Critics of the SDSR process and more particularly of its consequences for the RN have 
of course pointed to the unexpected Libyan campaign as an early example of the stra-
tegic short-sightedness of the review, with its ‘presentist’ fixation on Afghanistan-type 
counter-insurgency. While the RN and the RAF were able to cope with the demands of 
the Libyan campaign, they have done so by relying on a number of platforms and tech-
niques scheduled for early disposal under the terms of the SDSR. Bearing in mind the 
scale of the RN’s continuing involvement in the Afghanistan counter-insurgency cam-
paign, the continuation of its counter-piracy role off the Horn of Africa, counter-narcotics 
and HADR tasks in the Caribbean, stabilisation and diplomatic engagement functions 
in the Gulf and the South Atlantic, the RN effort was surprisingly ambitious and effec-
tive. A varying task force of some 13 warships and support ships, including what might 
be termed two ‘light carriers’ (HM Ships Albion and Ocean) and an SSN, extracted 500 
civilians from danger, helped enforce the UN arms and oil embargo, control the No-Fly 
Zone and support NATO air operations, engaged in mine clearance, naval gunfire sup-
port against enemy shore batteries, and launched a number of Tomahawk land-attack 
cruise missiles and helicopter (including Army Apaches for the first time) operations 
against targets ashore. The statistics demonstrated by HMS Liverpool are impressive: 
147 days on patrol, 28 action stations, under enemy fire on ten occasions and fired more 
rounds ashore than any British ship since the Falklands campaign.9 Given the extreme 
unlikelihood of the UK engaging in any further major ground-based counter-insurgency 
operations for the foreseeable future, this type of commitment, though totally unforecast 
by the SDSR, seems likely to set a pattern for the future.10 Other European navies were 
also extensively involved in the Libya operation, moreover, and demonstrated a contin-
ued level of 24/7 operational experience which should not be forgotten when comparing 
the decline in European platform numbers to their increase in the APR. 
ConClusIons
Given the increasing preoccupation of the United States in the APR (Frühling and Schreer 
2009, 98–103), the cuts in the Royal Navy have certainly not been welcomed by the 
US Navy, which has looked on the RN as its principal ally for over 50 years. The decline 
in the UK’s – and indeed NATO Europe’s – military power has not gone unremarked in 
Washington (Guardian 2011c). 
This brief review of the current situation for the RN suggests that the problems and 
issues that confront the navies of the APR apply elsewhere too, but perhaps in the case 
of Europe in a notably more acute form. The current travails of the RN are replicated 
in many, though not all of the other navies of Europe too, mainly in consequence of the 
current economic crisis. All this seems to reinforce the two consequential trends noted 
earlier, namely that:
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•	 Navies around the world have to take on more and more diverse roles as the concept 
of maritime strategy has broadened to include greater constabulary duties such as 
Maritime Security and wider tasks in aid of the civil power such as capacity building, 
humanitarian assistance and disaster response and capacity building and focused 
engagement in support of national diplomacy. But, in contrast to the situation to 
be found in the APR, navies in Europe have not been provided with extra resources 
with which to perform these new tasks.
•	 The result is a fast developing and historic shift in the naval balance between East 
and West which is likely to result in substantial but currently unknowable change in 
the world’s security architecture.
For navies, these are indeed interesting times.
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Naval developments in China 
Bernard D. Cole
Naval developments in China during the past decade or so are indeed impressive, if 
sometimes exaggerated in media reports. The People’s Liberation Army Navy, or PLA 
Navy, has been designed and equipped to accomplish specific missions, especially those 
subsumed in a Taiwan scenario, although other, more demanding tasks, are in the offing. 
The PLA Navy certainly faces challenges and weaknesses, particularly as wider-ranging 
assignments are confronted. 
Discussions of PLA Navy modernisation typically focus on hardware – on new ships, 
submarines, missiles and airplanes. That technological emphasis is understandable, but 
it too often overlooks the key factor in naval effectiveness: the people who maintain and 
operate the hardware. China’s navy in 2011 deploys approximately 290,000 person-
nel in a 2.3 million-strong military that remains dominated by the Army. The military, 
including the PLA Navy, also remains an overwhelmingly male-dominated organisation, 
although women play a role in administration, research and training billets.
These issues and developments constitute the subject matter of this paper, which 
also includes a brief discussion of navies in China’s history and statements emerging 
from the nation’s leaders in support of a modern navy for the Middle Kingdom. Will 
Beijing emerge as a naval power that will challenge the maritime interests of other na-
tions, or will it cooperate with other navies, including those of NATO allies, as a force for 
international good?
mIssIons
The Chinese navy is tasked with national defence ‘goals and tasks’. These are prioritised 
as ‘safeguarding national sovereignty’, to include national economic development; de-
fence of the homeland, to include ‘the security of China’s lands, inland waters, territorial 
waters and airspace, safeguard its maritime rights and interests … to oppose and contain 
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the separatist forces for “Taiwan independence” … and defend national sovereignty and 
territorial integrity’ (Xinhua 2011a).
traInIng
Addressing the Central Military Commission (CMC) in 1999, President Jiang Zemin 
stated, ‘We must [develop] high-quality talented military people’. Beijing emphasises 
its concern with military training in China’s various Defence White Papers. The 2008 
edition, for instance, prioritised the creation of ‘a scientific system for military training 
in conditions of informationisation’ as part of ‘attaching more importance to Military 
Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) training in counter-terrorism, stability mainte-
nance, emergency response, peacekeeping, emergency rescue and disaster relief ’ (Xin-
hua 2009a).1
The Chinese Navy has followed this directive during the past decade of modernisa-
tion. Advances in personnel education and training, accompanied by advanced individual 
and unit exercising, were especially spurred by the loss of the crew of the Ming class sub-
marine hull number 361 in 2003. The deaths of the 70 personnel onboard Ming 361 
were almost certainly due to inadequate training, with shoddy equipment maintenance 
apparently contributing to the tragedy.2
One result of this accident was a major leadership turnover in the PLA Navy, includ-
ing the dismissal of the service’s commander and political commissar; the commander 
and political commissar of the North Sea Fleet, of which Ming 361 was a unit; and at 
least eight other senior officers, including the commander of the Lushun Naval Base, 
who apparently was held responsible for the maintenance work performed on the sub-
marine shortly before its loss. 
The succeeding PLA Navy commander, Vice Admiral Zhang Dingfa, was a career 
submarine officer, which is notable: Zhang’s appointment suggests both the Central 
Military Commission (CMC) dissatisfaction with accepted Navy practices under previous 
commanders and concern about ensuring the capability of China’s submarine force to 
serve as a primary military instrument in the event of a security confrontation with the 
United States over Taiwan’s status. Zhang’s 2004 selection to membership of the CMC 
was also significant: he was the first navy commander so appointed.3
Another notable 2004 event for the PLA Navy was the release of China’s Defence 
White Paper for that year. In it, the PLA Navy was described as 
responsible for safeguarding China’s maritime security and maintaining the 
sovereignty of its territorial seas along with its maritime rights and interests.... 
[I]ntegrated combat capabilities are enhanced in conducting offshore campaigns, 
and the capability of nuclear counter-attacks is also enhanced.... [T]he PLA Navy 
… reorganises the combat forces in a more scientific way [and] speeds up the 
process of updating its weaponry and equipment.... [W]eaponry is increasingly 
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informationalised and long-range precision strike capability raised. It takes part in 
joint exercises to enhance its joint operational capabilities and integrated maritime 
support capabilities. (MNDC 2004)
These words may be viewed as a direct – if somewhat more realistic – stepchild of Mao 
Zedong’s admonition to his military commanders to ‘make [the navy] dreadful to the 
enemy’ (Huang 1994). 
Statements such as these, and similar sentiments expressed upon notable occa-
sions, are not just politically motivated, but in the arcane world of ‘China watching’, may 
serve as guides to future developments. President Hu Jintao’s description of the PLA 
Navy’s ‘four historic missions’ in 2004 has since been buttressed in writing by China’s 
various ‘defence white papers’ and in practice by military developments, particularly in 
the PLA Navy.4 An important thrust of the ‘missions’ is to point all the services, particu-
larly the Navy, in the directions of post-Taiwan missions: how should the navy be training 
and equipping itself to deal with missions after Taiwan is reunited with the mainland?
hardware
Material improvements in the PLA Navy are relatively easy to track.5 From its inception 
in 1950, when it commissioned its first patrol boats, small combatants (frigates and 
corvettes) and submarines, China’s navy has depended on Soviet/Russian platforms and 
technology. This dependence continues to a much lesser degree, although in the early 
2000s China acquired from Russia four Sovremenny class guided missile destroyers 
(DDGs), 12 Kilo class conventionally powered submarines (SSs) and 24 Su-30MK2 
aircraft for maritime interdiction. 
During the past 20 years the PLA Navy has added to its ranks approximately 38 
conventionally and 5 nuclear-powered submarines – 3 or 4 of them ballistic missile 
submarines SSBNs; 15 guided missile destroyers DDGs; 16 guided missile frigates 
(FFGs); more than 60 patrol craft capable of firing cruise missiles; 2 Yuzhao class land-
ing platform docks (LPD); 24 landing ship tanks (LSTs); and 2 replenishment-at-sea 
(RAS) ships. This steady, moderate programme of naval modernisation has accelerated 
since 2000, when all of the four nuclear-powered and 22 of the conventionally powered 
submarines have been commissioned, as have ten DDGs and six FFGs, all of the 26 
amphibious ships and at least 60 (Houbei class) missile patrol boats. In the first decade 
of this century, China has led the world in submarine construction, building almost three 
boats per year.
Until about 2005, however, the PLA Navy was still very much ‘platform-centric’, al-
most wholly dependent on individual ship and aircraft operations with only rudimentary 
radio and data-link coordination. At the end of the new century’s first decade, China is 
deploying ships capable of operating in coherent naval task forces able to project power 
on the seas. These new platforms are the beginning of the first really modern navy that 
Beijing will deploy as an instrument to deter Taiwan; thwart US intervention; and secure 
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China’s territorial claims in the East and South China Seas, as well as other maritime 
missions characteristic of a global power.
Three ex-Soviet carriers, Minsk, Kiev and Varyag, have also been purchased by Chi-
nese companies, supposedly for conversion to casinos. Construction of Varyag, equipped 
with a ‘ski jump’ bow to facilitate fixed-wing aircraft operations, began in a Ukrainian 
shipyard in 1985, but stopped in 1992. The partially completed ship has been in Chi-
nese shipyards since 2002, finally conducting its first sea trial in August 2011 (Reuters 
2011).
The same advances in the design and construction of Chinese submarines are re-
flected in the PLA Navy’s newest surface combatants. Since 2003 the Navy has ac-
quired three new classes of DDGs: the Luzhou, Luyang I and Luyang II. The Navy is also 
acquiring the Jiangkai and Jiangkai II class FFGs, which, while significantly less capable 
than the DDGs, exhibit the most ‘stealthy’ characteristics of any PLA Navy ship. These 
ships were likely designed to operate primarily in littoral waters, but apparently have been 
performing satisfactorily during extended operations in the Gulf of Aden. 
A particularly interesting addition to the PLA Navy’s surface force is the Type 022 
(Houbei) missile craft. These ships feature a wave-piercing catamaran hull that provides 
an unusually seaworthy platform for cruise missiles. That this hull form apparently was 
copied from an Australian commercial design does not detract from China’s accomplish-
ment in producing dozens of a relatively inexpensive combatant that might prove very 
threatening to much larger naval vessels.
In sum, fleet acquisitions since 2000 reflect a dramatic increase in Chinese ship-
building capability, especially in the technologically challenging field of submarine con-
struction. But China’s warships are equipped with many foreign-designed systems: gas 
turbine engines and super-rapid-blooming off-board chaff (SRBOC) dispensers pur-
chased from the United States and Ukraine; anti-aircraft warfare (AAW) missile systems 
and combat integration systems from France; helicopters of French and Russian designs; 
apparently Dutch-designed automatic 30-mm close-in weapons systems (CIWS); Ital-
ian-designed anti-submarine warfare (ASW) torpedoes; and ASW mortars and 130-mm 
guns that are Soviet-designed systems. 
The largest surface ships built by the PLA Navy to date are amphibious ships, simi-
lar in design, size and apparent capability to a US San Antonio class dock landing ship 
(LSD). These Yuzhao class (Type 071) vessels displace approximately 18,000 tons and 
have both a well deck capable of holding four air-cushion landing craft (ACV) and a flight 
deck capable of handling two helicopters, as well as a hangar. At least two of these ships 
are in the water, with three to four more planned.6
logIstICs at sea
Perhaps no ships are more important to increasing the power-projection capability of a 
fleet than those capable of replenishment at sea (RAS). Only five of the PLA Navy’s nu-
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merous supply and support ships are capable of underway RAS. Each of the three fleets 
is assigned one or two of these relatively small ships. China has added just two RAS ships 
since 2000, and these are the first PLA Navy support ships capable of simultaneously 
providing destroyers and frigates with fuel, provisions and ordnance.
Thus, China has been slow to increase its navy’s ability to remain at sea for extended 
periods. Only two of the PLA Navy’s five oilers, the Fuchi class ships, are less than twenty 
years old, and only one (Nancang, assigned to the South Sea Fleet) is capable of providing 
more than a single major fueling to a task group composed of four or more ships. This 
indicates that at least the logistic focus of maritime thought in Beijing remains on Taiwan 
and other regional situations such as the East and South China seas. Realisation of any 
talk of a Chinese ‘blue water navy’ awaits construction of a capable logistic force able to 
sustain long term operations at sea.
avIatIon
The Navy’s most serious aviation shortfalls are in fixed-wing ASW aircraft, tankers and 
airborne early warning and control aircraft (Airborne Early Warning and Control System 
[AEW&C], not Airborne Warning and Control System [AWACS]). Naval Aviation did not 
conduct its first air-refueling mission until 2000.7 The People’s Liberation Army Air 
Force has been acquiring AEW&C at a slow rate; Naval Aviation has not. The PLA Air 
Force retains priority for receiving and training in these capabilities. Even more signifi-
cantly, the navy joins the other Chinese services in its paucity of helicopters.
weaPons
China’s most formidable naval weapon systems are its anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs) 
– air, surface and subsurface launched. Its indigenous cruise-missile development pro-
gramme dates back to the late 1950s, before which the PLA Navy had been operating 
SS-N-2 Styx surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs) provided by the Soviet Union. Later 
purchases of French-built Exocets provided an additional model for Chinese designers. 
Long-range – more than 100 nm – ASCMs have been developed and are deployed on 
submarines. China has developed the capability of designing and manufacturing cruise 
missiles with close to state-of-the-art features, including supersonic speed, complex 
manoeuvres and submerged-submarine-launch capability
Progress
The Chinese Navy in 2000 was a modernising force, but one still severely limited in 
several warfare areas. Its submarine force was the exception, although composed mostly 
of old boats. That situation has now changed. In fact, the PLA Navy in 2011 is develop-
ing into a maritime force of twenty-first-century credibility in all warfare areas – even if 
marginal in AAW, ASW and force integration.
The surface combatant force has made major strides in the past decade, now mus-
34OslO Files on defenCe and seCurIty 6/2012 The rise of naval powers in Asia
tering its first area-AAW defence destroyers and more capable ASW ships. China is still 
apparently following its pattern of building successive classes of ships, each numbering 
in single digits; the next destroyer class is reportedly well into the design process and 
will represent a significant increase in size, perhaps displacing more than 10,000 tons, 
which will match the size of the US Arleigh Burke class destroyers.
The numbers of state-of-the-art ships, submarines and aircraft it deploys do not yet 
give the PLA Navy the ability to dominate East or South Asian waters, certainly when 
measured against the US Navy or even the Japanese Maritime Self-Defence Force or the 
Indian Navy. However, measuring total naval forces against one another is not particu-
larly useful in operational terms; what is more meaningful is a Clausewitzian measure: 
how much (and, we might add, how effective a) naval force China can deploy against a 
given objective at a time of Beijing’s choosing. Whether this mission concerns Taiwan 
or an East or South China Sea objective, it seems fairly certain that China will be able to 
seize the initiative when employing its new navy.
Mao Zedong recognised in 1950 that deploying a navy to conquer Taiwan required 
the development of expertise in amphibious warfare, seaborne logistics and maritime air 
power, but his plan to organise a strong navy was aborted because of the Korean War 
and thereafter limited by domestic political events, especially the disastrous Great Leap 
Forward. Later, naval development was severely impacted during the 1960s by the Sino-
Soviet split and the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. Only at the end of the 1970s, 
after the end of the Cultural Revolution and the post-Mao power struggle, was the PLA 
Navy in a position to ‘take off’.
In 2007 the PLA Navy’s commander argued, ‘We must build a powerful Navy ... to 
maintain the safety of the oceanic transportation and the strategic passageway for energy 
and resources, [and] to defend the unification of our nation.’8 This statement alludes to 
the fact that almost all of China’s primary sovereignty concerns lie in the maritime arena: 
Taiwan; territorial and seabed resource disputes with Japan in the East China Sea; similar 
disputes with Vietnam, the Philippines, Brunei, Indonesia and Malaysia in the South 
China Sea; and sea lines of communication across the Indian Ocean endangered by pi-
racy in the Gulf of Aden. Additionally, the government’s authority relies in significant part 
on continued economic growth, which in turn relies on maritime trade and energy flows.
Pla navy shortComIngs
The PLA Navy recognises its equipment deficiencies as well as the difficulties involved 
in correcting them. General Cao Guangchuan, director of the General Armaments De-
partment in the 1990s and later minister of defence, complained that poor pay made 
it ‘difficult for his department to retain top-quality scientists and researchers’, and that 
‘the task of developing the Navy’s armaments is arduous’.9 The PLA Navy surface forces 
suffer in four significant warfare areas. 
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antI-aIr warfare
Modern sea power is to a large extent defined by air power, in terms both of aircraft, 
manned and unmanned, and of missiles, cruise and ballistic. The PLA Navy is finally 
moving to ameliorate this weakness in launching the Luyang II class DDGs. That ship’s 
Aegis-like system is the Chinese Navy’s first to offer an effective area AAW defence; 
previous combatants offered only a point-defence capability. 
The Luda and Jianghu classes were designed without any surface-to-air missile 
(SAM) system; the four Sovremenny class combatants acquired from Russia are armed 
with the point-defence SA-N-7 system; the Luhu, Luhai and Jiangwei classes are 
equipped with the French-built Crotale or its Chinese version, the HQ-6/7 – also point-
defence systems. Even the Luyang I and Luzhou classes commissioned with the Luyang 
IIs in the middle of this decade, while armed with very potent AAW missiles, lack a true 
area-defence capability.
Anti-submarine warfare
ASW is another crucial PLA Navy warfare weakness. Detecting submarines, especially 
from a surface ship, is a very difficult process, and the PLA Navy does not appear to be 
taking advantage of available ASW technology, especially in the field of passive detec-
tion – some of it forty years old. Despite promising developments using satellite-based 
radar to find submarine wakes and airborne lasers to detect submarines at depth, sound 
transmission through water (sonar) remains the most reliable way to detect a submarine.
PLA Navy ships make almost exclusive use of hull-mounted, active, medium-
frequency sonar. This probably represents a financial and operational compromise, be-
cause this sonar type is the least expensive and simplest to operate of the various types 
available. A very few PLA Navy escorts have been equipped with towed, variable-depth 
sonars in addition to hull-mounted units since 1993. China’s navy lacks significant 
airborne ASW resources, with only a dozen old aircraft assigned to that mission, and 
there is no open-source knowledge that China has deployed sea-bottom listening arrays 
in its coastal waters. A serious ASW effort would encompass all these systems, properly 
integrated and supported by timely operational and technical intelligence.
Systems integration 
A warship is inherently a ‘system of systems’, and the PLA Navy is still in the early stages 
of integrating its operations across the complex warfare mission areas. This requires the 
effective integration of shipboard, airborne and shore-based systems in pursuit of the 
desired operational mission objective. Since 2000, the PLA Navy has made significant 
progress in this crucial area of integrating sensor, weapon and command, and control 
functions, but the integration problem is complicated by China’s practice of building 
ships that incorporate a combination of foreign and Chinese-built components within 
the same system – a French-designed missile system with a Chinese air-search radar, 
for instance.
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Beyond individual ship systems integration is the need for inter-unit integration that 
maximises the synergy among the systems and units of a task group, a task force and a 
fleet. The US concept of net-centric warfare presently is the epitome of this paradigm. 
The PLA Navy is certainly aware of the developments in net-centric warfare, but report-
ed PLA Navy exercises indicate that the force remains on a very steep learning curve to-
wards achieving integration. Effective joint operations require inter-service coordination, 
but PLA training plans and observed exercises show that it is moving slowly to achieve 
cross-service and cross-warfare area capabilities.
Maintenance and supply
The PLA Navy also is working to improve maintenance of its front-line ships. Even the 
newest combatants – the Luzhou and Luyang classes – face supply and maintenance 
problems attributable to the foreign origin of many of their weapons and sensor systems 
and propulsion plants. France, the Netherlands, Italy, the United States, Ukraine and 
Russia have all played a role in the design and/or manufacture of China’s newest war-
ships. This causes difficulties in training personnel in equipment maintenance as well as 
supply support, including acquisition of appropriate test equipment.10
These combinations reduce system efficiency and hence decrease warship lethality, 
and are exacerbated by China’s practice of building small classes of two to four ships. 
PLA Navy officers recognise the benefits of systems integration and equipment com-
monality, and the slow progress in these areas is probably due to budgetary limitations, 
the mix of indigenous construction and foreign purchases, and the small number of ships 
in most PLA Navy classes.
Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance
A final notable PLA Navy weakness is intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) 
capability. This is in part the result of China’s highly centralised and rigid command 
structure and in part because the navy is just beginning to venture into net-centric war-
fare. This capability is being directly approached from various angles, including subma-
rine detection, helicopter over-the-horizon missions and space-based assets.
The foregoing are ‘weaknesses’ from a US perspective, however. For instance, the 
PLA Navy may rely for air defence on submarines and anti-ship ballistic missiles limiting 
the ability of US aircraft carriers to engage Chinese forces rather than on the expensive 
development of their own maritime force of fixed-wing aircraft. There is nothing uniquely 
Chinese about ‘asymmetry’ in military operations, but no opponent should doubt PLA 
Navy commanders’ ability to adapt and innovate in operational situations.
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the future forCe
Admiral Yu Guoquan, director of the Department of Naval Equipment Technology and 
Warships division in 1995, outlined a vision of twenty-first-century naval systems. New 
naval weaponry, he wrote, would have six features: (1) improved reconnaissance and 
observation, precise targeting and better weapon-sensor integration, creating quicker re-
action time; (2) increased lethality; (3) increased mobility and speed, and hence shorter 
engagements; (4) improved protective and survival systems; (5) increased emphasis on 
electronic jamming and targeting; and (6) multiple dimensions.11
By 2020 the PLA Navy will probably number approximately 70 modern surface 
combatants, between four and six new ballistic-missile submarines and 50 modern at-
tack submarines, perhaps ten of them nuclear-powered. The old submarines – the Han 
and Xia class nuclear-powered and the Romeo class conventionally powered boats – will 
have been decommissioned or placed in reserve. The Navy’s attack submarine force will 
include approximately 15 Song, 12 Kilo, 10 Yuan and fewer than 15 Ming class boats. 
Additionally, the two new Shang class subs will likely be followed by construction of a 
follow-on SSN class, the Type 095.
The amphibious and logistical force will be more modern, but current building ef-
forts make it unlikely that the PLA Navy will include more than approximately two dozen 
amphibious ships of 2,000 tons displacement or larger, featuring perhaps four or five 
LSDs of the Type 071 or a larger follow-on class. At least eight modern RAS ships, two 
in the North and East Sea fleets and four in the South Sea Fleet, are likely to have joined 
the PLA Navy.
Naval Aviation’s future is shadowed by resource and doctrinal competition with the 
PLA Air Force and within the PLA Navy among the different warfare communities (sur-
face, subsurface, aviation, Marine Corps). One can easily imagine the PLA Navy losing 
pride of place to the Air Force in the effort to garner an increasing share of PLA funding 
for the Navy’s surface and submarine communities. Naval Aviation does not appear to 
occupy a strong position in these bureaucratic battles. A large, US-style aircraft carrier is 
unlikely to be deployed by 2020, but one to three Varyag type air-capable ships will al-
most certainly have joined the PLA Navy, providing one carrier to each of the three fleets.
The Marine Corps is unlikely to expand beyond its present two brigades, as the Army 
trains additional divisions as amphibious specialists. Hence, the Corps will retain South 
China Sea missions as its primary amphibious tasking while the Army retains primary 
responsibility for Taiwan. The Corps’ role as a ‘rapid reaction’ unit probably means, how-
ever, that its operational assignments will be determined more by the CMC General Staff 
Department than by the South Sea Fleet commander.12
Prospective PLA Navy numbers are large by Asian standards and reflect several spe-
cific factors. Firstly, Beijing’s number-one ‘national security’ priority will remain keeping 
the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in power. This requires a continued emphasis on 
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fostering a strong and growing economy, which in turn means that military budgets will 
increase in proportion to economic growth.
Secondly, Beijing’s primary maritime strategic goal of defending China against 
seaborne invasion is not urgent given the absence of any such threat. Other strategic 
concerns include the East and South China seas, coastal and regional SLOC defence, 
and the preservation of offshore resources. All require capable naval forces, and Beijing 
is allocating the resources to build the requisite navy at a moderate pace. Even concern 
about Taiwan’s status has failed to spur dramatic naval expansion at the expense of army 
domination of the PLA.
Thirdly, the Chinese polity continues to change. The revolutionary generation of mil-
itary-civilian leadership is all but extinct; current and future leaders are and will be either 
civilian or military, barring the unlikely rise of a military officer to national leadership. The 
PLA will continue to assume a more professional character, a process that may isolate 
the navy and the other services from China’s civilian population. Defence Minister Chi 
Haotian discussed this as a concern of the national leadership in September 1998, and 
it was very much a concern to Beijing in 2010. The PLA’s senior political officer stressed 
that ‘maintaining the Party’s absolute leadership is our military’s political priority’ and 
that the PLA must ‘resolutely resist ... “nationalising the military”’.13
China’s naval modernisation will continue for several reasons. First is Beijing’s deter-
mination to gain the respect due to a great power, which includes deploying a great navy. 
Second is the determination for regional dominance, to ensure that unwelcome policies 
are not undertaken by regional nations. Third, even following a peaceful resolution of 
Taiwan’s status, Beijing will consider a strategically capable Navy necessary to counter 
US and possibly Japanese power. The fourth reason is momentum: the current buildup 
has given rise to a wide range of long-term programmes and powerful interests – perhaps 
best described as China’s military-industrial complex – that have developed a life of their 
own. A possible fifth reason is domestic politics: no communist system has been able to 
establish systemic, orderly leadership succession. China may be the first, but that has yet 
to be proven; any leadership contest will involve the participants valuing the loyalty of a 
strong military, especially given the PLA’s role as a ‘party army’.
How China defines its national security interests during the next decade will deter-
mine the type of navy it will deploy, but Beijing believes the nation’s security objectives 
require modernising its current naval force. Although not clear in 2011, Beijing may well 
believe that current maritime concerns are serious enough to change China’s historic 
dependence on continental power. In that case, China might build a navy able to chal-
lenge for command of the sea throughout the East and South China seas, the western 
Philippine Sea and the eastern Indian Ocean.
Although characterised as strategically defensive, PLA Navy doctrine can be op-
erationally and tactically offensive in Western terms in light of the nature of ‘offshore 
defence’. Beijing sees the United States as the primary threat to its strategic interests. 
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The United States is the world’s most powerful naval power and is the dominant power 
inside the first island chain and hence, the confluence to Beijing of the United States as 
the guarantor of Taiwan’s independence and that island’s characterisation as the key in 
the island chain constraining China.
CooPeratIon or ComPetItIon?
PLA Navy has conducted a number of exercises with foreign navies during the past twen-
ty years. The most recent Defence White Paper (2010) issued by Beijing, in early 2011, 
notes ‘joint maritime exercises’ with Australia, France, Japan, India, the N etherlands, 
New Zealand, Pakistan, the Republic of South Korea (ROK), Russia, T hailand, the 
U nited Kingdom, the United States and Vietnam (Xinhua 2011b).
China’s use of its navy for diplomatic purposes and to counter actual or perceived 
threats to national interests will become increasingly common as that force gains in cred-
ibility and experience. The PLA Navy’s self-confidence is an important issue directly af-
fecting the civilian leadership’s readiness to employ the navy to defend national interests.
This self-evaluation appears to be modest, as indicated in numerous articles pub-
lished since 2006. The mantra is congratulatory to a point, but then concludes that ‘the 
quality of our officers and soldiers ... military capability ... modernisation of our military 
... weaponry and armaments ... personnel ... logistics ... structure and staffing ... cannot 
match the requirements of winning information-centric local wars.’ Even the 2009 Gulf 
of Aden operations have been described by Chinese ‘experts’ as showing that the PLA 
Navy is ‘still a long way from being strong enough to protect China’s expanding maritime 
rights and interests [due to] problems in helicopter maintenance, logistic supplies and 
telecommunications on the open sea’.14
Despite these doubts, the current modernisation path will result by 2020 in a Chi-
nese Navy that is capable across the spectrum of warfare areas from coastal defence to 
nuclear deterrence. That navy’s self-image will almost certainly grow with its capabilities, 
but its view of its missions and oppositions is less clear. Following a peaceful resolution of 
Taiwan’s status, which now seems likely, the PLA Navy will be in the hunt for additional 
ways of defending and advancing China’s national security interests.
These will likely involve current sovereignty and resources disputes in the East and 
South China Seas, as well as defence of sea lines of communication. This latter mission 
offers extensive potential for cooperation with other navies, ranging from that of the 
United States to those of much smaller Asian and African nations. The PLA Navy pres-
ence in the Gulf of Aden since 2009 offers promise of cooperation: the Chinese warships 
in those waters have at least cooperated with other nations engaged in anti-piracy opera-
tions, although they have yet fully to engage in coordinated efforts.
That is just one indicator though its promise is compromised by General Chen 
Bingde’s statement at the U.S. National Defence University in May 2011 that the Gulf 
of Aden operations were proving too stressful for the PLA Navy to continue. Potential 
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counter-terrorism operations may offer another venue for Chinese naval cooperation with 
other nations, especially if related to the defence of SLOCs in Asian waters. 
Other missions may allow for cooperation with the maritime forces, the navies and 
coast guards, of smaller nations, including Norway. At the most basic level, discussions 
and paper presentations at conference venues, both bilateral and multilateral, are pos-
sible. Beijing recently noted that defence and security consultations have occurred with 
Australia, Egypt, Germany, India, Indonesia, Japan, Mongolia, New Zealand, Pakistan, 
the Philippines, Singapore, South Africa, Thailand, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the 
United Arab Emirates and Vietnam (Xinhua 2011c). The United States should be added 
to this list, through the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement talks, which began in 
1998 and have occurred at least annually since then.
Another possible area of cooperation with the PLA Navy is personnel exchanges, 
between both operational units and military educational institutions. The PLA has con-
ducted such exchanges with many countries around the world (Xinhua 2011d). 
Such cooperation will require Beijing to weigh the balance between international in-
terests and national interests that have been deemed to vital to compromise in the inter-
ests of multi-national cooperation. The signs here, especially with respect to sovereignty 
issue such as those in the East and South China Seas, are not encouraging.
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China’s military modernisation 
and East Asian security
Robert S. Ross
Since the end of the Second World War, the United States has enjoyed near complete 
maritime dominance and absolute maritime security in the Western Pacific Ocean and 
the South China Sea. Both the post-Second World War and the post-Cold War East 
Asian strategic orders reflected US maritime dominance, and contributed as such to 
enduring stability in East Asia’s maritime regions. Where the United States enjoyed su-
premacy in East Asia, there was a ‘hegemonic peace’; on mainland East Asia, however, 
where France, the United States and the Soviet Union each contested in succession with 
Chinese power, there were multiple protracted wars.
 After thirty years of economic growth, technological development and significant 
increases in defence spending, the modernisation of Chinese military capabilities sug-
gests that the era of unqualified US naval security may be coming to a close. If China 
can significantly challenge US maritime dominance, there will be profound implications 
not only for US security and US–China relations, but also for the security of the smaller 
states of East Asia, the US alliance system in East Asia and the East Asian strategic 
order.
 The potential challenge to US security and regional stability will not simply reflect 
the development of the Chinese navy. US strategic presence in East Asia reflects Ameri-
can forward-based naval presence. But China’s territorial presence in East Asia allows 
it to influence maritime affairs with a full array of military capabilities, so that the most 
significant Chinese maritime assets may not reflect Chinese naval modernisation. In this 
respect, it can be misleading to focus on China’s naval capabilities as the source of 
Chinese influence in maritime East Asia and of the emerging challenge to the regional 
security order. Rather, the focus must be on China’s maritime projection capabilities, i.e. 
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not only China’s improving naval capabilities, but its improving land-based capabilities 
as well, and the challenge they pose to US maritime supremacy and the post-Second 
World War maritime strategic order. 
The chapter discusses the potentially important but still technologically immature 
PLA weapon systems together with the response of the US to China’s growing military 
capabilities, which seeks to minimise the latter’s impact on US and regional maritime 
security. The implications of China’s maritime preponderance for the US–China balance 
of power and regional stability are also explored.
ChIna’s ImProvIng marItIme CaPabIlItIes
China’s emerging maritime power depends on three distinct capabilities: its sub-surface 
ships, surface ships and land-based capabilities. In combination they suggest a develop-
ing capability that could destabilise the maritime status quo.
China’s capable submarine fleet
In the aftermath of the Cold War, the Tiananmen incident and the US termination of 
military technology transfers to China in 1989, Beijing turned to Russia for access to 
advanced military technologies. In 1994, Beijing reached an agreement with Moscow 
to purchase four Kilo class diesel submarines; in 2002, an additional eight Kilo class 
submarines were added to the list. These acquisitions indicated that Beijing’s maritime 
priority would be on developing its submarine capability, rather than acquiring surface 
ships. During this same period, China agreed to purchase just four Russian Sovremenny 
class destroyers, though the destroyers did come equipped with the capable Russia SS-
N-22/Sunburn (R-270 Moskit) anti-ship cruise missile.1 The Chinese military under-
stood that the US Navy’s superior reconnaissance and munitions capabilities and the 
limited range of the Sunburn missile would limit destroyers’ ability to move within target 
range of US ships, making Chinese surface ships vulnerable to attack by US forces. 
R ussia’s quiet diesel submarines were more suited to the challenge posed by a superior 
US Navy to Chinese security concerns.
 China’s determination to develop its sub-surface warfare capabilities is another 
challenge to US naval operations in the Western Pacific Ocean. By the the early twenty-
first century, US naval operations within 200 miles of the Chinese coast could no longer 
ignore Chinese capabilities. China’s submarine force was making US naval operations 
increasingly ‘complicated’. To minimise its vulnerability to Chinese capabilities, the US 
Navy had to plan more circuitous and longer routes for a carrier strike force to gain access 
to the Western Pacific Ocean, in particular to the Taiwan theatre, in the event of a con-
flict with China. Moreover, China’s acquisition of Russian Kilo class submarines enabled 
China to develop the expertise to manufacture its own advanced diesel submarines. In 
2001, China’s first Song class submarine entered naval service. This was followed up 
in 2010 when China launched an improved version of the Song, the Yuan class diesel 
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submarine. The Yuan class can be equipped with an air-independent propulsion (AIP) 
system, enabling extended-duration underwater operations and thus greater ability to 
avoid detection. These improved capabilities – as well as improved training – have al-
lowed Chinese submarines to operate at increasing distances from the Chinese coast and 
to carry out increasingly sophisticated operations.2
 The expansion of the PLA Navy’s diesel submarine force marked a significant im-
provement in China’s naval capabilities and in the development of its anti-access ca-
pability in its coastal waters. China’s submarines have challenged unimpeded US naval 
operations in the Western Pacific Ocean and undermined US ability to engage the PLA 
Navy operating in the Taiwan Strait and protect Taiwan from the mainland’s coastal 
water ships and aircraft.
 Nonetheless, China’s existing submarine force has not fundamentally challenged 
the survival of the US surface fleet, or indeed of US maritime supremacy, and it has 
not significantly altered the US–China regional balance. Firstly, diesel submarines are 
intrinsically slow so that Chinese submarines would have difficulty in engaging US ships 
in a carrier strike force. AIP cannot mitigate this weakness (Murray, forthcoming, 4). 
Secondly, Chinese torpedoes have a very short range, approximately 20 nautical miles. 
Before Chinese submarines could engage a US ship, they would have become vulnerable 
themselves to US anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities (Murray, forthcoming, 2; 
Cole 2010, 98). Thirdly, although China’s diesel submarines are quiet, the US Navy has 
improved its ability to identify and carry out surveillance of Chinese submarines. Finally, 
China’s coastal waters are encircled by a dense island chain stretching from the Korean 
Peninsula to the Philippines. The topography facilitates US tracking of Chinese subma-
rines as they enter the Western Pacific Ocean, and enhances US anti-submarine warfare 
capabilities (Yoshihara and Holmes 2011; Cote 2011; Cozad 2009, 300).
Nor can Chinese submarine capabilities challenge the US alliance system in East 
Asia. Insofar as China’s submarines possess only a limited ability to threaten directly 
the territorial security of other countries, they do not extend the PLA Navy’s maritime 
power-projection capability and coercive power against local powers, and thus do not 
allow China to challenge the strategic alignments between the United States and its 
maritime security partners or the East Asian security order (Cozad 2009, 292–293).
 In apparent recognition of the intrinsic limitations of its submarine force and its tor-
pedoes, China has recently begun to equip its submarines with anti-ship cruise missiles 
(ASCM). In 2007 the last Kilo class submarine delivered to China was equipped with 
the Russian SS-N-27B ASCM. The US Department of Defense reports that China has 
developed its own ASCM and that the missile will be deployed on both the Song and 
Yuan class submarines (DoD 2011, 2–4, 29–30). Although China’s submarines will 
have to surface prior to launching the ASCM, the greater range of the missiles compared 
to Chinese torpedoes will enable the submarines to achieve greater surprise and possess 
greater security from US naval forces, thus increasing the challenge to US operations in 
the Western Pacific Ocean.
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China’s surface fleet
China’s limited purchase of the Russian Sovremenny class destroyer reflected its under-
standing of the vulnerability of surface ships equipped with limited-range munitions and 
with steam turbine engines that limit their acceleration and operational manoeuvrability 
to US naval forces. China’s subsequent development of its own destroyers, including the 
Luhai and Luyang classes, suffered from similar limitations. Overall, China’s surface fleet 
has so far done little to constrain US naval operations anywhere in the Western Pacific.
 In August 2011, China launched its first aircraft carrier, the ex-Russian Varyag, sold 
to China in 1998. China’s first aircraft carrier suffers from many of the same limitations 
as its destroyers. It is propelled by a steam turbine engine, which limits its manoeu-
vrability and its ability to remain at sea for an extended period. Developing aircraft for 
the carrier will also be a challenge. China is still unable to manufacture advanced turbo 
engines, and is therefore dependent on Russia for its aircraft engines (Madeiros et al. 
2005, chapter 4). China’s J-15 carrier aircraft remains a project, not a capability, and 
even if it did become a capability, it may well have to rely on Russian engines and spare 
parts. Indeed, just learning to operate aircraft from the carrier in all-weather conditions 
will be a long-term challenge. Management of the carrier and its support vessels will also 
challenge the PLA Navy’s operational abilities. Moreover, as a ‘small’ 55,000 ton ‘ski-
jump’ aircraft carrier, China’s first carrier will be able to deploy relatively few aircraft and 
only aircraft operating with a minimal munitions payload. Thus, not even the deployment 
of the Chinese aircraft carrier can contribute to the ability of the Chinese surface fleet to 
challenge US maritime security. On the contrary, many observers argue that the Chinese 
aircraft carrier will simply become just one more surface-ship target for the US Navy. 
Even a Chinese fleet of three carriers would do little to change China’s capabilities, ex-
cept insofar as it diverts funds from more effective PLA Navy programmes (Ross 2009).
 But just as China is now configuring its many submarines to deploy ASCMs, it is also 
configuring nearly its entire surface fleet to carry ASCM launchers. William Murray of the 
US Naval War College writes that nearly every PLA Navy surface ship carries ASCMs, 
including the Luyang II class destroyer (sometimes referred to as the Luzhou class), 
the Russian Sovremenny class destroyer and the new Houbei class fast-attack catama-
rans. The range of China’s ASCMs is 97–151 nautical miles (Murray, forthcoming; see 
also ONI 2009, 18–20; Cole 2010, 112). The combination of the quantity of China’s 
surface ships and the range of the cruise missiles may compensate for the PLA Navy’s 
limited ASW capability, augment its limited submarine capability and thus significantly 
expand the PLA Navy’s ability to deploy a survivable naval attack force that can challenge 
the security of the US Navy operating in the Western Pacific Ocean. Rather than try to 
develop a traditional carrier-centred surface fleet to contend with US naval power in East 
Asia, China is relying on its development of sea-based missile platforms.
 The PLA Navy’s acquisition of a substantial number of submarines and surface 
ships equipped with ASCMs may help it develop over the next decade an ability to move 
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beyond a coastal anti-access capability for the defence of China’s coastal waters in a 
Taiwan contingency. As China’s navy continues to develop advanced technologies and 
training, it could develop a distant-water capability able to challenge the security of US 
naval operations in the South China Sea and Indian Ocean.
China’s land-based maritime capabilities
In the early post-Cold War era, China’s development of an anti-access capability relied 
not only on Russian submarines but also on the development of land-based coastal ca-
pabilities that could challenge US naval ships operating in China’s immediate coastal 
waters. This coastal capability depended on the acquisition of Russian missiles and air-
craft.
 In 1991 China contracted to purchase from Russia its first batch of S-300 and SA-
10 surface-to air missiles (SAM). By 2005, China had taken delivery of nearly 1,500 
Russian SAMs, and from 2005 to 2009 it had ordered more than 1,000 additional 
missiles. China is now manufacturing its own S-300 missiles. Deployed along the Chi-
nese coast across from Taiwan, their purpose is to protect China’s major cities and com-
munication nodes. The extended range of the S-300 can defend the airspace up to 
120 miles from the Chinese coast (Cliff 2011, 138; Hekler 2011, 247; Cole 2006; 
McDevitt 2007). 
 Chinese military aircraft also contribute to China’s anti-access capability. Since the 
early 1990s, China has purchased Russian Su-27 and Su-30 military aircraft. By 2008, 
it had approximately 170 of these advanced aircraft, most of which have been deployed 
in proximity to the Taiwan Strait. China is now producing the J-11, its own version of the 
Su-30, using Russian jet engines and other advanced Russian technologies.
 China’s land-based air capabilities have transformed the air-defence environment in 
China’s coastal waters and the US–China force-on-force balance in the Taiwan theatre. 
China’s large quantity of highly capable long-range mobile SAMs has made it increas-
ingly risky for US aircraft, including carrier-based F-18s and F-22s operating from Japan 
and Guam, to patrol over the Taiwan Strait and elsewhere within 100 miles of the Chi-
nese coast.3
 China also transformed the maritime theatre in the vicinity of Taiwan by deploy-
ing land-based short-range and medium-range conventional ballistic missiles against 
T aiwan. By the early 2000s, it had deployed over 500 ballistic missiles against Taiwan; 
by the end of the decade, over 1,000 such missiles were deployed against Taiwan. In so 
doing, China has used its land-based capabilities to degrade the capabilities of US for-
ward naval presence and to transform the Taiwan naval theatre. Because neither Taiwan-
ese nor US capabilities, including missile defence systems, can defend against Chinese 
missiles, the PLA has the capacity to project coercive power in the Taiwan Strait and 
across the strait onto Taiwan (Ross 2006). 
 The combination of Chinese land-based air-defence missiles, advanced land-based 
46OslO Files on defenCe and seCurIty 6/2012 The rise of naval powers in Asia
aircraft and ballistic missiles deployed on China’s coast on the Taiwan Strait, as well its 
submarine force, fundamentally altered the strategic environment in the Taiwan Strait. 
China’s modern air defence system has degraded the ability of the US Air Force to pro-
tect Taiwan from Chinese aircraft and ships operating in the Strait, and the US military 
could not prevent Chinese missiles from penetrating Taiwan’s airspace and destroying 
high-value Taiwan targets. US air and naval power could still deter mainland use of 
force against Taiwan, but it could no longer defend Taiwan from the cost of war with the 
P eople’s Republic of China (PRC). 
 This weakening of US ability to defend Taiwan had a transformative effect on 
T aiwan’s mainland policy. Faced with growing dependency for its security, as well as 
its economic prosperity, on mainland forbearance and the corresponding development 
of Chinese coercive military power, Taiwan opted to cooperate with the mainland. In 
2008, Taiwan’s voters elected Ma Ying-jeou as president. Ma opposed the Taiwan inde-
pendence movement and advocated closer economic and political cooperation with the 
mainland. Taiwan’s leaders have also increasingly recognised the futility of providing for 
Taiwan’s defence with a large defence budget and expensive high-technology platforms 
purchased from the United States (RCMND 2011; Mei 2011; Murray 2008). These 
trends in Taiwan’s mainland policy have had implications for US–Taiwan defence coop-
eration and for US expectations of the reliability of future US–Taiwan security relations.
 But it is misleading to equate the rise of Chinese military power in the Taiwan theatre 
with an emergent transformation of the US–China balance in East Asia. In recognition of 
the secondary strategic importance of Taiwan in 1949, the United States ceded Chinese 
control over Taiwan. It only reversed course in June 1950 following the beginning of the 
Korean War, when the US was waging war against communism and was concerned for 
its region-wide credibility to resist communist use of force. The contemporary peaceful 
transformation of the Taiwan defence environment does not challenge US credibility, its 
ability to protect its regional security interests or the East Asian security order. In many 
respects, the Taiwan theatre is the least important maritime theatre in East Asia.
 More importantly, China’s land-based capabilities in the Taiwan theatre are contin-
gency-specific. They do not yield China defensive or coercive maritime capabilities that 
extend beyond the Taiwan theatre to challenge US naval dominance or its strategic part-
nerships that are the foundation of the region-wide security order. Its land-based SAMs 
cannot expand its air-defence capabilities beyond a coastal anti-access capability. The 
Chinese Air Force has yet to develop aircraft that can contend for air superiority with US 
aircraft. The J-11 is a Chinese version of the Su-27/Su-30, and it remains dependent 
on Russian technologies. The J-20 ‘stealth’ aircraft remains a programme rather than 
a capability. China’s jet engine industry continues to confront technological obstacles. 
And even if China were to develop advanced aircraft, their limited range would limit their 
impact on the maritime regional order. China will require an extensive system of overseas 
airbases before it can rely on land-based military aircraft to affect US naval capabilities; it 
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will need to develop capabilities to project power into distant waters to affect region-wide 
US maritime superiority and the security of US allies. This will require different capabili-
ties than those that China has used to reshape the Taiwan theatre.
 China is now developing new missile systems that may affect US capabilities in 
maritime theatres. China’s anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) programme is designed 
around the DF-21D, a medium-range mobile ballistic missile. The DF-21D has a range 
of 800 nautical miles, but can be developed with a range approaching 1,500 nautical 
miles. A land-based ballistic missile that could reliably target US surface ships, especially 
US aircraft carriers, would give the PLA an ability to transform the maritime balance, not 
only because it would give China the opportunity to inflict high costs on the US Navy, 
but also because the ASBMs could neutralise US maritime air assets. This would in 
turn enhance the PLA Navy’s ability to operate securely in distant waters and challenge 
the security of smaller states without the support of carrier-based aircraft (Erickson and 
Yang 2009). Moreover, because it is based on land, the ASBMs would be a relative se-
cure platform. Unlike US air attacks against radar systems in Iraq in 2003 and Libya in 
2011, US targeting of Chinese interior radar installations with conventional munitions 
would entail considerable risk of significant escalation, sufficient in all likelihood to deter 
the United States from attacking China’s ASBM sites.
 The ASBM has received considerable media attention, but perhaps more significant 
for the maritime balance is China’s development of conventional intermediate-range 
ballistic missiles that can target distant fixed assets. Such systems are far less tech-
nologically challenging than the ASBM, but can have significant political and strategic 
consequences. China is developing missiles that can target US air and naval facilities in 
Japan, Singapore and Guam. This capability could enable China to degrade US forward 
presence and its wartime naval operations.4 It could also affect US political relations with 
its regional security partners. Just as Chinese short-range and medium–range ballistic 
missiles undermined Taiwan’s security by diminishing the ability of the US to defend 
Taiwan, and thus re-shaped Taiwan’s mainland policy, Chinese conventional interme-
diate-range ballistic missiles could have a similar coercive effect on US security partners 
elsewhere in East Asia and could thus erode US peace-time strategic presence in mari-
time East Asia and undermine the stability of the regional security order.
obstaCles to ChIna’s develoPment of marItIme 
CaPabIlItIes
China has made considerable progress towards developing capabilities that could chal-
lenge US naval dominance. Nonetheless, China has yet to develop an operational capa-
bility whose relative gains are sufficient to transform the regional maritime balance and 
the US alliance system in maritime East Asia. It faces obstacles of a technological nature 
and in terms of US counter-measures.
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Limits to China’s technological development
Rather than compete with the United States by developing a modern naval fleet that 
could challenge the US Navy, China has focused its resources on developing the missile 
as the one military platform that can effectively challenge US maritime supremacy. Given 
China’s level of technological and organisational sophistication, this is a sensible policy. 
Firstly, missiles rely on a narrow and accessible technology that can contribute to effective 
military capabilities against any adversary, in contrast to the multiple technologies that 
must be developed and integrated to enable development of sophisticated naval power. 
Secondly, effective operation of missiles requires far less organisational and managerial 
sophistication than that required to deploy effectively a naval fleet. Thirdly, missiles are 
far less expensive than ships. Despite the growth of the Chinese GDP since 1978 and 
the corresponding significant growth of the Chinese defence budget, given the size of the 
Chinese ground force army and the many domestic and national security missions that 
China’s PLA must prepare for, cost is not an insignificant consideration for the PLA. 
 Nonetheless, China still faces many significant technological obstacles before it can 
be confident that its sea-based and land-based missile forces can effectively contend 
with US naval capabilities. The most difficult challenge remains the targeting of a mov-
ing object in a large ocean, in which there are many moving objects. China’s long-range 
surveillance system depends on over-the-horizon (OTH) radar systems. Yet OTH radar 
systems possess intrinsic accuracy limitations associated with the technology and oper-
ating environment. A surveillance system for both ballistic missiles and sea-based anti-
ship cruise missiles that can reliably target moving objects at sea will depend on a dense 
system of low-earth-orbit surveillance satellites. China has deployed very few of these 
satellites (Cote 2011, 16, 14, 23–24).
 China has made considerable progress towards developing an ASBM system. It has 
tested the missile on land and developed various surveillance technologies (Hagt and 
Durnin 2009; O’Rourke 2011, 9–16). Nonetheless, it is not clear whether China will 
develop the necessary integrated system of multiple technologies that will enable de-
ployment of a reliable system that can yield the PLA operational capabilities that can 
fundamentally affect US naval operations.
 Similar technological obstacles also impede China’s development of an ASCM naval 
force. Before Chinese submarines and surface ships can fully operationalise a ship-based 
ASCM system that can target a US aircraft carrier, for example, Chinese ships must first 
be able to locate the carrier and communicate its location to the ship. OTH radar sys-
tems are just as inadequate for long-range targeting for ship-based ASCMs as they are 
for land-based ASBMs. Moreover, real-time communication of targeting information to 
submerged submarines remains a challenge.
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US counter-measures and the maritime balance
China is rapidly developing land and naval capabilities that will increasingly complicate 
US naval operations. This trend is inevitable, and it will continue. But even if China were 
to master the many complex technologies and systems necessary to operate an effective 
anti-ship missile capability, there is no ‘magic bullet’ that can fundamentally overturn the 
maritime balance in East Asia. This is because even as China develops its own advanced 
military technologies, the United States is devising counter-measures and continuing to 
modernise its own advanced military capabilities.
 The United States possesses various options to degrade China’s surveillance sys-
tems. Existing camouflage/obscurants and electronic warfare capabilities can interfere 
with advanced surveillance technologies that support Chinese land-based and sea-based 
missile systems.5 Moreover, the irony of China’s development of advanced military tech-
nologies is that the resulting capabilities make China’s military vulnerable to the same 
non-kinetic, ‘asymmetric’ measures that China could presumably use against the su-
perior US military. Advanced surveillance technologies that enable the location of ships 
at sea and missile targeting are vulnerable to US cyber warfare technologies and anti-
satellite capabilities. Thus, the United States could degrade much of China’s ability to 
target US naval assets without having to physically attack Chinese territory. Assuming 
the ‘worst case’ of mutual blinding of surveillance and targeting capabilities, the supe-
riority of US air and naval platforms would enable the United States to retain maritime 
supremacy and significant naval operational freedom (Cote 2011, 23–25).
 But the advent of new technologies that jeopardise the survivability of large surface 
ships also requires the United States to transition to less vulnerable maritime platforms.6 
The United States has already begun this process with the development of next-gen-
eration naval platforms; it deployed its first nuclear-powered cruise missile submarine 
(SSGN) in 2007, and in June 2010 it simultaneously deployed four SSGNs in the Pa-
cific Ocean. Each SSGN can carry 154 Tomahawk cruise missiles and special opera-
tions forces. The United States is also developing sophisticated unmanned aerial vehicles 
(UAVs). It is developing the Unmanned Combat Air System (UCAS) for deployment on 
surface ships. The UCAS will enable the development of smaller, faster, stealthier and 
less expensive aircraft carriers that can elude surveillance systems better than existing 
aircraft carriers. United States UAV Predator and Reaper missions over the Pakistan–
Afghanistan border region have established the effectiveness of UAV combat missions. 
The United States is also developing unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) for ASW 
missions and payload delivery, which will challenge the effectiveness of China’s diesel 
submarine force and its surface fleet, including their ASCM capabilities (DoN 2007; 
O’Rourke 2006).
 These emerging technologies will also enable the United States to offset the vulner-
abilities of its fixed naval facilities in East Asia. Numerous, smaller and less vulnerable 
platforms can deploy from more distant and more secure facilities without sacrificing 
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capability. The political challenge for the United States will be to transition to these less 
visible, smaller naval platforms and more distant basing arrangements without seemingly 
ceding the region to Chinese power and thus degrading the credibility of its commitment 
to defend the maritime states in East Asia and undermining its regional alliance system.
 The United States possesses many critical advantages that enable it to respond ef-
fectively to ongoing advances in China’s maritime capabilities. The challenge for the 
United States is to carry out a timely transition to a twenty-first-century navy that de-
pends less on large, expensive and vulnerable surface ships that carry unnecessary and 
expensive manned aircraft which in turn depend on expensive and vulnerable forward-
based facilities. This is a political and organisational challenge, rather than a technologi-
cal or financial one.
ConClusIon
The modernisation of Chinese maritime capabilities is a significant development in great 
power politics in East Asia. The PLA Navy has developed far greater ability to impose 
significant costs on the US Navy, so that the US naval can no longer sail East Asian 
waters unimpeded by a competitor navy. Force protection is an increasingly difficult task 
for the US Navy.
 But China’s ability to impose increased costs on US naval forces does not provide 
it with a war-winning capability vis-à-vis the United States that can transform Chinese 
risk-taking or with a coercive capability that can threaten the security of US strategic 
partners and US maritime alliances and destabilise the regional security order. Well into 
the twenty-first century the United States can retain conventional military superiority in 
maritime East Asia. Moreover, at stake in the emerging US–China maritime competi-
tion is the balance of power in East Asia. There is no great power interest more likely to 
elicit major war than the regional balance of power, so that US resolve and credibility to 
contend with improved Chinese capabilities should not be in doubt. 
 The PLA is no longer a mere Third World military force. It now poses a major chal-
lenge to the operational freedom of the US Navy. But nor has the PLA become the 
most powerful military force in East Asia. The United States retains numerous significant 
advantages that enable it to approach the People’s Republic of China with confidence, 
rather than with exaggerated alarm, and to sustain its regional alliances and the post-
Cold War regional security order. Such confidence and strategic advantages can inform 
not only US defence strategy for East Asia, but the full range of US diplomatic and politi-
cal relations with its East Asian security partners.
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1 For a recent discussion of China’s inventory of naval ships, see O’Rourke (2011). On China’s acquisition of 
Russian ships and its development of indigenous technologies, see Cole (2010), chapter 5.
2 The Song is discussed in Goldstein and Murray (2004); Murray (2007); and Cole (2010), 95–97.
3 For a discussion of the survivability of China’s SAM batteries, see Vick, et al. (2001).
4 For discussion of the capability for US naval basing in Japan, see Yoshihara (2010).
5 On obscurants, see Culora (2010).
6 On the declining utility of aircraft carriers, see Rubel (2009).

Naval developments in Japan 
Yoji Koda1
In 1952, only seven years after the end of Second World War, the Japan Maritime Guard 
was established as a rudimentary defence organisation for the nation. The leaders of the 
Japan Maritime Guard were determined that the organisation would be a navy, not a 
reinforced coast guard. These leaders were mostly combat-experienced officers (captains 
and below) of the former Imperial Japanese Navy, and had a clear understanding of the 
difference between a coast guard-type law-enforcement force and a navy. Two years 
later, the Japan Maritime Guard was transformed into the Japan Maritime Self-Defence 
Force (JMSDF) with leaders whose dream it was to build a force which had a true naval 
function was stronger than ever.2 However, they also realised the difficulty of re-building 
a real navy in light of the strict constraints imposed by the new, post-war constitution.3
Nonetheless, the JMSDF has built its forces and trained its sailors vigorously with 
this goal in view, and is today one of the world’s truly capable maritime forces in both 
quality and size. In order to understand the true nature of the JMSDF, and the maritime 
power of Japan, it is best to start by examining its defence strategy.
strategy of JaPan and Jmsdf
Since the founding of the Japan Self-Defence Force (JSDF), and within it the JMSDF, in 
1954, Japan has based its defence strategy on the Japan–US Alliance. This posture was 
clearly established by article 4 of Japan’s Basic Policy for National Defence, which was 
adopted by the National Defence Council and approved by the Cabinet on 20 May 1957 
(Asagumo Shinbunshya 2009a; MoDJ 2000, I-1-(4), 17). Four major defence policy 
documents have appeared since then and been approved by the Security Council and the 
Cabinet: National Defence Programme Outlines of 1976 and 1995, and National De-
fence Programme Guideline of 2004 and 2010. They have all confirmed that the basis 
of Japan’s national security and defence is the capability of the JSDF and the Japan–US 
Alliance (MoDJ 2000, I-1-(4), 19–50). 
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Fully complying with this concept, the military strategy of the JSDF has been to build 
and maintain the defence posture of Japan through cooperation with US forces under 
the alliance. Exceptions would be the outbreak of a military conflict, or limited aggres-
sion against Japan, in which case the JSDF would be solely responsible for appropriate 
military measures. Thus the operational concept of the JSDF with respect to US forces 
has been one of complimentary mission-sharing, in which US forces concentrate on 
offensive operations, while the JSDF maximises its capability for defensive operations. 
In other words, the two forces form what is known as a ‘spear and shield’ relationship. 
Under this policy, the Japan Ground Self-Defence Force (JGSDF) remains on Japa-
nese territory and prepares for an enemy invasion, while the US Army and Marine Corps 
prepare for and conduct expeditionary operations against enemy forces outside Japan. In 
the event of an invasion, these three ground forces would fight together on Japanese soil. 
Similarly, the Japan Air Self-Defence Force (JASDF) is to be engaged solely in de-
fence of Japanese air space, while ensuring the safety and security of the Japanese people, 
and of US forces in Japan. Thus, the Japan Air Self-Defence Force relieves US Air Force 
of the heavy burden of air-defence around Japan, enabling Air Force units to allocate 
extra assets for strike and other operations against the enemy. 
As for maritime operations, ensuring the safety and security of the waters around 
Japan is the most important mission of the JMSDF. In this way it ensures that Japan can 
receive American reinforcements from across the Pacific Ocean; it guarantees the safety 
of US naval forces operating around Japan; and enables US carrier strike groups to con-
centrate on strike operations against enemy naval forces and land targets. At the same 
time, for Japan, as a country of few natural resources and little domestic food production, 
the safety of merchant shipping is a matter of national survival in a crisis or wartime. All 
of these operations are grouped under the heading of protection of sea lines of commu-
nication (SLOCs) in the north-western Pacific. The JMSDF has accepted these simple 
realities as the essence of its strategic objectives. 
Proceeding from this defence strategy, the main missions of JMSDF have consist-
ently been defined as the protection of SLOCs and the defence of the homeland in case of 
direct invasion. In support of this defence strategy and its two main missions, in turn, the 
JMSDF has set anti-submarine warfare (ASW) as its main task. The operational concept 
under the Japan–US Alliance is that, in the case of a national or regional contingency, the 
US Navy would deploy carrier strike groups into the seas surrounding Japan, to provide 
strike capability lacking in the JMSDF, thereby obliging the enemy to give up its intention 
to invade Japan or attack its SLOCs. It would be necessary to exclude the enemy’s sub-
marines, which could be the greatest threat to carrier strike group operations in Japanese 
waters, as indeed to the safety of SLOCs around Japan. As a result of this logic, anti-
submarine warfare was the main pillar of JMSDF missions. Even in the present security 
environment, 20 years after the end of the Cold War and the threat of invasion from 
the Soviet Union, two factors remain unchanged: the Japan–US Alliance, and Japan’s 
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dependence on imported natural resources. Therefore the protection of SLOCs has con-
tinued to be a main mission for the JMSDF.
Homeland defence, of course, remains as a mission as well, however unlikely its 
occurrence. It is based on a scenario of a direct invasion of Japan by enemy ground 
forces. This would certainly be a state of national emergency, and each branch of the 
JSDF should do its best to repel the enemy. At the same time, homeland defence opera-
tions would involve many unforeseeable factors, such as how and where enemy forces 
will invade, and how US forces would assist the JSDF. Projecting counter-measures and 
courses of action for all possible scenarios is complicated. In any case, certain operations 
associated with the protection of SLOCs – for example, establishing and maintaining 
conditions necessary for US forces arriving in the waters around Japan – also contribute 
to homeland defence.
In other words, it is inappropriate to consider separately the operations required 
for each mission. Accordingly, the JMSDF has made it a basic policy to address the 
homeland-defence mission by giving full priority to the warfare capabilities, especially 
anti-submarine warfare, required for the SLOC-protection mission, in the belief that it 
can best contribute to Japan’s homeland security by defeating invasion forces at sea.
Jmsdf In the twenty-fIrst Century
The real capability of the JSDF, in all warfare areas, is to fight modern combat wars – 
either unilaterally, or bilaterally with US naval forces under the Alliance umbrella. This 
capability has improved substantially over the years. At the same time, there are two new 
factors in the security environment of the 1990s, and the first decade of the twenty-first 
century. 
One was the many side effects of the end of the Cold War and demise of the Soviet 
Union and Eastern-bloc nations, around 1990. In the military community, new types 
of non-combat missions, which used to be considered as secondary ones, such as hu-
manitarian assistance and disaster relief operations and counter-trafficking/illegal im-
migration operations, became the main or at least semi-main missions of military. At the 
same time, peacekeeping operations became important military missions as well. In this 
environment, a new form of international military cooperation, ‘a coalition’, became the 
standard framework of multinational cooperation after the First Iraq War.
The second factor was the rise of China. Firstly, China emerged as a economic power 
from early 1990s; then it grew to be an economic superpower, whose GDP equalled that 
of Japan by the mid-2000s, surpassing it in 2010. China’s extreme economic growth 
has supported a substantial and sustained military build-up and modernisation of the 
People’s Liberation Army (PLA). 
When we shift our view from global to domestic change in Japan, there is another 
factor to consider. The Japanese economy, which had supported ambitious JMSDF mod-
ernisation programmes in the 1980s and ’90s, stalled in the mid-1990s, and has never 
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recovered. Japan’s defence budget has also been continuously decreased, by about 1 per 
cent per year, since 2000. 
JSDF and JMSDF took these three new factors, two international and one domes-
tic, into consideration, and started adjusting strategies and force build-up programmes. 
New strategies were outlined in the 2005 and 2010 National Defence Guidelines Pro-
gramme, which emphasised three common policies for the twenty-first century.
 
•	 The continued importance of the Japan–US Alliance
•	 A determined intent to build and maintain a reasonably-sized and capable JSDF, 
which would fully meet future security challenges
•	 A new initiative to actively participate in various international security activities. 
The basic idea was that while keeping the Japan–US Alliance as a building block of 
national and regional security, Japan would play a larger role in world and regional 
security affairs (MoDJ 2011, 161–162)
For the JMSDF, the following are the basic components of its new posture and force 
strength, which takes into consideration the above-mentioned revised strategy and force 
build-up policy. With regard to force strength of front line equipment, there have been 
some reductions in size, but the quality of each force should be improved on a continual 
basis.
Surface force
The size of the surface force was reduced, but new ships and programmes have been 
maintained. For example, the new third-generation Hyuga class helicopter destroyer 
(DDH) (two ships, 20,000 tons, 30 knots, 10 helicopters, 350 personnel), has replaced 
the aging Haruna class first-generation helicopter destroyers. The remaining two second-
generation helicopter destroyers will be replaced by larger helicopter destroyers (25,000 
tons, 30 knots, more than 15 helicopters and 350 personnel) in the current five-year 
programme. Two more Aegis guided missile destroyers (10,000 tons, 30 knots, 300 
personnel) with latest combat systems have joined the fleet. There are six Aegis guided 
missile destroyers and two Tarter guided missile destroyers in the fleet. JMSDF plans to 
replace these remaining two Tarter guided missile destroyers with the latest Aegis guided 
missile destroyers in the next five-year programme. 
There have been continued efforts to improve the destroyers. As the first-generation 
of new destroyers needed improvements, 12 Hatsuyuki class (4,000 tons, 30 knots, 
one helicopter with 220 personnel) and eight Asagiri class (4,500 tons, 30 knots, one 
helicopter with 220 personnel) destroyers were built in the 1980s and early 1990s, 
followed by the second generation of new, larger and more capable Murasame type (nine 
ships, 6,200 tons 30 knots, two helicopters and 160 personnel) and improved Ta-
kanami class destroyers (five ships, 6,300 tons, 30 knots, two Helicopters and 160 
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personnel), built in the late 1990s and early 2000s. The third generation was developed 
in 2007, consisting of the improved Akizuki class destroyer (7,000 tons, 30 knots, two 
helicopters, 160 personnel). 
At the same time, due to budget constraints and changes in the regional security 
environment, the coastal defence destroyer force was reduced from ten divisions of 30 
ships (3 destroyers for each division) to four divisions of 16 ships (four destroyers for 
each division). Also, one flagship was discontinued in 2007. The total strength of the 
destroyer force has thus been taken down from 63 to 48 ships under the new 2010 
defence concept (i.e. National Defence Programme Guidelines).
Aviation
There is a new aviation programme which intends to develop follow-on maritime patrol 
aircraft to the current large fleet of P-3C maritime patrol aircraft. The development of 
this new maritime patrol aircraft (P-1) started in 2001, and was subsequently success-
fully completed. The budget for the first four new maritime patrol aircraft was approved 
in 2008. According to a media report, about 70 P-1s will replace 80 P-3Cs. The faster 
speed and longer endurance of P-1 aircraft will make up for some of the reduction of the 
overall inventory of P-1 in the Self-Defence Force.
The up-grade programme for the anti-submarine warfare (ASW) helicopter differs. 
In the 1980s, JMSDF used the HSS-2B as the first-generation ASW helicopter to im-
prove fleet capability, which was closely linked to the first generation of Hatsuyuki-class 
destroyers. Then, in the 1990s, the JMSDF shifted from the HSS-2B to the SH-60J 
whose airframe and engines were the same as United States Navy’s SH-60s. The on-
board mission-avionics system of this helicopter was domestically developed to meet the 
JMSDF’s unique operational requirements; the aircraft was designated ‘SH-60J’ within 
the JMSDF. SH-60 was a multi-purpose aircraft, with the latest ASW capability; it was 
very satisfactory except for its small fuselage and cabin. JMSDF therefore started an 
upgrade programme in the mid-1990s, which included enlarging the fuselage, adding 
infra-red forward-looking equipment, short-range air-to-surface missiles, and a 7.62 
mm (0.30 inch) calibre machine gun; as well as self-protection systems (chaff and flare). 
This upgraded helicopter was designated ‘SH-60K’, and started entering fleet service in 
2005.
Submarine force
The submarine force also kept on improving. Following the Harushio class, built from 
1990 to 1997 (seven boats, 2,700 tons), eleven Oyashio class (3,000 tons) boats were 
built, from 1998 to 2008. The new characteristics of the Oyashio sister boats are the 
latest command and control, as well as an improved display system. The next generation 
boat, the Soryu class (3,300 tons), was planned in 2005, and completed in 2009. It is 
the first JMSDF submarine to be equipped with an operational air-independent propul-
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sion system. There are several improvements including installation of X-shaped rudder 
and satellite communication system, from the preceding Oyashio class boats, and large 
numbers of this class will be built as core boats for the JMSDF’s submarine force. 
One noteworthy development is the JMSDF’s intention to increase the number of 
its submarines from 16 to 22 boats. This is considered to be a new initiative to prepare 
the JMSDF for the recent and quick expansion of the PLA Navy. Not least, JMSDF sub-
marines could be a ‘trump card’ in denying the activities of the PLA Navy in the waters 
surrounding Japan.
Mine counter-measure force (MCM)
In the mine counter-measure community, one essential change has taken place, the 
merging of the two existing MCM flotillas into a single Mine Force (MF: the Japanese 
designation is still the ‘Flotilla’). Along with this move, the number of MCM divisions 
was reduced to eight, while that of MCM vessels fell to 24. At the same time, more 
focus was placed on an unmanned mine-neutralisation system. The JMSDF succeeded 
in strengthening the MCM force, both in quality and quantity, by the early 2000s. The 
JMSDF then committed itself to improving the safety of the MCM force by developing 
the latest unmanned and autonomous MCM system, which would be unilaterally capa-
ble of searching, detecting, locating, identifying, classifying and neutralising sea mines. 
This system is designated ‘S-10’ and was first installed on a new type of MCM vessel, 
completed in 2008. MCM helicopters were upgraded from the old MH-53E to the lat-
est MCH-101 (European) model .
new InItIatIves
In addition to the aforementioned changes to force strength, other initiatives have been 
pursued and developed by the JMSDF. One has been the introduction of ballistic missile 
defence (BMD) capability to the Self-Defence Force by fully utilising its Aegis guided 
missile destroyer fleet. The most serious concern of Japan, after the end of the Cold War, 
has been over North Korea’s development of nuclear and ballistic missiles in the 1990s. 
North Korea’s aggressive actions have caused serious concern among the Japanese peo-
ple, especially North Korea’s attempt to test launch a ballistic missile in August 1998, 
which triggered the decision to build an effective ballistic missile defence network in 
Japan (MoDJ 2011, 238).4 Based on this decision, Japan and the US agreed to jointly 
participate in bilateral ballistic missile defence efforts at that time. Thanks to the US 
Navy’s already-launched BMD development efforts with its Aegis ships, it became quite 
clear that the Aegis guided missile destroyer fleet of the JMSDF would also become an 
integral part of Japan’s ballistic missile defence programme. Four guided missile destroy-
ers were modified to become BMD-capable ships in the mid-2000s, and live launch 
and engagement tests were successfully conducted at US Navy’s Hawaiian test range. 
A second initiative is the creation of a Special Force unit within JMSDF (BDH of 
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2006 (2009), 582–588). This new unit is called a Special Boarding Unit, and is in-
tended to be deployed in an armed resistance environment involving North Korean clan-
destine boat operations around Japan. The size of the special boarding unit today is 
very small, that is, it has a headquarters unit and several ready platoons, some training 
platoons, and about company-size Special Force capable personnel. In harmony with the 
establishment of the special boarding unit, JMSDF also built six surface-to-surface mis-
siles equipped high-speed patrol craft to prepare to counter North Korea’s actions near 
the coastal waters of Japan. These boats are capable of more than 40 knots, displace 
about 400 tons and will be a primary reaction force against clandestine operations from 
North Korea.
As the JMSDF will expand non-combat international operations such as counter-
piracy activities or other maritime interdictions, there will be a growing need to expand 
the size of its capable Special Force. At some point in the future, there will certainly be a 
possibility of expanding the special boarding unit into a US Navy SEAL-type real Special 
Force. 
Challenges: the modernIsatIon of the Pla navy and JaPan’s 
strategIC shIft from the north to the west
A new concern for Japan in the twenty-first century is the rise of the People’s Republic 
of China. China has been enthusiastically modernising its army and navy for the last ten 
years. Especially the PLA Navy’s modernisation and its expanded activities in the north-
western Pacific, East China Sea, South China Sea and Indian Ocean, have generated 
serious concern in neighbouring nations and their navies. The JMSDF is not an excep-
tion. The National Defence Programme Guidelines, published in 2010, clearly shows a 
strategic shift from a ‘Strategy in Cold War days (1950 to 1990), and the following un-
stable 1990s’, to a ‘new strategy focusing on growing People’s Republic of China’. This 
shift is quickly summarised as a ‘shift from North to West’ in Japan (MoDJ 2011, 521).
However, for the JMSDF in this new security environment, its main missions are 
still to protect Japan’s SLOCs and to support US Navy operations in the north-western 
Pacific and surrounding waters. Similarly, JMSDF’s strategy in the Cold War days was 
also to conduct defensive operations in the north-western Pacific and in the surrounding 
waters of Japan. So, for JMSDF, this strategic shift of primary ‘nation of concern’ from 
the Soviet Union to China had little impact on its strategic planning. In other words, the 
north-western Pacific and surrounding waters of Japan have been JMSDF’s main thea-
tres of defence operations in the past, and will remain so in the future. 
Contrary to the JMSDF, the Japan Ground Self-Defence Force and the Japan Air 
Self-Defence Force allocated most of their forces to the northern part of Japan during 
the Cold War. These two services will thus have to reallocate and relocate their fighting 
forces from northern to western Japan. 
Otherwise, there are small changes for the JMSDF in the strategic shift. It is still 
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very important for JMSDF today to maintain its capability, developed and improved to 
meet the new challenges of the 1990s and 2000s. This will surely mean contributing 
to protecting vital SLOCs and providing support operations for the US Navy, as well as 
conducting homeland defence of Japan. 
At the same time, there are several new developments, considerations and key con-
cepts in the PLA Navy’s strategy, which are listed here. 
•	 Anti Access/Area Denial and Anti Ship Ballistic Missile
•	 Area of core national interests: The South China Sea and the East China Sea
•	 Territorial disputes and natural resource competition
•	 String of Pearls: South China Sea and Indian Ocean
•	 Island Chains: Island Chain of Okinawa and that on Ogasawara of Japan
•	 New naval base in Hainan Island in South China Sea
•	 Aircraft carrier programme
•	 Naval Strategic Arms
•	 Asymmetric warfare
The JMSDF needs to respond to these challenges and maintain sufficient maritime ca-
pabilities against the PLA Navy. In this process, the JMSDF should cooperate closely 
with the US Navy, because the main focus – or strategic objective – of China’s and the 
PLA Navy’s strategy, is directed at the US Navy. China and the PLA Navy have strong 
intentions to create favourable situations which will erode Washington’s intention and 
determination to intervene in Asian areas, and, if possible, to prevent the deployment of 
US naval forces in this region at any time, even in peace time. So, there is a lot for JMSDF 
and US Navy to do to deny and neutralise China’s strategic ambitions.
One favourable situation is the fact that the current JMSDF’s strength and capabili-
ties are so well-designed to support US Navy operations in the East Asia region. JMSDF’s 
current strength, in terms of its capability to conduct non-nuclear maritime operations, 
is probably second only to the US Navy’s in the world. So, for the US Navy, there is a ro-
bust JMSDF force, whose size and non-strike defensive operation capabilities are almost 
twice as large as that of the US Navy’s 7th Fleet. It is as if there are two additional fleets, 
operating in the north-western Pacific in support of US strike and expeditionary forces in 
this region. So, if the two navies coordinate and cooperate well, they will surely be able to 
handle the PLA Navy’s growing forces. If not, our future could be devastating.
ProsPeCt for CooPeratIon wIth small modern navIes In  
dIfferent sCenarIos
Policy of the Government of Japan: Reluctant and restrained
The basic policy of the Japanese Government on military cooperation between Japan 
and foreign nations has been very restrained. This is mainly due to the so-called ‘Pacifist 
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Constitution’, which was enacted after the Second World War. The Constitution prohib-
its Japan from 
•	 declaring any form of war, and using forces as sovereign rights of the nation to settle 
international disputes
•	 having of military forces for above purpose, and 
•	 sending any forces to foreign territory5
At the same time, the Government’s interpretation of ‘collective self-defence’ is another 
negative element of this reluctant policy. The Government’s policy on this subject is that 
in light of the fundamental tenets of the Pacifist Constitution, Japan as a sovereign nation 
has both rights of self-defence and collective defence; however, given the fundamental 
spirit of the constitution, while the exercise of the right of self-defence as a sovereign na-
tion is constitutional, exercising the right of collective defence is counter-constitutional. 
Based on this reading, the Government designated the JSDF as a military power solely for 
the defence of the nation, which has been recognised as a constitutional force under the 
post-war Pacifist Constitution (Asagumo Shinbunshya 2009b, 582–588).
The relationship between JSDF and US forces under the alliance is influenced in 
basically the same manner. In theory, and under the above-mentioned interpretation, 
the two forces will fight together in an emergency or situation of aggression, under a 
common OPLAN6 developed as part of the US–Japanese Alliance agreement; however, 
in a tactical situation, there are two different independent command structures, which 
coordinate and cooperate. No single commander commands these two forces fighting 
together against a common foe, on the same battlefield. Rather, they have to fight under 
independent commands to establish common goals. 
Also, the JSDF cannot execute its right of collective defence; and in some extreme 
scenarios, the JSDF cannot directly protect US forces coming under attack. Of course, 
even in this difficult scenario, JSDF will attack and destroy enemy forces which attack 
US forces, but in theory, JSDF attacks the same enemy force for self-defence, not for the 
protection of US forces under attack. 
This is the relationship between the JSDF and its single allied partner, the US. From 
the US side, this policy has been very disappointing. For example, it is frustrating to the 
US that US forces will defend the JSDF in a combat situation, but a combat-capable 
JSDF will not protect US forces in jeopardy, simply due to Government’s abstract policy. 
This is one of several convincing tenets behind the currently influential ‘Japan is a free 
rider or cheap rider‘ school of thought. Having said this, however, practical relations 
between the JSDF and US forces, especially between the JMSDF and the US Navy, have 
been extremely good at almost all periods of the Alliance. This navy-to-navy relationship 
has been widely accepted as a centre-piece of the Japan–US Alliance. From the JMSDF’s 
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foundation and past the end of Cold War, the US Navy has practically been the only navy 
to fully exchange and maintain a close relationship with it.
Overseas training cruise
In the context of these unique Government defence policy interpretations, it is natural 
that the Government becomes more cautious and puts restraints on military exchanges 
and cooperation with foreign nations other than the US. Due to this negative policy of 
the Government, the JMSDF’s relationship with foreign navies has also been at a low 
ebb for many years. Except for the annual 150-day overseas training cruise for newly 
commissioned ensigns – which was a long-maintained tradition of the Imperial Japanese 
Navy – there have been practically no other opportunities for JMSDF to establish close 
relationships with other navies than the US Navy. 
From this view point, for the JMSDF, overseas training cruises have presented a 
unique but limited opportunity for building relations with other navies, especially from 
first cruise in 1957 to the early 1990s. Basically, the annual cruise can take one of five 
routes: Pacific and Oceania; North America; South America; Indian Ocean, Middle East 
and Africa; and round the world (including the Mediterranean Sea and Europe). 
The JMSDF’s Training Squadron, which carries about 180 newly commissioned 
ensigns on three ships, takes one of these routes, and visits about ten nations every 
year. For the JMSDF, this overseas cruise is not only a simple exchange opportunity with 
regional navies, but also a means to show its strategic presence in waters remote from 
where the JMSDF normally operates as a real self-defence force. In the 1990s, after the 
end of Cold War, military exchanges became one important measure to enhance mutual 
understanding among regional nations. The JMSDF started inviting junior officers or 
midshipmen/naval cadets of visiting regional nations to join these training cruises, fully 
or partially. The result of this exchange has been evaluated as extremely productive by 
the JMSDF and its counterparts.
Bilateral confidence and security building measures
A new worldwide initiative towards and after the end of the Cold War, culminated in 
measures aimed at building confidence and security. The US and Soviet navies started 
and realised this initiative in the late 1980s, and concluded a Prevention of Incident at 
Sea agreement. Many nations and navies followed suit and started promoting various 
confidence and security building activities. The JMSDF started several exchanges with 
the Russian Navy in the early 1990s. Ships visit each others’ ports, take part in joint 
search and rescue exercises, all considered good at promoting confidence and security 
building.
The JMSDF has been trying to start search and rescue exercises with the PLA Navy; 
however, due to political sensitivity in China, this initiative has yet to be successfully real-
ised yet. There was only one mutual Japan–China naval ship visit in 2007, and no more 
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after that. In addition to this, the visit of the JMSDF’s Training Squadron to Shanghai 
in 2011 was cancelled at the last moment, due to China’s discomfort over the Senkaku 
issue in September 2010.
other bIlateral CooPeratIon
There are several more successful bilateral exchange and cooperation exercises with 
other friendly nations. However, it is not easy for Japan to establish close relations with 
Asian nations. There are still strong historical and psychological issues to overcome, 
arising from the wariness of many Asian nations, caused by the bitter experiences of the 
Second World War. The JMSDF first approached the Royal Australian Navy in the early 
1990s; then the Republic of Korea Navy in the late 1990s. The Australian Navy has 
played an important role in bridging the divide between the JMSDF and Asian navies, 
such as the Singaporean Navy, the Royal Malaysian Navy and Indonesian Navy. Bilateral 
relationships with these navies have been very good since the mid-1990s. So, it may not 
be surprising that the JMSDF’s relationship with regional Asian navies is not an old one 
with a long history, but still a relatively new one, developed after mid-1990s. 
New cooperative framework: Western Pacific Naval Symposium
The Western Pacific Naval Symposium is a good multilateral and intra-regional frame-
work to discuss common maritime subjects among member and observer navies. The 
first symposium was held in 1988, and the JMSDF started participating in 1994. One 
of the reasons for the JMSDF’s delayed participation is the above-mentioned restrictive 
policy of the Japanese Government regarding international military exchange. However, 
the JMSDF’s first participation convinced the Government of the positive nature of the 
symposia, and there were no objections thereafter from the Government on this subject. 
The JMSDF hosted two symposia in Tokyo in 1996 and 2002. Under the umbrella of 
the Western Pacific Naval Symposium several programmes were organised to promote 
mutual understanding and facilitate productive relationships. The submarine rescue ex-
ercise and mine counter-measure exercise are two extremely successful programmes de-
veloped under this framework. At the same time, there are several forums for junior and 
mid-career officers, and personnel exchange programmes among participating navies, 
which are also regarded as very effective measures to meet symposium objectives. The 
symposium framework really provides various opportunities to JMSDF to establish and 
promote mutual understanding and cooperative postures with regional navies.
three maJor InCIdents In the twenty-fIrst Century
Operation Enduring Freedom 
The terrorist attacks against the United States on 11 September 2001, also caused a 
radical change to the Japanese Government’s policy on international contributions. At 
that time, the Government took full consideration of the Japan–US Alliance, and interna-
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tional efforts in the war against terrorism. And, in November 2001, the Government sent 
JMSDF units to support maritime interdiction operations, a part of Operation Enduring 
Freedom, conducted in the northern Indian Ocean and Arabian Gulf. The composition 
of the deployed JMSDF units was normally one or two fast combat support ships, i.e. 
fleet oiler and supply ships, and one to three escorting destroyers with helicopters. This 
operation lasted about eight years, and was terminated in January 2010 by the Govern-
ment formed by the newly-elected Democratic Party of Japan (MoDJ 2011, 521). 
During this period, JMSDF units delivered mainly fuel and fresh water to ships from 
the US, UK, Canada, the Netherlands, Spain, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan and 
New Zealand. Pakistan’s Navy joined these customer navies in later years. The eight-
year-long deployment was the first opportunity JMSDF had had to cooperate with many 
European/NATO navies.
In this operation, the JMSDF units joined a coalition force, and close coordination 
with US 5th Fleet/COMNAVCENT made JMSDF’s support operation with non-US na-
vies proceed very smoothly. The JMSDF had strong confidence in conducting this type 
of support operation with unfamiliar European friendly navies, which use a common 
operational standard.
Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) operations in Sumatra, Indonesia 
While maintaining JMSDF’s support force for Operation Enduring Freedom, the Gov-
ernment reacted comprehensively to the 26 December 2004 earthquake and tsunami 
disaster in Sumatra, Indonesia. The Government responded quickly and sent a joint hu-
manitarian assistance and disaster relief force composed of units from the three services 
of the JSDF. These forces included one JMSDF tank-landing ship which carried the Japan 
Air Self-Defence Force’s three CH-47 and two UH-60JA helicopters, as well as the 
tank-landing ship’s own two air-cushion landing craft. The JMSDF also sent one fast 
combat support ship and one helicopter destroyer, which carried three SH-60J helicop-
ters. The Japan Ground Self-Defence Force also sent medical support teams and the 
Japan Air Self-Defence Force was engaged in transport operations between Japan and 
the tsunami-hit areas using several C-130 transport aircraft and U-4 Gulf Stream utility 
aircraft.
The JSDF’s units joined the international HADR team which came from almost all 
over the world, and the JSDF accumulated precious experience and learned a lot from 
this multinational HADR operation. This was the second opportunity for the JMSDF to 
cooperate with many foreign navies, some from Europe. The JMSDF thereby developed 
stronger confidence in future cooperation with foreign navies.
Counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden and waters off Somalia
Japan started to send JMSDF units to the Gulf of Aden and waters off of Somalia in 
March 2009. The JMSDF has deployed both escorting destroyers and P-3Cs to conduct 
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counter-piracy operations. JMSDF’s counter-piracy operations are different from Op-
eration Enduring Freedom support operations. Due to the Government’s concern over 
collective security, the JMSDF units operate independently in their own counter-piracy 
operations. In order to fully comply with the Government’s collective security policy, the 
Government also prohibited JMSDF units from receiving any command from foreign 
commanders. However, there has been practical cooperation and coordination among 
many coalition navies, especially with the US Navy and other independent navies such 
as PLA Navy and the Russian Navy.
One experience is the fact that wide-area ocean surveillance information provided 
by JMSDF’s P-3Cs has been an indispensable element in the overall counter-piracy op-
erations in these waters. This operation is another opportunity for JMSDF to improve its 
cooperation capability in the future. 
ConClusIon
The JMSDF, which is uniquely constrained, has long been a bilateral maritime force with 
the US Navy. At the same time, the JMSDF has built a robust ‘tailored’ fleet, which meets 
the strategic requirements of Japan. The JMSDF today has become a well-balanced mar-
itime force built around a strong anti-submarine war capability, which is indispensable to 
carry out its strategic tasks. The JMSDF’s missions are to protect Japan’s SLOCs, support 
the US Navy’s operations in the north-western Pacific region, and contribute to its own 
homeland defence. From these points of view, the JMSDF today has become a world 
class navy, both in quality and quantity. 
However, with regard to its operations, the JMSDF has very little experience in in-
ternational cooperation. Except for its overseas training cruises, and several joint exer-
cises and training operations with the US Navy in US waters, the JMSDF had almost 
no international experience until the end of the Cold War. The JMSDF, together with 
the Government’s new policy, started expanding its international cooperation from the 
early 1990s. Hence, the JMSDF’s experience and history in this area are relatively short 
(about 20 years) and limited. 
Simultaneously, the JMSDF has also participated in several key international col-
laborative efforts during the last 20 years, and accumulated much valued experience and 
lessons. Generally speaking, the JMSDF is a capable navy able to join any form of non-
combat international cooperative venture anywhere in the world. In order for the JMSDF 
to accomplish and succeed in this type of international mission, close cooperation and 
coordination with the US Navy will be a key. In the past, the US Navy has been a strong 
supporter of this type of JMSDF operation. This is one of the benefits of more than half a 
century of the Japan–US Alliance.
Having said so, it is true that there are some new areas which the JMSDF could 
improve on. If the JMSDF takes future international cooperation with small to medium 
modern navies seriously, in different scenarios and in different areas, then it needs to 
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develop a new strategy and force development concept for this purpose. This type of 
international cooperation in remote areas has been considered as an alien operation to 
the JMSDF’s traditional missions and areas of responsibility. In this context, the JMSDF 
is not designed to function in the new missions, such as Operation Enduring Freedom, 
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief and counter-piracy, as discussed in this ar-
ticle. In order to meet this new challenge, parts of JMSDF’s strategy and force build-up 
concept should at least be reviewed. This could include positioning of international co-
operation in JMSDF’s tasking and adjusting the size of its required force strength for this 
purpose. And the most important factor here is the Government’s policy and support of 
such operations. In most scenarios in the foreseeable future, the JMSDF, supported by 
the US Navy and other navies in a deployed area, will be able to conduct and establish 
its given tasks by fully utilising its capabilities.
notes
1 This article represents the personal opinions of the author and not any official position of the JMSDF or the 
Government of Japan.
2 The Japan Maritime Guard was established in the Japan Maritime Safety Agency (later Japan Coast Guard) on 26 
April 1952. On 1 July 1954, the JMSDF was inaugurated within the Japan Defence Agency together with the 
ground and air self-defence forces. See MoDJ (1987) 542–43.
3 The new constitution of Japan, which replaced the Meiji constitution of 1889, came into effect on 3 May 1947 
in occupied Japan. Article 9 prohibits Japan from having armed forces: ‘Aspiring sincerely to an international peace 
based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the 
threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.
 In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea and air forces, as well as other war potential, 
will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.’ (Website of the Japanese 
Government: www.kantei.go.jp)
 The government’s interpretation of article 9 is that the constitution bans ‘wars of aggression’, not ‘wars of self-
defence’. Accordingly, the Japan Self-Defence Force (JSDF) – designed to act only in the defence of the nation 
if attacked – is purely a constitutional entity. This was the collective view of the Hatoyama Cabinet, submitted 
22 December 1954, and reprinted in Boei Handbook of 2009 (JSFD 2009a), chapter 12, ‘Position of the 
Government of Japan on Defence of Japan’, 604.
4 The Japanese Ministry of Defence does not officially designate Chinese threats in the White Paper. However, if 
we take all security elements in the region into consideration, it is clear that the Ministry and the Japanese Self-
Defence Force have started a realignment of the strategic front from north to west of Japan.
5 See footnote 2 above.
6 OPLAN = a military operation plan by the United States and South Korea for the defence against a North Korean 
invasion whereby Japanese bases are available if the US goes to war with North Korea.
Naval developments in India 
and multilateral cooperation 
Vijay Sakhuja1 
There is a strong belief among the Indian elite that it was the neglect of the seas that 
led to India’s domination by the colonial powers during the fifteenth to the nineteenth 
century, first by the Portuguese, then by the British and French. Significantly, the colonial 
supremacy came from the sea, to the littorals and into the heartland. Therefore, it is 
important for India to build an autonomous maritime military capability to preclude the 
dominance of the littorals by any external power. 
Since independence in 1947, India has engaged in land wars with China (1962) 
and Pakistan (1949, 1965 and 1971), shaping India’s military modernisation. The 
Indian policy-makers developed a strong continental mindset which led to the neglect of 
the Navy. However, India was confronted with two events at sea, both stark reminders of 
the dangers of external intervention from the sea, and reminiscent of the colonial past. 
The first was the dispatch of a naval flotilla by Indonesia during the 1965 Indo–Pakistani 
War to deter India from fighting Pakistan with a threat of opening another war front in 
the Andaman and Nicobar islands (PNHS 1991, 228–229). The second was the US 
decision to dispatch Task Force 74 led by USS Enterprise in the culminating stages of the 
1971 India–Pakistani war (Singh 2002, 63).
For India, the Navy also gains salience by the imperatives of globalisation and eco-
nomic growth. Over 97 per cent of India’s trade by volume and 75 per cent by value is 
seaborne; if one follows the ‘direction of trade’, nearly 50 per cent is eastbound, towards 
the Asia Pacific region, which is the current centre of gravity of global economic power. 
India imports nearly two-thirds of its energy requirements, the bulk of which is sourced 
from the Persian Gulf and West Africa. The safety and security of its energy supply 
chains and sea lanes through the Indian Ocean and the Asia Pacific waters, particularly 
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the Straits of Malacca and South China Sea, are critical to India’s economic growth and 
prosperity. 
There is also a heavy concentration of economic hubs in the coastal region, which 
constitute the engines of India’s economic growth. A number of infrastructures such as 
ports, shipyards and industrial hubs, have mushroomed in the coastal areas to support 
a burgeoning trade, which contributes enormously to national economic growth. Thus 
the naval power of India is also derived from the strategic necessities of globalisation and 
economic development. 
With 70,000 personnel and over one hundred combatants, the Indian Navy is the 
third largest in Asia after those of China and Japan. The vision of the Indian Navy envis-
ages building robust capabilities to safeguard India’s sovereignty and protect national 
interests. It is acquiring a number of surface and sub-surface platforms capable of long-
range, sustained operations supported by manned and unmanned aviation capabilities. 
In the nuclear domain, Indian strategic thinking pivots on an appropriate response in the 
form of deterrence from the sea across the peace–crisis continuum. 
IndIa’s marItIme strategy and forCe struCture 
India’s military maritime strategy identifies the Indian Ocean region as the primary area 
of interest and operations. This includes sea space encompassing the Strait of Bab-el-
Mandeb, Strait of Hormuz, Straits of Malacca and Cape of Good Hope. The Red Sea, 
South China Sea, southern Indian Ocean and East Pacific region have been classified as 
secondary areas of interest to the Indian Navy but would gain ascendency should events 
and incidents in these sea spaces impinge on India’s national interests (MoD I 2007, 
59–60). 
India’s maritime doctrine lays out the missions entrusted to the Indian Navy and the 
capabilities required for a number of tactical missions involving combat actions, coercive 
manoeuvres and benign operations. The doctrine supports the operational tenets of flex-
ibility, battle space dominance, decisive action through sea control, sea denial, guerre de 
course, naval blockade and combat in surface-subsurface-space-shore (S4) continuum. 
The doctrine also notes that it is critical for the Indian Navy to protect India’s exclusive 
economic zones that stretch over 2.3 million square kilometres.
The Indian Navy’s current force structure comprises nearly 140 vessels, including 
one aircraft carrier, eight destroyers, 13 frigates, 25 corvettes, 16 conventional subma-
rines, and a large number of smaller combatants. The inventory also includes several 
logistic support vessels and survey platforms. As far as air assets are concerned, the 
Indian Navy has a number of long/medium-range maritime patrol aircraft to support 
reconnaissance and surveillance needs and fighter jets, both ashore and onboard the 
aircraft carrier, that can prosecute targets at sea and on land. The ship-borne helicopters 
are designed for anti-submarine warfare, land-attack operations, electronic warfare and 
search and rescue missions. 
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Sea-based deterrence finds a prominent place in India’s strategic maritime formula-
tions. It is built around the notion that credible deterrence through the dispersal of plat-
forms/payloads can offer survivability and provide an assured retaliatory second strike 
capability. These formulations resonate in Indian strategic thinking and are exhibited 
in the quest to develop a robust sea-based nuclear deterrent. ‘No first use’ of nuclear 
weapons is the stated policy of the Government of India. In that context, Indian naval 
planners and strategists view a nuclear submarine as critical, and have argued that ‘[a 
nuclear submarine] is much more than just a submarine with a nuclear reactor … it is the 
arbiter of power at sea’ (Unnithan 2007). 
In 1988, India acquired a nuclear submarine on lease from the Soviet Union and 
commissioned it as the Chakra. It was later returned at the end of the lease period. 
Under the indigenous nuclear submarine programme designated as ATV, INS Arihant 
was launched in 2009 and may be commissioned in 2013 (Sud 2009). The Indian 
Navy may induct the K-152 Nerpa class submarine acquired from Russia on lease, in 
2011/2012 (Economic Times 2010). These acquisitions will provide India with the third 
leg of the nuclear triad. 
Similarly, an aircraft carrier finds a prominent place in the strategic and tactical cal-
culus of Indian naval thinking. Indian naval planners and tactical commanders have 
conceptualised a wide spectrum of missions for the aircraft carriers and exploit the ability 
of such platforms to transit the sea-space-shore continuum. In 1961, India acquired the 
Vikrant (ex-HMS Hercules), a Majestic class light fleet carrier from the United Kingdom 
that was tactfully deployed in the Bay of Bengal for combat operations in East Bengal 
(now Bangladesh) during the 1971 Indo–Pakistani conflict. The second aircraft carrier, 
the INS Viraat (ex-HMS Hermes), acquired in 1986, is still operational and serves as the 
only power-projection platform of the Indian Navy. In 2012, the Indian Navy will induct 
the Russian aircraft carrier, Admiral Gorshkov, renamed INS Vikramaditya, and currently 
being refitted in Russia (Aviation Week 2011). Meanwhile, India is also building an in-
digenous 37,500-ton aircraft carrier to be named Vikrant (IHS Jane’s Navy International 
2009). The vessel will host the Russian-built MiG-29K and indigenous (Navy) light 
combat aircraft. The Indian Navy also has plans to induct a third aircraft carrier, to make 
it a three-carrier force by 2017. 
Other than the aircraft carrier, the Indian Navy’s inventory comprises indigenously 
built and Russian-origin destroyers, frigates and corvettes. Likewise, submarines are an 
important component of the Indian naval force structure. The current inventory com-
prises a mix of Russian and German-origin boats, the bulk of which are of the Kilo 
class and four HDW-type 209/1500 boats (two built in India) of German origin. The 
30-year submarine construction plan, stretching to 2025, aims at an inventory of 24 
submarines, and will boost indigenous production (Mehta 2008, 58). Currently, the 
French-origin Scorpene class submarines are under construction in India under a trans-
fer of technology agreement, and the first vessel of the class will be delivered in 2015 
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(Times of India 2011). India is expected to announce a global tender for acquiring six 
next-generation submarines but it will take years to finalize the deal and six-seven years 
to build six advanced submarines. 
India’s expeditionary capability has witnessed a phenomenal increase and is built 
around INS Jalashwa (formerly the USS Trenton), acquired from the United States, and 
the indigenously built Magar class vessels. These vessels are capable of hosting helicop-
ters able to land special marine commandos in enemy areas. Besides this, the Indian 
Navy can charter ships from Indian shipping companies to support expeditionary opera-
tions. 
The naval air arm is built around Russian, British and French aircraft and helicop-
ters, including the indigenously built advanced light (ALH) helicopters (being produced 
by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited). The inventory is fairly modern by regional standards 
and can provide effective air cover to the fleet and for strikes ashore. The shore-based 
long-range maritime patrol aircraft provide surveillance to the fleet operating far from the 
shore. The Navy has anti-submarine warfare (ASW), early warning (EW) and missile-
capable helicopters that provide both defensive and offensive air capability to support 
fleet operations. The inventory is spread over 16 naval air squadrons, including fighter 
jets, both from shore and from the aircraft carrier, maritime patrol aircraft, helicopters 
and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). India will induct a number of aircraft in the com-
ing years, including 12 P-8I Poseidon from the US, helicopters from Italy and UAVs 
from Israel (Pakistan Observer 2011).
revolutIon In mIlItary affaIrs and the IndIan navy
The Indian Navy is a technologically advanced force, and the impact of the so-called 
revolution in military affairs on its force structure is quite visible. There is widespread 
application of IT and related systems in tactical doctrines, operational deployments, 
logistics support systems and administrative functions. Indian Navy’s network-centric 
warfare (NCW) strategy envisages a shift from platform-centric to a network-centric 
force, information technology-driven concepts of operation, entrenchment of informa-
tion technology across all operational and support functions, development of a C4I grid 
among command posts both ashore and at sea, including joint command centres for 
integrated operations. 
In that context, the Indian Navy has been able to exploit its technological proficiency 
and translate the same into operational competence for interoperability with diverse na-
vies that host varying levels of NCW capabilities. Interoperability has facilitated multi-
nation joint exercises and ad hoc coalitions that bring with them a variety of platforms, 
personnel, doctrines and operating procedures. The Malabar series with the US Navy 
and the Simbex series of exercises with the Singapore navy are good examples of inter-
operability between the navies. Some of the Indian Navy ships are even fitted with special 
US equipment to connect to its Centrix satellite-based system, enabling the exchange of 
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audio, video and data between the participating ships (Ved 2007). Similar arrangements 
are available for the bilateral exercises between the Singapore Navy and the Indian Navy. 
roles and mIssIons 
The Indian Navy’s roles and missions are closely linked to India’s national interests, and 
in that context, deterrence lies at the core of the Indian Navy’s strategic thinking: such 
capability should be able to deter any naval threat posed by the enemy individually or in 
concert with other allies. Further, the naval capability should be such that it should raise 
the threshold of intervention or coercion. 
India’s naval capability should also be able to deliver to the state and its marine 
domain the requisite custodial and constabulary functions in this prevalent phase of 
asymmetric conflicts. It should address maritime threats and challenges, including non-
traditional security threats such as terrorism, piracy, gun running, drug smuggling and 
human smuggling, since these can potentially disturb good order at sea. 
Naval diplomacy is an important function of the Indian Navy. It should act as the 
ambassador of goodwill, build maritime bridges with like-minded states and support 
national foreign policy objectives. Also, the Indian Navy should be able to underwrite 
regional stability, promote friendly ties with like-minded nations and provide timely re-
sponse capability. 
As noted above, one of the important roles of the Indian Navy is to engage in naval 
diplomacy to support India’s foreign policy objectives. Since its inception, the Indian 
Navy has been actively engaged in furthering national foreign policy objectives. It has 
participated in UN-supported international commitments, provided waterfront security 
to states, rendered relief during disasters, conducted joint exercises and anti-piracy pa-
trols for preserving order at sea, thus contributing to international efforts aimed at en-
hancing maritime safety and security in the oceans. It has also developed institutional 
linkages with several navies with a view to building confidence and trust. 
The Indian Navy’s role also requires its ships and aircraft to be at the forefront of 
Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) operations by deploying a variety 
of assets, both human and material, to respond to crises. These platforms serve as excel-
lent staging positions for distributing relief supplies over-the-shore when airports and 
seaports are damaged or obstructed. In the past, Indian ships have served as command 
platforms for disaster relief supply chains and overall coordination of operations. Indian 
naval ships have also served as hospitals and provided emergency medical relief. 
In the aftermath of the 26 December 2004 tsunami in the Indian Ocean, the In-
dian Navy played an important role in support of international disaster relief efforts in 
Indonesia, Maldives and Sri Lanka. It deployed nearly three dozen ships and an equal 
number of aircraft and helicopters in rescue and relief missions both at home and abroad. 
India was part of the core group of four countries alongside the US, Japan and Australia, 
to coordinate aid efforts in the affected areas. The international community acknowl-
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edged India’s capability and it registered its presence in the tsunami-affected region as 
a compassionate power capable of helping its neighbours even when its own shores are 
troubled. In subsequent years, the Indian Navy was again tasked to respond to Cyclone 
‘Sidr’ in Bangladesh in 2007 and in May 2008 to Cyclone ‘Nargis’ in Myanmar. 
InstItutIonal aPProaChes 
Currently, India is an active member of several international and regional arrangements 
for maritime cooperation at both government and non-government levels. It is signatory 
to the UNCLOS III, member of the Indian Ocean Rim-Association for Regional Coop-
eration (IOR-ARC), ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), East Asia Summit (EAS), ASEAN 
Defence Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM), Association for Bangladesh-India-Myanmar-Sri 
Lanka-Thailand Economic Cooperation (BIMST-EC), South Asia Association for Re-
gional Cooperation (SAARC), Council for Security Cooperation in Asia Pacific (CSCAP), 
as an observer in the Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS), Regional Cooperation 
Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP). 
Indian naval ships and personnel participate in several maritime security-related 
events, including defence exhibitions, seminars, symposia and conferences at both Track 
I and II levels such as the International Maritime Defence Exhibitions (IMDEX) in the 
Persian gulf and Southeast Asia, Langkawi International Maritime and Aerospace Exhi-
bition (LIMA), International Seapower Symposium in the US and Shangri-La Dialogue 
in Singapore. 
At another level, the Indian Navy conducts events such as MILAN, Indian Ocean 
Naval Symposium (IONS), International Fleet Reviews (IFR), symposia, seminars and 
conferences as part of its engagement in naval diplomacy. These engagements are dis-
cussed in the succeeding paragraphs. 
mIlan and IndIan oCean naval symPosIum (Ions)
Since 1995, the Indian Navy has been hosting Milan meetings at Port Blair in the Anda-
man Nicobar islands in the Bay of Bengal. ‘Milan’ in Hindi means ‘confluence’ and these 
biennial meetings are aimed at fostering closer cooperation among navies of countries in 
the extended neighbourhood of Southeast Asia and as far as Australia.
Expanding on the Milan, in February 2008, the Indian Navy hosted the Indian 
Ocean Naval Symposium in New Delhi.2 The IONS is similar to the WPNS (Western Pa-
cific Naval Symposium) and was attended by naval delegations from 29 countries of the 
Indian Ocean. The event also included a symposium on ‘Contemporary Trans-National 
Challenges: International Maritime Connectivities’, and a two-day conclave for the naval 
chiefs of the participating countries. In his address to IONS delegates, the Indian Prime 
Minister observed that the ‘need for cooperation among navies of the region in prevent-
ing such global crimes is therefore of paramount importance’ (DNA 2008).
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marItIme mandala 
In the twenty-first century, India’s strategic interests have undergone a profound trans-
formation, overcoming years of ideological rigidity to an interest-driven autonomy clear-
ly showcasing a systemic transformation. This has been possible partly due to India’s 
choices of globalisation, resulting in strong economic growth and a desire to restore some 
of the glorious historical epochs of political, economic and strategic pre-eminence. These 
strategic choices and new economic strength have resulted in significant opportunities 
for increased transactions with the great powers that are fast evolving into new partner-
ships, multilateral and bilateral engagements and cooperative initiatives. 
These emerging strategic and economic strengths also provide for focused naval 
interactions that offer tactical-operational engagements exemplified by interoperability 
among the navies. These are translating into technology transfers and have spawned 
defence-technology relations that have accrued immense dividends and fostered a series 
of new defence-technological collaborative enterprises. This ensures augmentation of 
India’s existing maritime industrial infrastructure and adds to India’s growing techno-
logical strengths. 
Since the 1990s, the Indian Navy has been nurturing an ascendant strategic pro-
file, with engagements with the United States, Russia, France, United Kingdom, several 
other EU navies, Israel, Japan and navies in Southeast Asia. 
Indic statecraft finds its comprehensive theoretical expression in the ancient Indian 
classic The Arthasastra translated as ‘science of politics’. In essence, Arthasastra is a trea-
tise in political realism, showcasing how the political world works with firm foundations 
in self-interest, strategic autonomy and the dynamic nature of alliances (Boesche 2003, 
15). Simply put, Mandala is a construct in international relations that signifies the con-
tiguity of region and defines the geo-strategic and geo-political interests and relations of 
the state. In spatial terms, Mandala denotes a zone. Schematically, Mandala is figurative 
of concentric circles, which define the relations of the state at the core, with its immedi-
ate, intermediate and outer ring of countries. 
In the immediate ‘Mandala’, India’s naval engagements with its neighbours, par-
ticularly Bangladesh, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Myanmar, have been problematic due to 
suspicions and mistrust, and not least the ‘big neighbour syndrome’ among these coun-
tries (Economic Times 2011). Also, China’s military-strategic-technical support to these 
countries to balance and box India in the South Asian region has resulted in India’s 
strategic encirclement. India has attempted to hard-balance its immediate Mandala by 
engaging with several Indian Ocean, Persian Gulf, Southeast Asian and Pacific powers. 
In that context, the Indian Navy has been in the forefront in supporting political, strategic 
and economic engagements of seminal significance and purpose. In perspective, India’s 
strategic naval engagement would be an interpretation of the ‘Mandala’ doctrine.
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ProsPeCts of CooPeratIon wIth smaller navIes 
Maritime and naval cooperation provide ambient conditions for states to develop a broad 
and substantive agenda for building mutual trust and confidence, and, in some cases, 
translate into strategic partnerships. These initiatives are particularly significant for the 
smaller navies who are constrained to protect their maritime interests due to lack of 
resources and capabilities. In essence, cooperative agendas build synergies in joint and 
coordinated naval patrols and exercises that are usually focused on a specific operational 
theme and can be leveraged in times of crisis. In that context, the Indian Navy has devel-
oped closer relations with several like-minded states across the globe – and these have 
resulted in ‘maritime bridges’.
the maldIves and srI lanka (Counter-terrorIsm) 
Closer to home, the Maldives and Sri Lanka have benefited from their maritime coopera-
tion with India. For instance, in November 1988, Maldivian dissidents in Colombo and 
Tamil mercenaries of the People’s Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE), had 
attempted to overthrow the Maldivian Gayoom regime (Jain Commission 1997, ch. 1). 
A quick air and sea response from India resulted in the capture of mercenaries who were 
fleeing with hostages in a vessel, thus aiding the restoration of the legitimate regime in 
the capital Malé. 
In Sri Lanka, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), decimated by the Sri Lan-
kan military in May 2009, was perhaps the only non-state actor conducting maritime 
operations on a large scale. It was able to execute a classical sea control manoeuvre in 
waters off Jaffna in the north east of Sri Lanka. The LTTE still owns and operates a fleet of 
deep-seagoing ships that had in the past facilitated logistics support by way of a regular 
supply of arms, ammunition and other materials. The LTTE has the potential to bounce 
back and engage in illegal activity. 
In fact it was lack of governance and an ineffective maritime security apparatus in 
the Maldives and Sri Lanka that created the conditions for the growth in terrorism, piracy 
and other illegal activities. India is vulnerable to asymmetric domination that may have 
its origins in neighbouring countries. In response, at the functional-operational level, the 
Indian Navy has engaged both the Maldivian and Sri Lankan navies through bilateral 
naval exercises, regular ship visits, training, transfer of naval hardware and sharing of 
intelligence. 
Post-2008 Mumbai terror attacks, the Indian maritime security organisation has 
been revamped, involving major organisational changes, the establishment of the Coastal 
Command and setting up of joint operation centres. The Indian Navy and Coast Guard 
are in the process of acquiring cutting edge technologies to enhance littoral security and 
these could bridge the gap in maritime surveillance and reconnaissance. Sri Lanka has 
also developed some naval capability which it used very effectively to fight the LTTE, but 
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it still lacks a surveillance and response capability on the high seas. The Maldivian mari-
time forces are essentially constabulary in nature and lack combat capability. Further, by 
all estimates, the current security architecture of Sri Lanka and the Maldives is not robust 
enough to deter, detect and defeat a challenger, partly due to lack of capabilities. 
maurItIus, seyChelles and mozambIque (Counter-PIraCy) 
The Indian Navy’s engagement with smaller states in the Indian Ocean dates back to the 
1970s. Indian naval ships have called at ports in Mauritius on a regular basis. India even 
supplied a patrol craft, provided crew to the Mauritius marine wing of the police force 
and also undertook repairs and maintenance including the supply of spares parts. The 
Indian Navy conducted a hydrographic survey of Mauritius’s territorial waters and EEZ. 
The Indian president, during her visit to Mauritius, said, ‘We are committed to work with 
the government of Mauritius to jointly fight piracy and enhance security in the Indian 
Ocean through mutually agreed measures.... [India] will help the Mauritian government 
in setting up an anti-terrorism cell’ (Economic Times 2011). 
Pursuant to a request by the Seychelles government, Indian Navy ships have un-
dertaken anti-piracy and counter-terrorism patrols on a regular basis in its waters. 
S eychelles President James Alix Michel announced during his 2010 state visit to India 
that ‘India and Seychelles have agreed to work together in controlling piracy in the Indian 
Ocean so that we can try to make sure that this area is safer for economic development’ 
(Indian Express 2010). 
Likewise, India and Mozambique, too, have agreed to work together to improve 
maritime security in the Indian Ocean. The bilateral agreement provides for joint activi-
ties, including maritime patrols along the Mozambican coast, mutual training in military 
institutes, supply of defence equipment/services and establishment of partnership and 
transfer of knowhow and technology for assembling and repair of vehicles, aircraft and 
ships as well as rehabilitation of military infrastructure.
sIngaPore (taCtICal exerCIses) 
The Indian and the Singaporean navies established 18 years ago an annual exercise pro-
gramme code named SIMBEX that has continued ever since. These exercises alternate 
each year in the Indian Ocean and South China Sea and involve a harbour and a sea 
phase, indicating that the two navies have reached a higher proficiency in conducting 
naval operations. These bilateral exercises involve complex air, surface and sub-surface 
warfare to enhance the interoperability and mutual understanding of the two navies. 
Further, both sides deploy sophisticated naval platforms, including submarines and long-
range maritime patrol aircraft. These exercises are quite similar to those the Indian Navy 
engages in with the US Navy for the Malabar series of exercises.  
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norway (humanItarIan assIstanCe and dIsaster relIef,  
Counter-PIraCy) 
Both India and Norway have long seafaring histories and possess modern navies equipped 
with sophisticated platforms. The Norwegian Navy has the Fridtjof Nansen class frigates, 
which are capable of blue water operations, the Ula class submarines and Skjold class 
corvettes. 
The Norwegian Navy’s deployment of the frigate Fridtjof Nansen, the flag ship of its 
class, for anti-piracy in the Gulf of Aden in August 2009, and its successful engage-
ment with Somali pirates, is noteworthy. On 30 September 2011, the Norwegian Navy 
established Camp Skare in Seychelles to support the NATO counter-piracy operation 
Ocean Shield (defpro.com). A P3-N Orion surveillance aircraft has been deployed for 
surveillance and counter-piracy operations in the seas along the coast of eastern Africa. 
However, the areas of operation of the Indian and the Norwegian navies are quite 
different; the Indian Navy is more focused on the Indian Ocean and the Norwegian Navy 
looks towards the Atlantic and Arctic oceans. The Norwegian Navy is likely to be drawn 
more and more towards the Arctic as the ice cap melts and new shipping routes become 
popular among shippers. Further, the Norwegian Navy will be called upon to protect its 
maritime interests in the northern waters. There is a noticeable naval growth among the 
Arctic littorals, moreover, which are building capabilities for operations in the Arctic. 
Nevertheless, the Indian and the Norwegian navies do interact with each other 
through an ad hoc arrangement called SHADE (Shared Awareness and Deconfliction), 
established in December 2008. This forum, based in Bahrain, provides a platform for the 
participants (26 member nations and three coalitions, i.e. Combined Maritime Forces 
(CMF), EU and NATO) to coordinate activities of the countries and coalitions involved in 
military counter-piracy operations in the Indian Ocean region. 
Although there is no institutional mechanism facilitating interaction, the two navies 
can develop a bilateral cooperative agenda that could be built around joint exercises in 
the Indian Ocean or Atlantic Ocean and take part in joint anti-piracy drills. Humanitar-
ian assistance and disaster relief exercises and capacity building of smaller island Indian 
Ocean states could be another agenda for cooperation. 
ConCludIng remarks 
The force structure of the Indian Navy showcases high technology platforms, nuclear 
capable submarines to support the strategic triad and doctrinal and operational advance-
ments. These capabilities are significant for guarding ocean frontiers, securing maritime 
interests, protecting littoral hubs that form nodes of trade and energy supplies, safe-
guarding critical sea lines of communication and exercising influence in the region. Fur-
ther, any maritime contingency that impacts on Indian security interests in the Indian 
Ocean and Pacific Ocean will be the responsibility of the Indian Navy.
The Indian Navy has successfully deployed its assets to respond to different crises 
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in ‘waters far away from home’, as well as for building maritime bridges through opera-
tional engagements and capacity building. In the future, the Indian Navy can be expected 
to continue to support a variety of missions involving international cooperation such 
as disaster relief and humanitarian assistance, counter-terrorism, anti-piracy and, also, 
preventing illegal migration. 
notes
1 Works consulted in the preparation of this paper include Hiranandani (2000); Pannikar (1959, 1971); Naval 
Headquarters, New Delhi (1998, 2001); ModI (2004, 2007); Sakhuja (2011); UN (1983).
2 ‘Indian Ocean Naval Symposium’, available at http://indiannavy.nic.in/ion.htm accessed on September 17, 2011. 

The challenge of understan-
ding the Russian Navy 
Mikhail Tsypkin1
The Russian naval tradition is torn between the desire of Russian politicians to project 
the image of a great naval power and the reality of Russia as a great land power. In the 
course of the twentieth century, Russia and the Soviet Union tried three times to build a 
true blue water navy – before the First World War, in the late 1930s before the Second 
World War, and during the second half of the Cold War (from the 1960s until the late 
1980s). In each case, the plans had to be abandoned because a blue water navy turned 
out to be not crucial for the nation’s survival. In both world wars, the Russian Navy was 
useful on the flanks of the great land battles of the Eastern Front, but did not play an 
independent role. In the first decade after the Soviet collapse, the real – as opposed to 
the declaratory – missions of the armed forces were to maintain Russia’s sovereignty, to 
preserve its status as a nuclear superpower, to deal with the brushfire wars in the post-
Soviet space and in the North Caucasus and, in a political crisis, to defend the current 
occupant of the Kremlin from challengers. None of these missions requires a blue water 
navy; accordingly, the Russian Navy, despite regular outbursts of soaring rhetoric from 
Russian politicians, was allowed to stagnate and deteriorate.
PutIn’s navy
The arrival of Vladimir Putin into the Kremlin, in 2000, appeared to open a new and 
more ambitious era for the Russian Navy (Voyenno-morskoiflot – VMF). Since then, the 
Navy has been showered with political attention; received several new ships; sent its 
ships on global cruises for the first time since the collapse of the Soviet Union; heard 
promises to build several aircraft carriers; seen combat in the Black Sea; and sent its 
attack submarines, for the first time in more than a decade, to the shores of the United 
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States. At the same time, the Russian Navy suffered disasters; including the catastrophic 
sinking of the Kursk nuclear attack submarine; was ordered to remove its main staff from 
the Russian capital of Moscow to the relative backwater of St Petersburg; was down-
graded in the plans of military reform; and fell behind on the plans to modernise the 
sea-borne leg of the nuclear triad. What does this contradictory record tell us about the 
future of VMF?
Under Putin, the Russian Navy has received a lot of political attention. Within days 
of assuming the office of the president (on April 3, 2000), Putin signed a detailed docu-
ment entitled the Foundations of the Russian Federation’s Naval Policy until the Year 2010. 
A year later (on 21 July 2001) he approved another major document, the Maritime Doc-
trine of the Russian Federation until the Year 2020 (morskayakollegiya.ru 2009a; kremlin.ru 
2001). In 2007, the Russian government adopted the Strategy for the Development of the 
Shipbuilding Industry until the Year 2020 and Beyond (garant.ru 2007). The interagency 
Maritime College (Council) has produced voluminous documentation regarding future 
plans for the Russian Navy. Russian Navy officers have filled the pages of the Naval Di-
gest, their professional journal, with detailed and passionate arguments about the future 
of the Russian Navy.
In the Soviet era, such abundance of official pronouncements would have been suf-
ficient for a reasonably confident forecast of naval developments. The Soviets had a well-
established (however wrongheaded) worldview and goals in international politics; their 
policy debates were for the most part conducted in secrecy (and thus did not confuse 
Western analysts) and resulted in settlements that would then be revealed to the world; 
they also had a mechanism for mobilising resources that could turn, however imperfectly, 
intentions into capabilities. Russia, in contrast, is still seeking its position in the world, 
fluctuating between loud hostility to the West and demands to be accepted as its partner. 
Russia’s policy process is opaque and informal: the highest authority, especially in mat-
ters of national security, is theoretically vested in the president. The current incumbent 
at the time of writing (Dmitri Medvedev) however, appears to play second fiddle to the 
strongman prime minister (Vladimir Putin), who skilfully balances interests of powerful 
financial-industrial clans closely connected to the machinery of the Russian state. This 
political system produces endless intrigue and policy debates, often without an obvious 
resolution and execution. Finally, Russia’s economy is much smaller than the Soviet one, 
and no longer has the mobilisation mechanisms, such as all-encompassing economic 
planning and disregard for the customers’ wellbeing, that allowed the USSR to compete 
in the military field with more advanced and wealthy countries. Profit-seeking has be-
come perhaps the strongest motive in the activities of Russian elites. 
Another difficulty in forecasting Russian naval developments stems from the fact 
that the current naval force is a product of the Soviet era. Recently we have witnessed 
an increased level of activity by the Russian Navy. One should not, however, make pro-
jections on the basis of what we see today. There are strong reasons to doubt whether 
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Russian industry will be able to replace the retiring ships. The former navy commander-
in-chief, retired Admiral Vladimir Kuroedov, recently observed that the Russian ship-
building industry has been unable to build new ships in a timely fashion, while research, 
development and design of new ships capable of deploying far from Russia’s shores have 
been chronically underfinanced (Kuroedov et al. 2009, 17).
Russia’s unsettled vision of its place in the world has had a direct impact on its naval 
policy. Putin has promoted the vision of Russia as a ‘great power’, erasing the ‘humilia-
tions’ of the 1990s. The Kremlin’s vision is rooted in the Soviet past: being a great power 
means being taken as an equal by the United States. This vision is irrational, given the 
economic and demographic realities, but it is driven by a veritable hostile obsession with 
the US among the Russian elites and public. Russian politicians discovered in the 1990s 
that the Russian public, while reluctant to have their children drafted for military ser-
vice, associate patriotism with military power. The Russian Navy represents a particularly 
tempting subject for public relations games. Big ships look even more impressive than 
marching infantrymen and rolling tanks. Construction of a capital ship can be rightfully 
presented as a national achievement. The Russian naval tradition is rhetorically linked 
to the one relatively positive figure in the Russian history, Peter the Great. The Navy can 
provide a visible proof of Russia’s ‘resurgence’ and growing international activism by its 
presence in various areas of the world and port calls. The Russian Navy also includes 
the platforms for the sea-based leg of the Russian nuclear triad, which is extolled by the 
Russian leaders and media as the key to national defence and to keeping the status of a 
great power. And in the realm of naval policy, being a great power requires having aircraft 
carriers to match the United States. 
vIrtual aIrCraft CarrIers
The subject of aircraft carriers surfaced in a very tentative fashion in the Foundations of 
Naval Policy (March 2000). At the same time, however, Putin was very concerned about 
finding ways to fill Russia’s treasury by using its natural resources. In response to this 
imperative, the then Navy Commander-in-Chief Admiral Vladimir Kuroedov (1997–
2005) appealed to Putin’s obvious interest in the economic dimension of R ussia’s mari-
time policies, especially in the exploration and extraction of Russia’s natural resources 
from the seabed, as reflected in the Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation (approved 
in 2001). Both the Foundations and the Maritime Doctrine put emphasis on defence of 
R ussia’s sovereignty over mineral and biological resources of the ocean. As far as the Na-
vy’s priorities are concerned, these documents stress the traditional importance of ballis-
tic missile submarines (SSBNs), as the sea-based leg of Russia’s nuclear triad. According 
to some reports, in 2004, the Ministry of Defence prepared a plan of naval development 
up until the years 2040–50, emphasising the defence of Russia’s territorial and con-
tingent waters by projecting naval power for about 500 kilometres from the shore – an 
antithesis of a blue water navy equipped with aircraft carriers (NVO 2006). The issue 
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of blue water navy complete with aircraft carriers was not to be raised prominently until 
2005, by which time the Russian financial situation began to improve drastically, and 
relations with the United States, which had seemed to have picked up after 9/11, began 
to deteriorate again as a result of Ukraine’s ‘Orange Revolution’ of 2004. 
On 25 March 2005, the Kuznetsov Naval Academy in St Petersburg hosted a con-
ference on the History, prospects of development and combat employment of aircraft carriers 
in the Russian Navy. Speakers included industry executives and prominent retired admi-
rals, who were all in favour of equipping Russian Navy with carriers. Carrier enthusiasts 
argued that Russia needed these ships in order to repulse attacks with cruise missiles 
– presumably, by the US Navy – against Russia’s heartland from the Arctic and Pacific 
oceans. The likely cost of this undertaking met resistance from the influential finance 
minister Aleksei Kudrin (KZ 2005). On 25 August 2005, Putin, while on board the 
heavy missile cruiser Peter the Great, stated that it was time to start long-term planning 
(beyond 2020) for new weapon systems; he reiterated his view that the Navy was criti-
cally important for extracting resources from the seabed; and said that Navy’s financing 
had been increased to 30 per cent of the defence budget (kremlin.ru 2005). Still, there 
was no apparent rush to build carriers. In early 2006, then Minister of Defence Sergei 
Ivanov said it was a bit early to discuss building aircraft carriers, although he recognised 
that the Russian Navy would need them. Further he explained that, until 2015, the ar-
maments programme treated the Navy as being equally important to the strategic nucle-
ar forces; 25 per cent of the weapons acquisition budget in the course of this programme 
would go to the Navy. (Of course, Ivanov neglected to mention the overlap between the 
budgets of the Strategic Nuclear Forces and the Navy because of the need to build new 
nuclear submarines carrying submarine-launched ballistic missiles [SLBMs].) The new 
Navy Commander-in-Chief Admiral Vladimir Masorin said at the time that no aircraft 
carriers would be built until 2015, and until then the shipbuilding programme would 
focus on smaller ships that could escort carriers (Izvestia 2006).
Masorin stated that the Russian Navy, given the budget constraints, could not afford 
any of the ‘fashionable’ doctrines that their Americans counterparts implemented. In-
stead, the Russian Navy would devise an asymmetrical strategy to deter use of force. The 
strategy should enable the Russian Navy to prevent a potential adversary from dominat-
ing the theatre of naval operations and guarantee unacceptable damage to the adversary. 
In the next ten years (until 2015), he said, the main task would be to maintain the 
existing ships in the state of readiness, and prepare ideas and plans for a new generation 
of navy ships and an adequate support and logistics system for them (KZ 2006). Even 
conceptual work on the design of aircraft carriers was reportedly not included in the 
2006–15 armaments plan (NVO 2007a).
As oil prices climbed throughout 2007 and the first half of 2008, and relations with 
the West deteriorated even further, the rhetoric about aircraft carriers escalated. In May 
2007, a meeting of top Navy brass and leaders of the shipbuilding industry considered 
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the issue of aircraft carriers. A spokesman for the Navy said that the participants believed 
that Russia needed carriers and that ‘building a ship of this class would increase the 
status of Russia as a maritime power’ (KZ 2007). Admiral Masorin commented in June 
2007 that the new Russian carriers would be relatively small (50,000 tons), nuclear 
powered and have about 30 aircraft (fixed wing and helicopters). The beginning of their 
production had been originally planned for 2016/17, but may be undertaken earlier, 
added the admiral (NVO 2007b). A year later, his successor, Admiral Vladimir Vysotsky, 
announced that beginning in 2012/13 Russia would build ‘five or six’ aircraft carriers 
for its Northern and Pacific fleets (Newsru.com 2007). On 11 October 2008, then Presi-
dent Dmitri Medvedev visited the Admiral Kuznetsov carrier and confirmed that Russia 
indeed would build aircraft carriers, the first of which would be completed by 2013–15 
(kremlin.ru 2009). In November 2008, the media reported that the shipbuilding com-
pany Sevmash in Arkhangelsk was selected to build the new carriers and its general 
manager was already discussing with journalists the upgrades that his shipyard would 
require to accommodate the construction of carriers (Prime-Tass 2008). But a sudden 
rhetorical turnaround was executed in June 2009, when Deputy Minister of Defence for 
Armaments Vladimir Popovkin stated that the plans to begin building aircraft carriers in 
2012 would be postponed indefinitely (GTZ.RU 2009).
There is likely no single explanation for the blooming and withering of the enthusi-
asm for carriers. The most apparent reason – the rise and fall of the Russian economy – is 
obvious. The rapid growth of the Russian economy during Vladimir Putin’s second term 
as president (2004–08) produced euphoria among the Russian elite. It is possible that 
the Russian policy-makers, schooled in finance, but not in management of manufactur-
ing industries, failed to appreciate the enormous complexity of building aircraft carriers. 
They may have seen sufficient financing as the only major condition for such an under-
taking. It is likely that the shipbuilding industry encouraged this kind of thinking out of 
an obvious self-interest, without pointing out to the political leaders that the problems 
of Russian industry’s – an outdated capital plant and a depleted rapidly ageing work 
force – could not be solved in the short and even medium term simply by an infusion of 
money.2 As the realities of the economic crisis set in and forced a sober survey of R ussia’s 
economy by policy-makers, the improbability of the aircraft carrier project became obvi-
ous to the Kremlin.
It appears that the Russian High Command had no real – rather than rhetorical – 
plans for building aircraft carriers. In various official pronouncements, the number of 
carriers fluctuated from ‘a couple’ to five ‘or’ six. This ‘or’ suggests that no plan had 
ever been approved. Moreover, Admiral Vysotsky, when explaining the Navy’s future for 
the military daily Krasnaya Zvezda in February 2009, named as the Navy’s priorities the 
building of SSBNs, attack submarines, multipurpose surface ships, strike and reconnais-
sance systems, command and control and navigation systems (KZ 2009). Carriers were 
not mentioned. This is a very traditional emphasis on ships that can defend Russia’s 
contiguous waters, as well as on the sea-borne leg of the nuclear triad.
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At his 5 June 2009 press conference, the Chief of General Staff Army General 
Nikolai Makarov warned that rearming the Navy would take longer than the other servic-
es because of the huge cost: a capital ship, he said, would cost as much as a fully armed 
division of the Ground Forces (KV 2009). Several days later, Deputy Minister of Defence 
Popovkin observed that the Russian High Command still had to decide, ‘[why] do we 
need these carrier groups? What are our strategic interests in the [distant] regions, what 
do we have to defend far away [from home]?’ (GTZ.RU 2009) If the Russian leaders 
need proof that building carriers would be extremely difficult, the saga of overhauling and 
upgrading the former Admiral Gorshkov for the Indian Navy has definitely provided one. 
One July 1, 2009, Medvedev visited the Sevmash shipyard, and warned the shipbuilders 
that they could no longer drag out the Gorshkov project, which had commenced in 2004 
with an initial completion date of 2008; after huge cost overruns, the completion date 
has been postponed to 2012–13 (kremlin.ru 2009). All of the above suggests that the 
discussion of aircraft carriers had no concrete plans behind it.
The discussion of carriers, however, reflected certain realities of Russian politics and 
economy. One was likely a carry-over from Putin’s successful PR campaign of 2007–
08: portraying Russia as a great power was one of its central elements. Another factor 
behind the aircraft carrier hullabaloo may have been purely commercial. One of the main 
trends of Putin’s industrial policy has been the formation of giant, state-controlled indus-
trial holdings (which include privately owned enterprises in which the government owns 
shares), headed by government officials close to Putin. On 21 March 2007, the Russian 
government created the United Shipbuilding Corporation (USC), to put under the same 
roof the research and development and shipyards involved in design and production of 
naval ships and weapon systems (VN 2009a). The first chairman of the USC board was 
the head of the administration (chief of staff) of the Cabinet of Ministers Sergei Narysh-
kin, appointed in September 2007 (Newsru.com 2009a). In May 2008, soon after Putin 
had moved to the post of prime minister, the USC top job went to one of the most power-
ful figures in Russian business and politics, Deputy Prime Minister Igor Sechin (Newsru.
com 2009b). Sechin reportedly played the central role in the imprisonment of Russia’s 
wealthiest man at the time, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, and has been accused of profit-
ing immensely form the destruction of Khodorkovsky’s oil company YUKOS (Newsru.
com 2008). One of the most important holdings of the USC is the shareholder-owned 
Sevmash shipyard in Archangelsk. These shareholders could have profited from stories 
persistently leaked to the media that Sevmash had already been selected to become the 
prime contractor to build new aircraft carriers (Izvestiya 2009).
the ‘new look’ and the russIan navy
The real priorities of the Russian Navy should be viewed in the light of the latest military 
reform, to which the Russians refer as ‘the new look’ of the Armed Forces, probably 
because all the previous military reforms since 1991 changed virtually nothing. The 
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decision to seek the new look for the Russian military followed the Russo–Georgian war 
of August 2008, which demonstrated that the Russian Armed Forces suffered from 
numerous deficiencies. The essence of the ‘new look’ is a transformation of the hollow 
Soviet-type military, which would need to mobilise millions of conscripts in order to fight, 
into a much smaller force ready to fight on a short notice. Its structure is also to change, 
with divisions replaced by brigades, and operational commands (partially modelled on 
American combatant commands) established in conjunction with existing military dis-
tricts. This is a step away from preparations to fight an all out war against NATO towards 
plans to be ready for regional conflicts along Russia’s periphery. This realistic approach 
recognises that a large-scale conflict with NATO (or, for that matter, China), is highly 
unlikely, especially in view of Russia’s nuclear arsenal.
Russian experts have had relatively little specific to say about the impact of the 
‘new look’ on the Navy. According to Admiral Vysotskiy, the Navy’s missions under the 
new look have not changed. They include the paramount one of strategic deterrence, 
plus various missions to defend Russia’s interests in the contiguous seas, as well as 
participation in an international force sanctioned by the United Nations. The priori-
ties in procurement, according to Vysotsky, would include SSBNs, multipurpose attack 
submarines, multipurpose surface ships, as well as reconnaissance, target acquisition; 
command, control and communications (C3); and navigation systems (KZ 2009). This 
suggests that the future Russian Navy is supposed to operate with confidence in adjacent 
seas and embark on selected missions further away from home, such as distant port calls 
and participation in international efforts against piracy, smuggling, etc.
A practical demonstration of what awaits the Navy under the ‘new look’ has been 
provided by the recent decision to operationally subordinate the Black Sea Fleet and the 
Caspian Flotilla to the commander of the North Caucasus military district /operational-
strategic command, a Ground Forces officer. This decision was reportedly prompted by 
the inability of the amphibious assault ships of the Black Sea Fleet to provide support 
in a timely fashion to the Russian ground forces fighting Georgian troops along the In-
guri River and the Kodori Gorge (NVO 2009a). The Northern and Baltic fleets will be 
similarly subordinated to the commander of the Leningrad military district / operational-
strategic command, while the Pacific Fleet will be subordinated to the commander of the 
Far Eastern military district / operational-strategic command (NG 2009).
This approach is a nightmare for the proponents of a Russian blue water navy. The 
tension between them and the authors of the military reform was expressed in an un-
precedentedly shrill article in the August 2009 issue of the Naval Digest authored by the 
retired Commander-in-Chief Admiral Kuroedov and two other Navy officers. Tellingly 
entitled ‘We should continue to fight for the Russian Navy’, the article blames the decline 
of the Russian Navy squarely on the domination of the military by the Ground Forces: 
‘The main cause of this situation is the Navy’s complete dependence upon the Army’s 
decision-making mechanism which has resulted in a low level of financing for the Navy.’ 
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Further, the authors claim that during the Putin era the Navy received only 12 to 14 
per cent of the overall military budget, a figure much lower than the 30 per cent cited in 
the past by Putin and Sergei Ivanov. Kuroedov et al. accuse the ‘hidebound’ resistance 
of failing to recognise the Navy’s independence ‘in any sphere of its current existence’, 
which has resulted in a ‘tragedy’ for the Russian Navy (Kuroedov et al. 2009, 17, 19).
It appears that Minister of Defence Anatoliy Serdyukov wants to make it very difficult 
for the Navy to lobby for its interests in Moscow. He ordered the main staff of the Navy to 
move from Moscow to St Petersburg, a decision met with a howl of protest. High-ranking 
Navy retirees staged open protests and active duty naval officers organised leaks. Moving 
a government agency from Moscow to St Petersburg gets the agency in question away 
from the centre of power and makes it less relevant. This is what has happened to the 
Constitutional Court, a body whose importance in Russia is quite minimal. Moving the 
main staff from Moscow to St Petersburg would mean rebuilding the C3 system, reserve 
wartime command facilities for the Navy, etc. There is no military utility whatsoever in 
the move – but it certainly puts the Navy brass further away from Putin, Medvedev, and 
their staffs. It also frees up valuable real estate in the centre of Moscow, which the Min-
istry of Defence can sell, and creates new business in St Petersburg, the home of both 
Putin and Serdyukov.
As mentioned earlier, the most significant missions of the Russian Navy are strategic 
deterrence and the projection of power in the contiguous seas. The all-important stra-
tegic deterrence mission has suffered a series of setbacks. Currently (2010), the Navy 
is responsible for 172 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and 612 nuclear 
warheads (deployed on 13 nuclear powered ballistic missile submarines [SSBNs]) out of 
the total of 634 strategic delivery platforms and 2,825 nuclear warheads of the Strategic 
Nuclear Forces (SNF) (Pavel Podvig’s blog 2009). If a new arms control treaty between 
Russia and the United States is signed, the total number of delivery vehicles and war-
heads of each side will go down to 500/1,100 and 1,500/1,675 respectively; the 
Russian Navy’s share of delivery vehicles may go up to nearly one-half, and the warheads 
to about one-third of the total. The future of the sea-based leg of the nuclear triad is 
uncertain, because of continuing failures of the Bulava R 30 SLBM. At issue is not just 
the solid-propellant missile itself, but also the Borey class SSBN specially built to carry it. 
If the Bulava has to be replaced by the existing liquid-propellant Sineva SS-N-23 SLBM, 
the Borey design will have to be changed to accommodate a large missile. This would 
be very costly, and make resources available to the general-purpose naval forces even 
scarcer. The cost of the sea-based leg of the strategic triad probably explains the huge 
discrepancy between the Navy’s budget figures cited by Kuroedov (12–14 per cent of 
the overall military budget) and the 25–30 per cent cited by Putin and Sergei Ivanov. The 
Bulva SLBM and Borey class SSBN seem finally to be close to production.
Resource allocation for the Navy is a difficult process because of the conflicting 
priorities when it comes to Russia’s four fleets and one flotilla. The geography makes 
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such decisions nearly a zero-sum game, since one Russian fleet cannot easily reinforce 
another in an emergency, and an emergency can easily arise, since three fleets (Northern, 
Black Sea and Pacific) and the Caspian flotilla operate in areas with a potential for border 
and other conflicts. The main competition for resources is likely to arise between the 
Northern and Black Sea fleets. The Russians have said much about the importance of the 
Arctic and of the Northern Fleet. The Arctic is the home of the majority of Russian SS-
BNs. The Northern Fleet is the least geographically constrained of all the Russian fleets, 
enjoying relatively easy access to the Atlantic Ocean. The economic potential of the Arc-
tic is deemed to be very considerable: the ice-melting may lead to new possibilities for oil 
and gas extraction, as well as opening for regular navigation from Europe to the Far East 
along the northern edge of Russia. The Northern Sea Route (as the Russians call it) could 
favourably change Russia’s strategic situation by improving the tenuous transportation 
link of European Russia with the Far East, as well as strengthening Russia’s position as 
the transportation link between Europe, Asia and North America. 
There is potential for conflict over Russia’s claims regarding the seabed in the Arctic. 
However, in 2010, Norway and Russia solved a long-lasting border dispute in the Bar-
ents Sea. Reading the comments made by the Russian naval experts, one may conclude 
that the militarisation of the Arctic is inevitable (Yakovlev 2008, 28–37; Smolovskiy 
2008, 18–21). This is hardly surprising given the self-interest of the Navy, the antago-
nistic views of the West that have become politically correct since the late 1990s, and 
the fact that the Arctic is a hiding place of the Russian strategic deterrent, the SSBNs 
based in the Kola peninsula (see Atland 2007, 521). At the same time, as Katarzyna 
Zysk observes, the Russian policy in the Arctic so far has been quite pragmatic (Zysk 
2009, 106). While the Russians created enormous publicity around the stunt of putting 
the Russian flag on the bottom of the Arctic Ocean, they have not followed through on 
their rhetoric by unilaterally claiming a large sector of the Arctic. Russia is strategically 
isolated in the Arctic region and NATO naval forces have easy access there. While the 
Russians have shown a willingness to demonstrate that their Navy is ‘back’, avoiding 
direct confrontations with NATO has, so far, been as much the heritage of the Soviet era 
as the dream of a blue water navy. 
One of the highest priorities of Russia’s foreign policy under Putin has been creat-
ing an exclusive sphere of influence in the post-Soviet states (YZ 2009). The Black Sea 
region has seen the sharpest conflict resulting from Moscow’s attempts to implement 
this policy priority. The prime example was the Russo-Georgian war of 2008, in which 
the Black Sea fleet saw action. The tensions between Russia and Georgia have been 
intertwined with the tensions between Russia and Ukraine (Russia has been incensed 
by Ukraine’s support to Georgia), and with the fate of the Black Sea fleet that may lose 
its base in Sevastopol after 2017. However, Russia has now extended its lease of the 
Ukrainian naval base at Sevastopol until 2035. The Russians would like to keep NATO 
naval forces out of the Black Sea. Admiral Vysotskiy stated that ‘the non-Black Sea na-
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tions have no business in the Black Sea’. He emphasised naval cooperation with Turkey 
(which controls access to the Black Sea) and which goes hand in hand with the Kremlin’s 
wooing of Ankara by various energy projects (RIA Novosti 2009a). Unlike in the Arctic, 
the Russians have more grounds for the hope of keeping the NATO navies (primarily the 
US Navy) out, thanks, in part, to various provisions of the Montreux Convention. 
Russia’s decision in August 2008 to recognise Abkhazia and South Ossetia guaran-
teed continuing tension in the Black Sea area for years, if not for decades. The temptation 
to use force in the Black Sea is much greater than in the Arctic, since during the Russo-
Georgian war NATO’s conduct demonstrated that it would not defend countries that are 
not its members, and also because NATO naval deployments to the Black Sea are lim-
ited, with the Montreux Convention preventing aircraft carriers of the Western nations 
from entering the Black Sea. Recent interceptions of Abkhazia-bound ships by Georgia, 
and Abkhazian threats to destroy the Georgian ships taking part in such operations, raise 
the spectre of a naval conflict involving Russia. The possibility of a conflict with Ukraine 
over the fate of Sevastopol and the Crimea cannot be completely discounted. In view of 
this, it is logical that the Kremlin has recently stressed the importance of building up the 
military infrastructure and buying new ships for the Black Sea fleet (VN 2009b). The 
neighbouring Caspian Sea is important for Russia’s energy interests and for its influence 
both in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Thus, the southern flank may very well siphon off 
resources from the Northern Fleet.
An important recent development indicates the growing interests in littoral opera-
tions to support Russia’s goals vis-à-vis other post-Soviet nations. While attending a 
EURONAVAL 2008 exhibition in Paris in October 2008, Admiral Vysotsky expressed 
open interest in purchasing a Mistral class force projection and command ship, built by 
the French THALES Corp (RG 2008). Secret negotiations with the French company 
began about the same time (RG 2009). On 24 June 2009, Admiral Vysotsky said that 
Russia might start buying ships abroad (RIA Novosti 2009b, c). Soon the media began 
to cite rumours of Russia negotiating a purchase of an aircraft carrier with a French com-
pany (RIA Novosti 2009c). In late August 2008, the Chief of the General Staff General 
Makarov confirmed that Russia had indeed entered into negotiations with the French 
company to buy a Mistral class ship, and hoped to have a contract by the end of 2009 
(Vedomosti 2009). There is now a contract for four French Mistral class amphibious as-
sault ships.
The Mistral class is ‘all-electric ships with an overall length of 199 meters and a 
displacement of 21,300 tons’.
 
The … concept combines a landing helicopter dock, a floating hospital, an 
amphibious assault ship, troop transport and a command vessel in a single 
platform. … They have a crew of 160, plus 450 troops, endurance of 45 days, 
and a maximum range of 11,000 nm at 15 knots.… It can carry up to 16 heavy 
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helicopters and one-third of a mechanized regiment, plus two … hovercraft or 
four … landing craft. A high-performance communications suite makes the 
Mistral ideal as a command vessel. The 750 sq.m. hospital features two operating 
theatres and offers 69 beds. If additional hospital/medevac space is required, the 
hangar can be converted into a modular field hospital. (GlobalSecurity.org, nd) 
Thus, a Mistral-class ship is a potent asset for operations in the post-Soviet space, ena-
bling Russia to carry out amphibious landings and serving as an instrument of psycho-
logical pressure: this ship is large, and with its ability to project power on land, any small 
country would feel threatened if such a Russian ship carrying naval infantry, tanks and 
helicopters appeared in its vicinity during a crisis in relations with Russia. Moreover, it 
could do something the Russian politicians craved in vain during the Kosovo war: send 
a visible signal of Russia’s strong displeasure with NATO while reminding it of its ability 
and willingness to help its friends. 
The biggest question concerning the future of the Russian Navy is the condition of 
the Russian shipbuilding and manufacturing industry in general. According to a Russian 
expert, the Navy has received only four new ships since the year 2000. It can count on 
buying, in the foreseeable future, one nuclear attack submarine (the Severodvinsk, a Yasen 
class, project 855); three diesel submarines (the Lada class, project 677); and three cor-
vettes (the Steregushchiy class, project 20380). (This forecast excludes SSBNs.) It has 
taken nearly ten years to get the St Petersburg, the first of the Lada class submarines, to 
the stage of testing. It took seven years to get the first ship of the Steregushchiy class into 
service (NVO 2009b; arms-expo.ru 2009; submarine.id.ru 2009). Such a slow rate, not 
least in a time of increasing defence budgets, suggests serious problems in the shipbuild-
ing industry. Judging from the plans to import the Mistral class ship, the Russian naval 
command has apparently become quite sceptical about the ability of the Russian defence 
industry to provide them with all the ships they need.
The condition of the Russian shipbuilding industry, both civilian and naval, leaves 
much to be desired, but is outside the scope of this paper. Still, some facts need to be 
mentioned. The Maritime Council concluded recently that ‘the shipbuilding industry 
currently cannot effectively fulfil all the strategic tasks set by the government’ (morskaya-
kollegiya.ru 2009b). Russian shipbuilding exists mostly thanks to Navy orders – more 
than 70 per cent of its contracts are with the Ministry of Defence (Rumantsev 2009). 
This has not made the industry as a whole competitive: indeed, the habit of working 
for the Navy has made the industry unable to control costs (government.ru 2009). The 
formation of the USC so far has not changed the situation for naval shipbuilding. One 
of the few good, recent results of the Russian shipbuilding industry, the diesel-electric 
icebreaker St Petersburg, was built at the St Petersburg Baltiysky Zavod shipyard by the 
United Industrial Corporation, and not by the USC (foxbusiness.com 2009).
Without attempting a detailed discussion of the subject, I would like to note that the 
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Russian defence industry as a whole is stuck in transition from the command economy 
to the market economy. Until this transition is complete, the defence industry will not be 
a reliable provider of new weapons for the Russian military. The Russian manufacturing 
industry in general, including the defence industry, suffers from many problems. Accord-
ing to Sergei Chemezov, the general director of the state corporation Rostekhnologii, 
about 70 per cent of the main equipment of the Russian machine building (including 
shipbuilding) industry is 20 years old or even older. Only 5 per cent of the machine tools 
are five years old or younger. ‘The defence industry suffers badly because Russia has 
fallen behind in computer technology’, observed Chemezov (NVO 2007c). The current 
economic crisis has hit the defence industry hard: in January 2009 about one-third of 
defence industry companies were in danger of bankruptcy (gazeta.ru 2009). After years 
of talk about building unmanned aerial vehicles, Russia had to begin importing them 
from Israel. Now it is about to import Mistral class ships from France, thus spelling an 
end to Russia’s dream of being an autarkic, totally self-sufficient military power. The 
Russian defence industry is not dead by any means, but Russia is no longer an autar-
kic defence industrial power. Its ability to arm itself will depend on cooperation with 
other nations and imports. This would obviously have a major impact on such complex 
weapon systems as modern surface and subsurface navy ships, and on Russia’s ability 
to conduct a foreign policy independent of the influence of the major industrial powers.
ConClusIon
The ultimate challenge of understanding the Russian Navy lies not in the capabilities of 
the Russian shipyards or in plans drawn up by the Main Naval Staff and redrawn by the 
General Staff. Measuring strength and weakness in conventional terms is a less reliable 
forecasting instrument than in the recent past. The rapidly and unpredictable changing 
international scene can provide unexpected leverage to the weaker actors and paralyse 
the stronger ones. While the Russian Navy is not likely to project its power in a mean-
ingful way over the world’s oceans in the foreseeable future, it will be able to serve as an 
instrument for gaining influence vis-à-vis Russia’s smaller and weaker neighbours and for 
defending the maritime approaches to Russia proper. Therefore we cannot rule out the 
possibility of further naval or combined operations employing the Navy as one arm of the 
operating forces on Russia’s peripheries. Many of Russia’s smaller neighbours depend 
to a considerable degree on the ability of the United States and other NATO members 
to project power around the periphery of Eurasia to ensure their stability and security.
On the other hand, continuing high energy prices, increased naval budgets and 
global warming would seem to strengthen Russia’s geostrategic position as a link-nation 
between Asia, Europe and North America. It does not solve its problem with the geo-
graphical location of its different fleets, but may enable Russia to deploy naval units more 
rapidly from European Russia to the Far East. The Far East is of great importance for 
Russia with its rich fisheries, energy reserves and transportation links to the huge Asian 
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markets. This fact, combined with the increased importance of Asia in world politics and 
the unsolved territorial dispute with Japan over the Kurile Islands, makes it probable that 
the Russian Navy will pay greater attention to the Far East and that at least one of the 
new Mistral class amphibious assault ships will have the Far East as its home base.
notes
1 This is a revised version of the paper delivered at the 2009 Seapower Symposium and subsequently published in 
Blank and Weitz (2010).
2 For details on the situation in the manufacturing sector, see the interview with the director of Rostekhnologii state-
owned corporation Sergei Chemezov, see NVO (2007c).

Maritime developments in 
Asia: implications for Norway
Øystein Tunsjø1
The shift of the economic centre of gravity towards Asia, the rise of China and India and 
the primary focus of US security on developments in Asia are testament to the emer-
gence of an Asia-centred world. Changes in the distribution of capabilities within the 
international system are fuelling a transition towards a bipolar system concentrated on 
US–China relations. The possible effect of these geopolitical changes on the transatlantic 
relationship, NATO and Norwegian defence and security policy2 will be examined.
The wider transformation process taking place in Asia has broader implications, also 
for a geographically remote country like Norway. This will probably be the case regard-
less of whether the rising powers in Asia succeed in their economic, political and military 
ambitions and whether great power cooperation can be promoted and conflicts of inter-
est managed. A number of direct and indirect consequences for Norway as a coastal 
state with strong maritime interests, not least sovereignty disputes at sea and growing 
concerns about safeguarding SLOCs will be considered.
norway In an asIa-Centred world
Economic, political and military power is becoming increasingly concentrated in Asia. 
The US, Norway’s closest and most important ally, is redeploying military forces from 
Europe to East Asia. In light of the growing US debt burden, it is worth pondering 
whether it has the means to maintain a global military presence. The lack of money and 
resources will force the US to examine its commitments and priorities. The Asia-Pacific 
Region and the Middle East are likely to figure among the top priorities (DoD 2012). 
US defence budgets allocate funding for US carrier and submarine presence in East 
Asian waters and improving the forward presence of American air power in the region 
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(Pentagon 2011; O’Rourke 2011; Ross 2004, 267–304, 280–280). Over the last 
two decades, several US defence posture reviews have mandated Pacific base increases 
and European drawdowns. and US bases in Asia have been expanded and modernised 
(DoD 2006, 2010a, 2012).3 In 2007, for the first time in 60 years, more ships were 
based in the Pacific than in the Atlantic. Two-thirds of the US Navy used to be located on 
the East coast and deployed in the Atlantic, but about two-thirds are now located on the 
West coast and operate in the Pacific. Newly commissioned ships are largely deployed 
to Asian waters.4
One important development in this re-alignment is the US response to more as-
sertive Chinese behaviour (Ross 2012). Pursuing a ‘push back’ strategy, the US is con-
solidating alliances in Asia, engaging in closer military cooperation with countries in 
Southeast Asia and conducting a more active and provocative diplomacy on sensitive 
questions related to Taiwan, Tibet and the South China Sea (Christensen 2011). In July 
2010, three nuclear powered cruise missiles submarines appeared simultaneously at 
Pusan, South Korea (USS Michigan), Subic Bay in the Philippines (USS Ohio) and at the 
strategic Indian Ocean outpost of Diego Garcia (USS Florida) in a show of force not seen 
since the Cold War (GT 2010).
While very few people remember the last time an American carrier battle group vis-
ited or held exercises in the North Atlantic, three US carrier battle groups were deployed 
to East Asia following the North Korean shelling of a South Korean island in November 
2010. The point here is not to sound alarmist, but to illustrate shifting US priorities 
and other developments that will shape Norwegian defence and security policy (Tunsjø 
2011b). 
Geopolitical changes and the fact that China is the only great power demonstrably 
capable of challenging US power preponderance mean that US military presence in Asia 
will be a priority of US strategists. Nevertheless, by continuing to emphasise sea power 
the US retains the flexibility to direct naval power to Norwegian waters and provide as-
sistance to Norway in a wartime contingency. US allies – Norway in particular – have 
shown an ability to adapt to new circumstances by facilitating, upgrading and sharing 
much of the costs of accommodating flexible US response units. Norway maintains pre-
positioned war reserve equipment for US expeditionary Marine Corps, and Norway can 
be of strategic value if the US looks to expanding its forward military presence in the 
Arctic in the future. The US will maintain its position as the leading global power for the 
foreseeable future and will most likely continue to help preserve a benign security en-
vironment in Europe while offsetting any great power aggression or regional hegemonic 
ambitions in Europe. 
It would be premature to conclude that Europe is history. The US has always been 
both an Atlantic and a Pacific power and is still committed to NATO and Europe through 
institutional ties, shared history, democratic values and cultural factors. Peace and stabil-
ity in Europe, largely promoted by NATO and the EU along with US presence in Europe, 
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are essential to the US objective of preventing a two-front situation while it focuses on 
the rise of China (Tunsjø 2011a).
While it is also important to remember that tension and disagreement in trans-
atlantic relations are nothing new, the crucial difference, which comes in addition to 
the disappearance of the Soviet Union and lack of a new common threat as a rationale 
for NATO’s collective defence, is China’s rise as a peer competitor. Creating a balance 
against China is not a priority in Europe, but then China does not represent the same 
threat to European powers as it does to the US. 
In addition to geopolitical changes and the coming of a bipolar system concentrated 
on US–China relations, US domestic factors reinforce a shift in US diplomatic and politi-
cal priorities. Ethnic, generational, demographic and educational factors could weaken 
transatlantic ties. Many US decision-makers are no longer predominantly concerned 
with Europe. As Richard Haass, president of the Council of Foreign Relations, forcefully 
argues, 
intimate ties across the Atlantic were forged at a time when American political and 
economic power was largely in the hands of Northeastern elites, many of whom 
traced their ancestry to Europe and who were most interested in developments 
there. Today’s United States – featuring the rise of the South and the West, 
along with an increasing percentage of Americans who trace their roots to Africa, 
Latin America or Asia – could hardly be more different. American and European 
preferences will increasingly diverge as a result. (WP 2011) 
The proportion of US citizens of European origin is in relative decline in the US; Asian 
and other minorities represent a growing fraction of students at US universities and col-
leges and more than 100,000 exchange students in the US are from China and India. 
Europeans have not invested very much on developing expertise in Chinese military and 
security affairs and are less relevant as partners on issues to do with security in Asia. 
Given its preoccupation with China’s rise and an Asia-centred world, the US will 
seek to consolidate ties with Asian allies and partners. The first foreign leader to be 
welcomed to the White House by the newly installed President Obama was the prime 
minister of Japan. For the first time in nearly 50 years, the first foreign trip by an Ameri-
can secretary of state in a new administration was to Asia, starting in Japan. In 2009, 
Obama shelved his plans to attend celebrations marking the twentieth anniversary of the 
fall of the Berlin Wall on 9 November. He travelled instead to Tokyo where he stated 
on 14 November 2009, ‘there must be no doubt: as America’s first Pacific president, 
I promise you that this Pacific nation will strengthen and sustain our leadership in this 
vitally important part of the world’ (FT 2009). With President Obama adopting an ‘Asia 
first’ approach, there is little wonder that he has been characterised as the first ‘post-
Atlanticist President’ (New York Times 2010). 
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Accordingly, a ‘new division of labour’ and allocation of tasks, responsibilities and 
duties within NATO could be one way of preserving strong ties across the Atlantic in the 
face of new challenges to transatlantic relations from diverging threat perceptions and 
an Asia-centred world (Tunsjø 2011c; Deudney et al. 2011). Norway’s participation 
in Operation Unified Protector in Libya is an important example of this new division of 
labour in a more Asia-centred world. 
Norway’s participation in the Libya mission demonstrated how a small country and 
close ally of the US can complement US strategic and political objectives, while simul-
taneously pursuing its own interests and preserving NATO’s relevance in the new global 
environment. Norway’s participation in out-of-area operations and the new division of 
labour can ensure that bilateral ties with the US remain strong. This new division of 
labour offers Europe an opportunity to avoid traditionally destructive ‘high politics’ and 
conflicts in Asia, while simultaneously promote its neighbourhood policy, take more re-
sponsibility for Europe’s defence and stability and consolidate and revitalize the EU. 
NATO’s emphasis on partnership could also help fashion this new division of la-
bour.5 For example, SLOC protection operations by NATO and Norway’s involvement in 
counter-piracy missions in the Gulf of Aden provide opportunities for Norway to promote 
and contribute to a global partnership, which again could complement US strategy in an 
Asia-centred world, enhance the relevance of NATO and be conducive to Norwegian 
defence and security interests. Nonetheless, it remains to be seen whether NATO will be 
able to develop a comprehensive and effective partnership with Asian powers.
The financial predicament in which many European states find themselves, one that 
threatens to undermine the entire EU, needs to be resolved before European powers can 
take steps to shape great power politics, and promote their interests and the new divi-
sion of labour that complements US strategies and priorities in an Asia-centred world. 
Indeed, there is little evidence today of any willingness or ability among NATO and EU 
members to spend more on defence and contribute more to out-of-area operations in 
ways that would relieve the US from the burden of tackling non-traditional security chal-
lenges. Even Norway, which is in a much better economic position than most of the other 
European states, could only afford to maintain its 2009 deployment of a frigate to the 
Gulf of Aden for six months.
norway and marItIme develoPments In asIa
Sovereignty disputes at sea
There are numerous disputes over sovereignty of Asian waters and territory. According 
to Statoil’s office in Beijing, Norwegian petroleum and offshore companies are well po-
sitioned to compete for exploration contracts whenever delineation issues are resolved 
in the South China Sea.6 If the parties to the code of conduct originally drafted in 2002 
after a series of incidents in the South China Sea agreed to abide by it and addressed 
outstanding legal issues preventing or complicating commercial activity in the contested 
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areas, foreign oil and gas companies would have an opportunity to explore and develop 
offshore energy reserves in the region.7 
The multiple disputes in the South China Sea have unleashed strong statements and 
displays of naval strength with implications for Norwegian interests. In the middle of the 
escalating conflict in the summer of 2011, the Norwegian seismic survey ship Viking 2, 
chartered by the state oil and gas company Petro Vietnam, was deliberately rammed by 
a Chinese fishing boat, according to the Vietnamese foreign ministry.8 The ship, manned 
by six Norwegians, was conducting a seismic survey inside Vietnam’s 200 nm EEZ 
(Straits Times 2011). Speaking later to a Norwegian newspaper, the captain downplayed 
the dramatic headlines. The ship had been operating in international waters, outside 
Vietnam’s EEZ, when the incident occurred. These things happen, he said, and was 
determined to get out to sea again after a few days in dock for repairs (Aftenposten 2011). 
His version was disputed by the Vietnamese government, however, which insisted the 
incident had indeed taken place inside its EEZ, further fuelling tensions between Viet-
nam and China. 
Responding to the incident and China’s display of its naval strength in the South 
China Sea, Vietnam conducted a live-fire exercise off its coastal waters. Following the 
PLA’s military exercises off Hainan, which included beach landing drills to retake a seized 
island, the Philippines government decided to send its flagship BRP Raja Humabon to 
the Scarborough Shoal (South China Morning Post 2011). Maritime conflicts continued 
in 2012, especially in the Scarborough Shoal and the East China Sea. While neither the 
Norwegian seismic survey ship nor its crew were injured or arrested, the incident off the 
Vietnamese coast demonstrates how Norway and in particular its maritime and offshore 
commercial interests are directly affected by maritime disputes in Asia. 
The Asia-Pacific is the region with the fastest growing defence budgets, averaging 
8.9 per cent p.a. (SIPRI 2010). China has had double digit growth in defence spending 
for about two decades; its military and naval build up and ambitions for sea power are 
fuelling tensions among its neighbours and causing geopolitical friction worldwide. Mili-
tary budgets in Vietnam, South Korea and the Philippines rose sharply recently (Diplomat 
2011; Defence Talk 2010; Jane’s Defence Weekly 2010); India’s defence budgets are in-
creasing; Japan changed its defence posture to highlight China’s military modernisation 
as a rising threat (kantei.go.jp 2010a; b); and the Australian government has put forward 
a more alarmist regional defence review (DoDA 2009, 16, 28–29; Australian 2011). 
The US has a strong forward military presence in the region. 
All this suggests continuing tensions, a new arms race and and a mounting potential 
for conflict, all of which can have implications for Norwegian foreign policy and maritime 
interests. Looking back 60 odd years, two of the major implications of the 1950–53 
Korean War were the cementing of transatlantic relations and “adding the O” to NATO. 
If a conflict were to erupt in Korea, the Taiwan Strait or the South China Sea today, would 
it reinforce and revitalise transatlantic relations? Different European and US threat per-
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ceptions and strategies for dealing with China’s rise suggest that another conflict in East 
Asia would probably constrain and weaken transatlantic ties instead. 
Norwegian interests, and especially maritime commercial interests, are not only af-
fected directly by increased tension and conflict in Asian waters or the management of 
legal claims at sea, but sovereignty and territorial disputes can have indirect implications. 
The degree to which coastal states will continue to respect the full navigational freedoms 
associated with the high sea within their EEZs is not entirely clear. Around 25 states out 
of the 157 member states of UNCLOS have already enacted limitations within their EEZ 
that interfere with the navigational rights and freedoms of other states, and this group 
is growing (Rothwell and Stephens 2010, 155). As Chinese legal experts contend, the 
traditional freedoms of the sea have been greatly reduced and coastal state jurisdiction 
enhanced by extending the contiguous zone from 12 to 24 nautical miles; by expanding 
territorial waters from three to 12 nautical miles; by clarifying and extending the conti-
nental shelf seaward; and by the emergence of the concept of the EEZ (Jilu and Haiwen 
2012). 
It is ‘no longer possible’, Wu and Zhang therefore maintain, ‘to insist that the prin-
ciple of freedom of the seas remains the same as it had for more than a hundred years.’ 
The drafters of UNCLOS consciously avoided negotiating the rules applicable to military 
activity carried out in the EEZ. Nonetheless, Wu and Zhang argue, the new legal regime 
challenges the view of military activities as falling under the ‘freedom of the seas’ (Wu 
and Zhang 2012).9 It is important to note that China’s stand on this issue reflects a 
degree of contradiction, since China undertakes incursion and surveillance in areas of 
Japan’s EEZ that are not disputed by China (Cole 2010, 41; Valencia 2011).
While China’s claims about territorial waters and extended jurisdiction are sup-
ported only by a minority of UNCLOS member states, other legal experts claim that if 
China were to gain support for its view and freedoms to undertake military activities in 
foreign EEZ were limited, global economic development could suffer and the safety of the 
world’s merchant fleet put at risk. As Dutton has argued, the attempt to create a regional 
exception must be that law applies everywhere, or not at all. Close to 40 per cent of the 
world’s oceans are covered by EEZs. Accordingly, ‘just as the lack of effective governance 
on land results in the disruptive spill-over effects of failed states on their neighbors, so 
too at sea would a removal of international authority to provide order result in maritime 
zones of instability’ (Dutton 2012). Such conditions would neither serve Norway’s se-
curity interests nor the commercial interests of the Norwegian merchant fleet, one of the 
largest in the world, which relies on safe sea routes for the continued operation of its 
business around the world. 
At the same time, rising naval powers have in the past changed their position on 
the issue of freedom of navigation for military purposes as they grew more dependent on 
the global connections provided by the seas and more capable in protecting their global 
interests at sea. When conflict broke out in Libya in 2011, China decided to send the 
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missile frigate Xuzhou, on counter-piracy missions in the Arabian Sea and the Gulf of 
Aden, through the Suez Canal. It arrived off the Libyan coast on 2 March in one of the 
PLA’s first deployments to the Mediterranean to assist, facilitate and provide security for 
the evacuation of more than 35,000 Chinese workers based in Libya by commercial fer-
ries and ships (Xinhua 2011e; China SignPost 2011). While this operation is not directly 
comparable to US military exercises or intelligence gathering in China’s EEZ, it shows 
how China’s more global interests need to be protected by military means and freedom 
of navigation for military purposes inside a country’s EEZ and territorial waters. Such 
actions would signal a watering down of China’s stand on national sovereignty.
Another indirect implication for Norway of maritime sovereignty disputes in Asia is 
that the law of the sea and its conventions, on which Norwegian interests depend, are 
not static or given, but changing and evolving. Norway does not take issue regarding 
sovereignty disputes in Asia, such as those in the South China Sea. Legal experts at the 
Norwegian MFA refuse to comment on the disputes and advise the Government to act 
accordingly.10 For example, no official response emanated from the Norwegian Govern-
ment or MFA to the June 2011 Viking 2 incident.
Nonetheless, there remain some unresolved maritime disputes in the Arctic where 
Norway also has strong commercial and security interests (Jensen 2009, 406–424; 
Hobér 2012). Nor have questions relating to the regulation of access to many of the 
waterways in the Arctic, such as the Northwest Passage and the Northeast Passage or 
the right to extract resources from the seabed in parts of the Arctic, been settled. It is not 
clear whether freedom of navigation in the Arctic will be upheld within EEZs, and there 
is already a tendency towards creeping jurisdiction in which coastal states are claiming 
stronger control. As pointed out, a Chinese or an Asian exception to accepted rules of 
international law could undermine laws guaranteeing freedom of navigation everywhere.
China could end up supporting coastal states in the Arctic that impose restrictions 
within their EEZs, for example, through the practice of staying silent and accepting rules, 
regulations and regimes enforced in waters and sea lanes defined by Russia, for ex-
ample, as internal waters (Weltan 2011).11 China’s own sovereignty and jurisdictional 
claims in the South China Sea are likely to remain China’s primary considerations. China 
faces a traditional challenge, shared by other coastal states and maritime nations such 
as N orway, of balancing expanding jurisdictional waters and developing the natural re-
sources in those waters, on the one hand and the desire of major maritime powers to 
uphold the principle of the freedom of the seas everywhere, on the other. Both China and 
Norway, although for various reasons,12 have ended up in practical terms in support of 
Russia’s claims to territorial waters, contrary in part to their own maritime interests and 
to the preservation of the principle of the freedom of navigation at sea.
Finally, in a long-term perspective, the new SLOCs which are opening up in the Arc-
tic will allow Norway to benefit from a more Asia-centred world and maritime develop-
ments in Asia. As Europe and Asia literarily melt together in the future, this could have 
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commercial, environmental, strategic and military implications for Norway, although the 
long-term consequences remain uncertain.
Safeguarding SLOCs
Piracy, hijacking and robbery constitute a larger risk to shipping, driving up insurance 
rates on vessels passing through shipping lanes known to piracy attacks and hijacking. 
Piracy costs the world economy an estimated USD 7–12 billion per year (MarineLog 
2011).13 Safeguarding SLOCs in Asia has recently become one of the operational tasks 
of the Norwegian Royal Navy. Norway deployed a frigate to the Gulf of Aden to combat 
piracy in 2009. It operated alongside several other navies from Asia. Norway will send a 
new frigate to the same area in 2013. 
There is not enough space to discuss here whether state-of-the-art surface ships 
should be used for constabulary tasks. Nonetheless, such out-of-area operations could 
complement the US strategic pivot to the Asia-Pacific Region, facilitate a division of 
labour in transatlantic relations, enhance the relevance of NATO and protect Norway’s 
commercial and security interests. They could also provide a platform from which to 
pursue and refine NATO’s partnership ambitions. It would demonstrate NATO’s flex-
ibility and capacity to deal with traditional and non-traditional security challenges in the 
twenty-first century, regionally and globally.
Piracy attacks in Southeast Asia have fallen off dramatically in the past few years, 
largely thanks to national, bilateral and multilateral measures (Ho 2009a; b).14 The lit-
toral states of Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand have all taken measures to 
address the issues of piracy and robbery. They include more naval and coast guard pa-
trols, better surveillance, coordinated patrols by littoral states, capacity building, training, 
technical assistance, more contact between command centres and the shipping com-
munity and a focus on improving people’s living standards and welfare in areas bordering 
the key sea lanes (Ho 2009b). 
A multilateral framework has been established under the Regional Cooperation 
Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP). 
Seventeen countries are contracting parties to ReCAAP and Norway was the first non-
regional country to join this multilateral effort. The important steps taken to deal with 
piracy activity in Southeast Asia show that it is possible to manage and limit the risk of 
piracy. Although Norway’s role has been limited compared to that of the littoral states, 
Norway has contributed to and enhanced cooperation in the fight against piracy in mari-
time Asia, conducive to Norwegian interests. 
Many writers have pointed to the differences between Somali and Southeast Asian 
piracy (Raymond 2012; Bateman and Ho 2008). The most important difference is the 
lawlessness on land in Somalia and the inability of the Somali government to respond, 
which encourages the pirates. Few Southeast Asian states are similarly affected, and 
there are very few places, if any, where pirates can take and hold a large vessel and its 
crew for ransom and prevent its recovery. 
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Arming merchant ships at sea
Efforts to curb piracy off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden were initially 
not successful. Several shipping companies and governments have therefore concluded 
that arming ships is necessary in order to fight piracy. However, under the Norwegian 
rules and regulations, guards on ships will be armed security personnel hired in from 
the private sector, not personnel from the Norwegian military. Of course, these security 
companies prefer to hire former military personnel, including ex-Special Forces officers. 
N evertheless, letting shipping companies hire armed private security guards is contrary 
to a widely held principle in Norway, say the critics, whereby only the police and the 
military are entitled to bear arms. Contemporary piracy in Asian waters has therefore 
changed the tradition of not arming commercial ships at sea. Governments have long 
been urged not to let shipping companies hire private armed guards and the laws of many 
nations have indeed prevented vessels from carrying weapons.15
Nonetheless, as of July 2011, Norwegian shipping companies could ask the gov-
ernment for permission to arm their ships. In their submissions they must present a risk 
assessment, details on the training, qualifications, recruitment of personnel, and explain 
how the ship is going to store and use the weapons on board (Dagsavisen 2011). Flag 
state jurisdiction and any laws and regulations imposed by the flag state concerning the 
use of military guards and private security companies will apply to shipping companies 
with armed vessels. However, most port authorities refuse weapon-bearing vessels entry, 
and getting every country to change their regulations would be difficult. And since com-
mercial vessels often stop in a dozen countries during a voyage, even one ‘uncooperative’ 
authority would make it hard for them to carry weapons. Coming up with a common 
international standard will therefore be difficult, because so many countries are involved 
(New York Times 2009).
The decision to arm ships could also lead to an arms race with the pirates and to 
more violent attacks, possibly risking the lives of ships’ crews. It would increase the risk 
of accidents to ship or cargo, such as a fire resulting of a shoot-out with pirates. Roughly 
1,000 Norwegian-owned ships sail through the Gulf of Aden each year, half of which fly 
the Norwegian flag and it is estimated that between 250 and 300 Norwegians are on 
board ships in the Indian Ocean every day. If confrontations with pirates escalate, Nor-
wegian ships and Norwegians on board them may face an even greater risk. 
Conversely, arming ships has so far proved successful and few ships with armed 
guards have been hijacked. In addition, the constabulary forces and escort missions have 
made substantial progress in 2011 and 2012 in curbing piracy attacks. Difficult legal 
issues and humanitarian considerations remain, however. The ships and the private se-
curity companies operating under both Norwegian and international law are obliged to 
assist wounded pirates and pirate vessels in distress in the event of a failed attack and 
shoot-out. Several pertinent questions need answers. If the pirates surrender and are 
captured alive, for instance, what are the obligations of the shipping companies, their 
ships and the private security companies to bring the pirates to justice, and how is this 
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going to happen in practice? Where will they be taken? Will the pirates be kept on the 
ship for weeks or months on end, before being handed over – and to whom? Weapons 
on ships could possibly be used in terrorist attacks. While Norwegian authorities may 
enforce strict and transparent rules and regulations, who will control the military guards 
or private security companies on ships from countries like Iran, Pakistan, North Korea 
and so forth?
Many countries might be tempted to use military guards and ex-military officers 
equipped with sophisticated military technology on the thousands of ships from various 
states plying the critical sea lanes around the world to gather intelligence or undertake 
covert operations.16 While the idea is to carry armed guards in seas known for piracy, 
such as the Gulf of Aden, Southeast Asia and off Nigeria, how and when will the military 
guards and private operators disembark from the ships? If ships operating in piracy-
prone waters in Asia carry military guards, Asian countries may want to do the same in 
the Mediterranean and even the Atlantic. Asian ships transit Norwegian ports daily and 
it might be worthwhile to think about the implications if these vessels carried armed 
military guards.
ConClusIon
What happens in Asia on the maritime front is of geopolitical, commercial, strategic, 
military and legal importance to Norway. The re-emergence of great powers in Asia and 
relocation of power from the West to the East mark the transition towards an Asia-
centred world. One of the most important of these geopolitical changes in contemporary 
international affairs is China’s and India’s respective drives to become major sea powers. 
Their quest for sea power strains their mutual relations, while making the US and Japan 
even more determined to preserve their supremacy at sea. How this unfolds will deter-
mine the peace, stability and prosperity of Asia, with consequences of great importance 
to Europe, transatlantic relations, NATO and Norway. 
As the US grows increasingly occupied with security issues in Asia, Norway and 
NATO may be forced to share more of the burden for defence, security and stability 
in Europe and in Europe’s neighbourhood (the Arctic, Eastern Europe, the Near East 
and North Africa), instead of seeking to play a role in the great power politics of Asia. If 
European states can respond effectively to new security challenges in their own neigh-
bourhood, it may be possible to preserve a benign European security environment, safe-
guard European interests, retain strong transatlantic ties and Europe’s relevance in an 
Asia-centred multipolar system and a new world order. However, it remains to be seen 
whether European powers are willing and capable to engineer this new division of labour 
in transatlantic ties.
Norwegian shipping and offshore interests are directly affected by maritime security 
in Asia. Territorial disputes in Asia could affect the Law of the Sea and its conventions 
and the development of a legal regime for the Arctic region. Different interpretations of 
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the law of the sea by the governments of, i.e. China, Russia and the US, will also affect 
Norway. Relations between great powers at sea are also affected. This was illustrated by 
the arming of merchant ships at sea, which had an immediate effect on Norway’s mari-
time interests and broader security considerations. 
Norwegian maritime interests will always be susceptible to the evolving situation in 
Asia, and Norway needs to join others to ensure order at sea. Reconciling governments or 
parties at odds with each other is one way of safeguarding Norwegian interests. That will 
require joint ventures and partnerships with traditional allies and Asian naval powers, to 
protect SLOCs and promote rules of engagement at sea. This could prevent great power 
rivalry from undermining stability and order at sea, facilitate a new division of labour 
in NATO and transatlantic relations, and ensure NATO’s continued relevance despite 
Washington’s preoccupation with Asian power politics and rivalry.
notes
1 The author is grateful to Robin Allers, Johannes Rø, Tom Kristiansen, Roald Gjelsten, Robert S. Ross, Kristine 
Offerdal, Rolf Tamnes and Bjørn Terjesen for valuable comments and suggestions on earlier drafts of this paper. 
The author would also like to thank many of the participants of the Sea Power Symposium at the Naval Academy 
in Bergen, 24 August 2011, who were both constructive and helpful in their feedback. The paper also benefitted 
from discussions with partners working on the project International Order at Sea, chaired by the Norwegian 
Institute for Defence Studies in partnership with Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), New Delhi; 
Center for Naval Analysis, Washington D.C.; China Foundation for International and Strategic Studies (CFISS); 
and China Institute for Maritime Affairs (CIMA). The author is solely responsible for the opinions expressed herein.
2 The Norwegian Government has issued a growing number of reports addressing geopolitical shifts and a more 
Asia-centred world. See MFAN (2009); MoDN (2008). For a debate on these reports see Dagsavisen (2007a; 
b); Dagbladet (2008a; b). Some researchers have examined ways in which the West and NATO could adjust to a 
more Asia-centred world while maintaining a robust alliance across the Atlantic. See Tunsjø (2008, 2011a; b; c), 
Deudney et al. (2011). 
3 The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review was criticised by the Quadrennial Defense Review Independent Panel. 
‘The absence of a clear force-planning construction in the 2010 QDR’, the panel wrote in its final report, 
‘represents a missed opportunity’. It called for an expansion of the force structure in the Asia-Pacific, depicting the 
rooting of the structure in a maritime strategy to be essential (QDR Independent Panel 2010, xii–xiii). According 
to the US Navy’s maritime strategy, October 2007, ‘[c]redible combat power will be continuously postured in the 
Western Pacific and Arabian Gulf/Indian Ocean’ (US Navy 2007). See also US National Defense Strategy (NDS), 
June 2008 and May 2010 (DoD 2008; 2010b). 
4 The US Navy had deployed 31 of 53 its nuclear attack submarines in the Pacific by the end of 2009. See Kan and 
Niksch (2010). 
5 On the importance of partnership see Edström et al. (2011); NATO (2010, 8–10).
6 Interview with Statoil representative, Beijing, August 2009. Statoil, in partnership with British Petroleum, was 
involved in a major petroleum project in Vietnam in the 1990s. It terminated in 2001–2002.
7 For the declaration text, see aseansec.org (2009).
8 Norway has had close contact with Petro Vietnam since the early 1970s through development aid programmes for 
Vietnam.
9 Restrictions are based on the lack of legal definition of the terms ‘military activities’, ‘the use of the seas for military 
purposes’ and ‘navigation’.
10 Two aspects are important in the opinion of the MFA. 1) The government should not take part in these 
international disputes simply out of consideration for Norway’s commercial interests. For example, an official 
protest in the aftermath of the Viking 2 incident could have hurt Norwegian businesses operating in China. 2) 
There is an underlying attitude, based on lessons learned during the Cold War and from working on the law of the 
sea, that Norway should keep a low profile on law of the sea issues that do not directly affect Norwegian interests. 
Instead, Norway should promote its interests and pursue its objectives through the appropriate institutions and 
diplomatic channels. 
11 Several Chinese energy and maritime law experts have expressed apprehension in discussions with the author in 
Beijing and Oslo about Russian behaviour in the Arctic and restrictions within its EEZ during.
12 With the signing of the maritime delimitation treaty regulating the border between Norway and Russia in the 
Barents Sea with Russia, Norway has settled its sovereignty disputes at sea in the Arctic. For the Joint Statement 
issued at the time, see regjeringen.no (2010). Oslo is reluctant to challenge Russia’s interpretation of its internal 
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waters and restrictions on freedom of navigation because of the importance of maintaining good relations with 
Russia on issues like the Spitsbergen Treaty, petroleum resources, fishing rights and the need to maintain a benign 
security environment in the High North.
13 The International Maritime Bureau set up a Piracy Reporting Centre in 2009 (see icc-ccs.org 2009). 
14 It has been pointed out by some experts that the 2004 tsunami that hit Indonesia and islands in the Indian Ocean 
in December 2004 probably eliminated several pirate groups, including their supply lines and infrastructure.
15 Historically, one of the reasons for this has been the fear that weapons on board ships could be used by mutineers. 
In recent times, it has been out of concern about liability and for the safety of sailors, although many captains 
probably continue to carry weapons on board their ships. 
16 Of course, intelligence agencies are not likely to have military guards on merchant ships as their preferred option 
for intelligence gathering. As one PLA expert pointed out in conversation with the author, the PLA and the CCP 
would be more concerned about control and command issues. Instead of focusing on potential benefits of using 
merchant ships to gather intelligence, the PLA and the CCP would probably be anxious over their inability to 
control of PLA military guards on merchant ships in the event of a crisis or shoot-out, which could backfire on 
China’s broader national interests. Nonetheless, if governments do let merchant vessels carry military guards, they 
will have more options and greater opportunity to make their presence felt in more distant waters, where their 
military forces do not normally operate.
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